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Political  Markets  and  Community  Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial  Models  of Local  Government
Legitimacyt
Frank  I.  Michelman*
Some  recent  studies  have  sought  to  "define  and  illuminate  the  basic
character  of the  legal  system"'  by  exposing  a  more-or-less  hidden  "implicit
economic  logic"2  in  the  system,  suggesting  that  "the  . . . system  itself-its
doctrines,  procedures,  and  institutions-has  been  strongly  influenced  by  a
concern  (more often implicit  than explicit) with promoting economic  efficien-
cy. "S The studies have  concentrated  on  legal  activity of a sort that seemingly
would be most resistant to unifying  rationalization  in strongly goal-orientated
terms-that  is,  to  common-law  adjudication  in  the  well-trodden  ways  of
private  law,  where  law  is  supposedly  made  incrementally  and  under  severe
formalistic  constraint  (if "made"  at all  and not just "found")  and openly  in-
strumentalist  reasoning  is  not  usually  professed  without  at  least  a  hint  of
apology  or recrimination.  They  have  made  rather  impressive  progress  in  an
effort  to  show  that  the  ostensibly  divergent  and disrelated  materials  of  the
common law  can be unified,  ordered, made mutually coherent,  by regarding
them  as the handiwork  of generations  of judges motivated by an  aim-veiled
tThis  article  is  a  significantly  revised  version  of  the  Harris  Lectures  delivered  in  April,
1977  at the Indiana University  School of Law of Bloomington. It has had the benefit of valuable
criticism  from several  colleagues and friends who kindly read earlier  drafts or portions,  including
Bruce  Ackerman,  Philip  Heymann,  Duncan  Kennedy,  Mitchell  Polinsky,  Richard  Posner,
members  of  the  Society  for  Ethical  and  Legal  Philosophy,  and  members  of  the  Law  and
Economics  Workshop  at the University of California  at Los Angeles.
*B.A.  1957  Yale;  LL.B  1960.  Professor  of Law,  Harvard.
'Posner,  The Economic Approach to Law,  53 Tex.  L.  Rev.  757,  764  (1975)  [hereinafter
cited  as  Posner  I].
2Id.  at  760.  See  also  R.  POSNER.  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  179  (2d  ed.  1977)
[hereinafter  cited  as  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS].
'Posner  I,  supra note  1,  at 763-64.INDIANA  LAW JOURNAL
and  inarticulate  but  nonetheless  conscious-of  making  the  law  efficient in  a
strictly economic  sense.4 Common law  doctrines and decisions  are thus viewed
as the  outward  manifestations  of an underlying  normative  order.
As a  student of public  law-local government  law particularly-I  am  led
to wonder whether  an identical  or parallel  regularity can be discovered  in the
characteristic  materials of that  field.  Of course,  the field of local  government
law  cannot  offer  for investigation  anything  quite  corresponding  to  the  com-
mon  law-the  unwritten,  judge-created  law-insofar  as  legal  theory  insists
that  all  claims  of  local-government  authority  must  be  traceable  to  specific,
formal  constitutional  or  statutory  sources. 5  Yet  a  great  deal  of the  law  to
which  courts  appeal  as  delineating  local-government  authority  is  actually  so
open,  so little  constrained  or determined  by constitutional  or statutory  texts,
so little  referable to  any discoverable  legislative intent-is rather so much and
so  obviously  a  product  of  doctrinal  formulations  evolved  by  judges  in  the
course  of  case-by-case  adjudication,  from  sources  and  inspirations  quite
beyond  written  texts  or  suppositious  historical  intentions-that  whole masses
can  fairly  be said  to  compose  a  floating  "general  law"  of local  government
hardly  less  open  to  spontaneous judicial  economizing,  or less  inviting to  the
rationalizing  ambitions  of  a  theorist,  than  is  the  corpus  of private-law  doc-
trine  .
6
This general  law encompasses  not only judicial elaborations  of vague con-
stitutional  phrases  but  also  judge-made  doctrines  of  implied  constitutional
limitations  and  so-called  "canons  of contruction"  for  statutory  material.  To
give just a  few illustrations:  The universally  recognized judicial doctrines  that
restrict  exercises  of  regulatory  authority  to  those  that  promote  "the  general
welfare,"  or demand  that  tax revenues  be expended  only  for  a  "public pur-
pose,"  may  be  thought  implicit  in  the  standard  constitutional  injunction
against  depriving  persons  of property  and liberty without due  process of law,
or in constitutional grants to legislatures  to exercise  the power to tax,  or they
may just be  direct judicial  implications  of constitutional  intent  claiming  no
4See,  e.g.,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  supra note  2,  pt.  II;  Posner, A  Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL  STUD.  29  (1972);  Posner,  Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L.  &
EcON.  201  (1971).  There are  other contributors  and contributions  of merit,  a good collection of
which  can  be gleaned  from  EcONOMIC  AANALYSIS,  supra note 2, passim. For Professor  Posner's
view that the efficiency-tending characteristic  he finds  in the common  law is,  at least in part,  a
result  of conscious judicial striving  towards  efficiency,  see  EcONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  supra note 2, at
181,  405; see also id. at 440-41.  For a contrasting view see Rubin,  Why is the Common Law Effi-
dent?, 6 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  57  (1977);  Priest,  The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi-
cient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL  STUD.  65  (1977).  For further discussion  see notes 221-227  infta & text ac-
companying.
'See,  e.g.,  J.  DILLON.  1  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE LAw  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  448-55
(5th ed.  1911)  [hereinafter  cited  as J.  DILLON].
6"[A]n  historical  view  shows due process  as an  example of the method of the common  law,
both  because  it  has  evolved  slowly  and  because  its  development  has  been  so  thoroughly  in  the
hands  of the  judiciary."  Miller,  The  Forest of Due Process Law:  The American Constitutional
Tradition, in NOMOS  XVIII:  DuE  PRocESs  at 4 (J. Pennock  & J. Chapman eds.  1977).
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specific  textual  base.7  Rarely  does anything  seem  to turn on which theory  is
used.  Again,  the  standard  constitutional  recitals  that  something  called  "the
legislative  power"  is  "vested in"  the  state legislature8  may be  a partial source
of the judicial doctrine  that limits  the extent  to which state  legislatures may
"delegate"  authority  to local  units  of government  or to  nonpublic  agencies. 9
The  due  process  clauses  may  also  be  a source  of such  doctrine. 1 0  Likewise,
state  statutes  conferring  specified  powers  or  functions  on  local  governments
may provide a  basis for judicial holdings that restrict the extent to which the
designated  local  governments  may,  in turn,  delegate  those  powers  or  func-
tions  to other public  or nonpublic  agencies  - as may,  again,  the due process
clauses. 12  But  little  seems  to  turn  on identifying  textual  bases  for delegation
doctrine.  There exists a general  body of law on delegation which  has a  life of
its  own not significantly  determined  by  constitutional verbiage,  which speaks
through  non-enacted  doctrinal  formulations  and  gives  rise  to  non-enacted
rules for  construing statutes,  such  as  the famous  "Dillon  Rule" of strict  con-
struction of legislative  grants  of governmental  power  to local  units.13
Inasmuch  as  these  "open"  areas  of public  law  pertain  to  disputes  about
the extent of governmental  powers or the procedures for exercising them, it is
natural  to think that  a judge formulating  doctrine  or deciding  cases in  these
areas  would  have  somewhere  in  mind  a  normative  model  of  government,
however indistinct, inarticulate,  or intuitive the model might be-  a normative
model  being  a  general  conception  of how  governmental  institutions  ideally
must  be  supposed  to  work  in  order  to  satisfy  the  conditions  of  a  theory  of
moral justification  for such institutions.  Governmental  institutions  tend to oc-
cupy morally problematic positions-generate a  continuing demand for moral
justification  because  our world  is  one  in  which  ultimate  ends  are  generally
taken to be those of individuals  and social arrangements,  accordingly,  tend to
7The two ideas-the ultra  vires idea that the constitutional grant of authority to levy taxes
does not encompass levies  whose  proceeds are directed to nonpublic purposes,  and the individual-
rights idea that there is  a constitutionally protected  personal or  individual right not  to have one's
property  appropriated for nonpublic purposes-are  commingled  in the classic  case of Loan Ass'n
v.  Topeka,  87  U.S.  (20  Wall.)  655  (1875).  See  also Lowell  v.  City  of Boston,  111  Mass.  454
(1873);  T.  COOLEY,  2  CONSTITrIONAL  LIMITATIONS  1026-40  (1927).  For the view that constitu-
tional  due process guaranties  incorporate  this  personal right,  see,  e.g.,  Fallbrook  Irrigation Dist.
v.  Bradley,  164  U.S.  112,  158  (1896);  Albritton v.  City  of Winona,  181  Miss.  75,  178  So.  799
(1938).
aE.g.,  TENN.  CoNsT.  art.  2,  §  3  (1956);  MASS.  CONST.  C.  1, §  1,  art. IV;  id. DECLARATION
OF  RIGHTS  art.  XXX.
'E.g.,  Opinion  of the Justices,  328  Mass.  674,  105  N.E.2d 565  (1952).
0E.g.,  Rice  v.  Foster,  4  Del.  (4 Harr.)  479  (1847)  (natural  rights)  (semble);  Eubank  v.
Richmond,  226  U.S.  137 (1921)  (due process).  See notes  63-103,  110-18,  130-42 infra  & text ac-
companying.
"E.g.,  Murray v. Egan,  28 Conn.  Supp.  204,  256 A.2d  844  (1969);  Dunellen Bd.  of Educ.
v.  Dunellen  Educ.  Ass'n 64  N.J.  17,  311  A.2d  737  (1973).
"2E.g.,  Marta  v.- Sullivan,  248  A.2d  608  (Del.  1968).
IsThe  anti-delegation  inspirations for the Rule are apparent in Judge Dillon's classic  discus-
sion.  See J. Dillon, supra note  5.
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be  judged  by  their  conduciveness  to  individual  welfare,  individual  self-
realization,  individual  freedom.
Parts  II  and III  of this  essay  will  try  to show  that  the  "public  purpose"
and  "delegation"  doctrines,  as judicially  fashioned  and  applied,  suggest  the
coexistence  in  the  judicial  mentality  of  two  different,  and  contradictory,
models of local-government  legitimacy (described  in  Part I)-an economic  or
"public  choice"  model  and a  non-economic  "public  interest"  or  "community
self-determination"  model.
1 4  Part  IV  will  compare  the  descriptive  power  of
these models in relation to a topic of current legal  concern,  local zoning.  Part
V will try briefly to suggest  what  an  irresolute  duality of models  might mean
for the  intellectual  situation  of local-government  law generally.  Finally,  Part
VI  will  trace  some  relationships  between  these  apparent  judicial conceptions
of local-government  legitimacy and  the theory  that common-law  adjudication
has historically been  shaped by judicial striving to make the  law economically
efficient.
I.  Two  MODELS  OF  LEGITIMACY
In the economic or public  choice model,  all substantive values or ends are
regarded  as  strictly  private  and  subjective.  The  legislature  is  conceived  as  a
market-like  arena  in  which  votes  instead  of money  are  the  medium  of ex-
change.  The  rule  of majority  rule  arises  strictly  in  the  guise  of a  technical
device  for  prudently  controlling  the  transaction  costs  of  individualistic  ex-
changes.15  Legislative  intercourse  is  not  public-spirited  but  self-interested.
Legislators  do not deliberate  towards  goals,  they  dicker  towards terms.  There
is  no  right  answer,  there  are  only  struck  bargains. 16  There  is  no  public  or
general  or  social  interest,  there  are  only  concatenations  of  particular  in-
terests  or  private preferences.  There is  no reason,  only  strategy;17  no persua-
sion,  only  temptation  and threat.  There  are  no  good  legislators,  only shrewd
ones;  no  statesmen,  only  messengers;' 8  no  entrusted  representatives,only
tethered  agents.' 9
" 4Compare  the  "two  irreconcilable  and  mutually  incomprehensible  paradigms  in  political
thought"  described  and  discussed  in  Salkever,  Freedom, Participation and Happiness, 5 POL.
THEORY  391  (1977).
In  speaking  of  a  "judicial  mentality"  I  mean  to suggest  the  existence  of a  characteristic
judicial  conciousness,  not a  collective  one.  Insofar  as judicial  habits  of thought  are  conditioned
by  more general  ideological  environments,  my  thesis is that  the  "second revolution  in American
political  thought"  described  by  Katz,  Thomas Jefferson and the  Right to Property in Revolu-
tionary America,  19 J.  LAW  &  ECON.  467,  486-87  (1976),  has never  fully displaced  the first.  See
id. at 481-83.
15See generally J.  BUCHANAN  &  G.  TULLOCK.  THE  CALCULUS  OF  CONSENT  (1962).
"See,  e.g.,  G.  STIGLER,  THE  CITIZEN AND  THE  STATE  114-41  (1975).
"
7See,  e.g,  W.  RIKER,  THE  THEORY OF  POLITICAL  COALITIONS  (1962).
"On  "messengers"  see  W.  BAGEHOT,  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUION  193  (2d  ed.  1872).
"Compare  the  views of Edmund Burke,  as  lucidly reviewed in H.  PiTKIN.  THE  CONCEPT  OF
REPRESENTATION  168-89,  esp.  at  176  (1967)  [hereinafter  cited  as  H.  Pitkin].
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The opposed,  public-interest  model depends at bottom  on a  belief in the
reality-or  at least  the  possibility-of public  or objective  values and ends  for
human  action.2 0  In this public-interest  model the legislature  is regarded  as  a
forum  for identifying or defining,  and acting towards those ends.  The process
is  one  of  mutual  search  through  joint  deliberation,  relying  on  the  use  of
reason supposed-t  have persuasive  force.  Majority  rule is  experienced  as the
natural  way of takg action  as  and for  a group l  -or  as  a device  for filter-
ing  the  reasonable  from  the  unreasonable,  the  persuasive  from  the  unper-
suasive,  the  right  from  the  wrong  and  the  good  from  the bad. 2 2  Moral  in-
sight,  sociological  understanding,  and  goodwill  are  all  legislative  virtues. 23
Representatives  are chosen  in  part for  their supposed  excellence  in such  vir-
tues.24  This model,  no  doubt,  is  as sentimental  as the public-choice  model  is
"Compare  the "idealist  position" described  and criticized  in K.  ARROW,  SOCIAL  CHOICE  AND
INDIVIDUAL  VALUES  81-86  (2d ed.  1963)  (discussing  views of Kant,  Rousseau, T.H.  Green,  Frank
Knight,  and  others)  [hereinafter  cited  as  Arrow].  See  also  A.  LEVINE,  THE  POLITIcs  OF
AUTONOMY:  A  KANTIAN  READING  OF  ROUSSEAUS  SOCIAL  COINTRAcr  56  (1976)  [hereinafter  cited as
Levine].
2
11d. at  61.
22See id. at 64-66;  Kuflik,  Majority Rule Procedure, in NoMos  XCIII:  DUE  PROCESS  296,
305-09  (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds.  1977)  [hereinafter  cited as Kuflik].  In the "idealist"  view,
"the case for democracy rests  on the  argument  that free  discussion and expression  of opinion  are
the  most  suitable  techniques  of  arriving  at  the  moral  imperative  implicitly  common  to  all.
Voting,  from this point of view,  is not a device whereby each  individual expresses  his personal in-
terests,  but rather where  each  individual  gives his  opinion  of the general  will.  This  model has
much in common with the statistical problem  of pooling the opinions of a group of experts  to  ar-
rive  at  a  best  judgment;  here  individuals  are  considered  experts  at  detecting  the  moral  im-
perative."  K.  Arrow,  supra note  20,  at 85.  J.  RAWLs.  A  THEORY  OF JUSTICE  354-59  (1971),  ap-
pears  to  combine  the  "pooling  of  views"  (idealist,  objectivist)  notion  with  a  version  of  the
"trading-off'  (economic,  subjectivist) notion in reaching  a justification of majority  rule.  He  calls
attention  to the  likelihood that pooling of views through discussion  will improve decisions  (regar-
ding what  is just and, secondarily,  expedient).  Id. at 357-59:
Yet  even  with the  best of  intentions,  .. . opinions  of justice  are bound to clash.  In
choosing a constitution,  then, and in adopting some form of majority rule,)the parties
accept  the risks of suffering the defects of one  another's knowledge and sense of justice
in order  to gain the advantages  of an  effective legislative  procedure.  There  is  no other
way to manage  a democratic  regime. Nevertheless,  when  they adopt the'majority prin-
ciple the parties  agree to put up with unjust  laws  only on  certain conditions.  Roughly
speaking,  in  the  long-run  the  burden  of  injustice  should  be  n1ore  or  less  evenly
distributed over different  groups  in society,  and the  hardships of uInjust  policies should
not weigh  too  heavily  in any particular  case.
Although  Rawls'  meaning  is  not  crystal  clear,  the  "certain  conditions"  limiting  the  parties'
tolerance for unjust laws seem to include (chiefly) the majority-rule  system itself which supposedly
will tend  to  moderate  concentration  of injustice  on  any particular  group.  It may  be,  however,
that the "certain  conditions" Rawls  has in mind are substantive constraints like bills of rights and
minimum  guaranties derived  from  the "two principles of justice."  But that reading seems the less
plausible  because those  constraints would  tend to  moderate  the distribution  of burdens or costs,
not  the distribution  of "injustice."  I
2
3See,  e.g.,  H.  Pitkin,  supra note 19,  at  169  (describing  Burke's  views).
2
4The precept of  apportionment  of  district representatives  b population-of "one  person,
one  vote"  within  the  framework  of  a  geographically  districted  representation  scheme  (e.g.,
Reynolds  v. Sims,  377  U.S.  533  (1963))-seems  easier to  reconcile v.ith the "public  interest" view
of  the purpose  of elections  (choosing  the  best-qualified  officials) t  an with  the "public  choice"
view (making  particular interests  influential in proportion  to  their  weights"  in the population).
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unlovely; but though public interest may in that sense be a less "realistic"  way
of looking  at  the world  than  public  choice,  I  doubt  that it  is  less  real  as  a
description  of our  actual  way  of  experiencing  and  interpreting  our  political
life;  nor  is it less real-and here is  a major thesis  of this essay-as  a descrip-
tion  of the  way judges  perceive  that life.
Coexistence  of the  two  opposed  models  of  legitimacy  may  be  connected
with  a  deep  controversy  in  our  philosophical  tradition  between  opposed  no-
tions  of human  freedom  and  value.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  a  tradition
deeply  entrenched  in  Western  thought-chiefly  associated  with  Kant25  and
Rousseau26  but apparently  tracing back at least to Aristotle27 - that conceives
individual  freedom in such  a way that its attainment  depends  on the possibili-
ty of values that are  communal  and objective-jointly  recognized  by members
of a  group  and  determinable  through  reasoned  interchange  among  them.  In
the conception  advanced by  Rousseau  and Kant,  freedom  is the state  of giv-
ing  the  law  to  oneself.2 8  This  conception  is,  to  put  it  a bit  crudely,  one  of
self-regulation  as  opposed  to self-indulgence.  It implies  that unfettered  trade
in  a  perfectly  free,  competitive  market  cannot  by itself  constitute  a  person's
See generally Auerbach,  The Reapportionment Cases: One  Person, One Vote-One  Vote,  One
Value,  1964 Sup.  CT.  REv.  1,  21-61. See also J.-J.  ROUSSEAU.  The Social Contract or Principles  of
Political  Right, in  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  AND  DISCOURSES  (Everyman's  ed.  1950), at 68 ("By  this
means  [election]  uprightness,  understanding,  experience,  and  all  other  claims  to  pre-eminence
and public esteem  become so  many  further guarantees  of wise government")  [hereinafter  cited as
J.J.  Rousseau]. 21See note 28 infra.
2
6 See id.
2
7Compare ARISTOTLE.  POLITICS (J.  Warrington tr.)  in  ARISTOTLrS POLITICS AND  THE  ATHE.
NIAN  CONSTITUTION 156 (Everyman's  ed 1959): "In  extreme democracies . . . everyone lives  as he
pleases, as Euripides says, 'for  any end  he happens to desire.' But this  is  an  altogether unsatisfac-
tory conception of liberty. It  is  quite wrong to imagine that life  subject to constitutional control
is  mere slavery; it  is  in  fact  salvation." See  E.  BARKER.  THE  POLITICAL THOUGHT  OF PLATO  AND
ARISTOTLE 355 (Dover  ed. 1959). Durkheim is  another notable contributor  to this associational
conception of freedom. See  E.  DURKHEIM. SUICIDE  169-70, 210-15, 248-49, 289-90, 356  (J.
Spaulding & G.  Simpson tr.,  1951); R.  WOLFF.  THE  POVERTY  OF  LIBERALISM 143-45 (1968).
28J.J.  ROUSSEAU.  supra note 24,  at 9  ("to  remove all  liberty from [man's] will  is  to remove all
morality from his acts");  id.  at  19 ("what  man acquires in  the civil  state, moral liberty  ...
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere  impulse of  appetite is  slavery, while obe-
dience to a  law which we prescribe to ourselves is  liberty"); id.  at 91: (the essence of the body
politic lies  in  the reconciliation of obedience and  liberty"); J.-J.  ROUSSEAU.  EMILE  243  (Everyman
ed.  1911): "I  am a  slave in  my  vices, a  free man  in  my  remorse"); I.  KANT,  GROUNDWORK  OFTHE
METAPHYSIC  OF MORALS  (Paton  tr.,  paper  ed.  1964),  at  108 ("If the  will seeks the law that is to
determine  it  anywhere  else  than  in  the  fitness  of its  maxims  for  its  own making  of universal
law-if therefore  in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the character of any of its objects-the
result  is  always heteronomy. In that case  the will does not give itself the law,  but the object does
so  by  virtue of its relation  to  the will");  Id.  at 114 ("Will  is  a kind  of causality belonging to  liv-
ing things  so far  as  they  are  rational.  Freedom ,would  then be the property  this causality  has of
being  able  to  work  independently  of determination by  alien  causes  .. . .What  else  then  can
freedom  of  the  will  be  but autonomy-that  is,  the  property  which  will  has  of  being  a  law  to
itself?")
For the  relevant  connections  between  Kant's  thought  and Rousseau's,  see  A.  Levine, supra
note 20; E.  CASSIRER.  ROUSSEAU,  KANT.  GOETHE  23,  31-32, 57 & passim (J.  Gutmann tr.  1945).
See  also E.  CASSIRER,  THE  QUESTION  OF JEAN  JACQUES  ROUSSEAU  63, 96-97, 107-15 (P.  Gay  tr.
1954) [hereinafter cited as Cassirer].
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freedom;  for  by  itself  free  trade  can  be  taken  as  a  reflection  of  perfect
enslavement  to  wants  or  appetites  that  are  not  chosen  but just  impinge  on
one  inexplicably  and  uncontrollably.  Freedom  in  the  Kantian  view  must
mean  choosing one's  ends  by an  activity  of reason.  To  think that something
called  reason  can liberate  from  the bondage  of appetite  is not  to think  that
such liberation is achieved  merely by subordinating the immediate urgings  of
impulsive desire to the calculated scheming of a  longer-range plan.  Reason in
such  a  long-range  planning  guise  would still be merely  technical,  would  still
function in the service of the reasoner in his ultimately unfree  aspect of a car-
rier of unchosen wants.  If reason can liberate from appetite,  it can do so only
insofar  as  the  reasoner  can  somehow  rise  above  the  question  of what  long-
range  plan will  best  satisfy  the  present  wants  of the  person  as he  is  in  the
world  as  it is,  to  deal rather with  a  question  about how one  is to become  or
remain the person  he wants to be,  in the world he needs  to live  in if he  is to
be that person.29 Reasoning in such a  constitutive mode seems to involve con-
straint of choice by  some  principle  or set of principles  other than  the princi-
ple of maximizing the satisfaction-even  the long-range  satisfaction-of  one's
present  wants.
There  may be grounds  for thinking 'that, for many  if not all individuals,
the  possibility  of  such  a  reasoned  choice  of  ends  will  depend  on  the  in-
dividual's  functioning-by participation  and commitment-  as a member of a
group  of  persons  engaged  in  making  choices  by  which  all  members  are
bound. s0  If  so,  then  it  is  the  case  not  only  that  freedom  for  individuals
22Compare  M.  HORKHEIMER.  ECLIPSE  OF  REASON  46  (paper  ed.  1974)  (Platonic  concept  of
Ideas represents  "the sphere of aloofness,  independence,  and in a certain sense even freedom,  an
objectivity that  [does]  not submit  to  'our' interests").  See  also Knight,  Ethics and the Economic
Interpretation, in  THE  ETHICS  OF  COMPErION AND  OTHER  ESSAYS  21,  22-23;  id.  at 26  (rather
than  "act  in order  to  live,"  men  "live  in order  to  act,  they  care  to  preserve  their  lives  in the
biological  sense in order to achieve the kind of life they consider worthwhile");  Knight,  The Ethic
of Competition, in id. 41,  at nn.41-42;  id. at 69 ("The sort of person one  is depends on  the sort
of philosophy  one chooses").
'OIt  seems  that special  conditions  are required in order  that self-submission  to  chosen ends
may liberate  from  one enslavement (to  random appetite) without simply substituting another (to
"chosen"  ends or principles);  and these special  conditions may  be most readily comprehensible  as
attributes  of collective  choice within  groups.
If the chosen principles are not to be themselves enslaving they must be open to  change.  But
if they  are  changeable  at will (so  as  not  to be  enslaving),  then how  are  they not just a kind  of
glorified  appetite,  themselves  not chosen but just randomly  and inexplicably given  to one? (Com-
pare  Knight, Ethics and the Economic Interpretation, supra note  29,  at  21,  questioning  whether
"life  is a matter of economics.")  What we seem  to need for freedom are  principles that are  open
to a special  kind of change-that  is,  change that  is itself constrained  by  the principles.  In other
words,  principles  that  govern  morally  free choice  must  be such  as  are capable  of  evolutionary
change-change  susceptible  of  reasoned  criticism  in  terms  of  the  very  principles  that  are
themselves  undergoing  transformation.  But  what  sort  of principles  might  there  by  that  could
satisfy  all these  conditions of constraint,  openness,  and continuity? There  must be,  at least,  a set
of abstract  principle to which members  of a group commit  themselves for the settlement  of ques-
tions  of  joint concern-something  like  what John  Rawls  calls  principles  "of justice."  (See,  J.
RAwLs,  A  THEORY  OF JUS-rcE  3-6  (1971).)  The  openness  of  the principles  would  reside  in their
abstractness,  allowing  a part  of their meaning always  to  be held in abeyance,  to be worked  out
through  the  various,  distinctive  understandings  of the several  individual  group members  as  ap-
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depends  upon  the  possibility  of objective  ends  or  values  to  which  one  can
commit oneself  on  principle;  but  also that  for  individuals  in  secular  society
such  ends  or  values  will  encompass  matters  of  interpersonal  relationship,
obligation,  and  respect  and,  for  the  freedom-seeking  socialized  individual,
political  process  will  be both  a  medium for  reasoning  towards the  ends  (and
acting towards  their attainment) and,  at the same time,  itself one of the ends.
And  so  the  Kantian  notion  of  freedom  seems  to  be  a  link  that  connects  a
public-interest  model  of politics with  an objective  stance  towards  values.
On the other hand there is  a strictly individualist and subjectivist concep-
tion  of  human  experience,  a  conception  which  serves  as  a  foundation  for
modern  economic  analysis.31  From  this  subjectivist conception  can be derived
a  strictly behavioristic  interpretation  of the notion of value,  which interpreta-
tion may in turn  lead to insistence that economic  efficiency  is the only social
good  there is-or at least the  only  one that  is amenable  to neutral  scientific
discussion.  The general  idea  is that values,  so-called,  are taken to be nothing
but individually  held,  arbitrary  and inexplicable  preferences  (the subjectivist
element)  having no objective  significance  apart  from what individuals  are ac-
tually  found  choosing  to  do  under  the  conditions  that  confront  them  (the
behaviorist  element);  from which  it seems  to follow  that there  can be no ob-
jective  good  apart  from  allowing  for  the  maximum  feasible  satisfaction  of
private  preference  as  revealed  through  actual  choice-or,  in  other  words,
plication  to  specific  cases  is required.  Their  constraining  force would  reside  in the commitment
to  resolve  specific  cases  consistently  with  them.  And their  continuity  would  reside in  the insitu-
tionalized  processes through which their  application was specified  and their meaning concretized,
processes  which  themselves  would  undergo  evolutionary  change  constrained  by  the  principles
which  govern  them.  (The argument  in this  footnote  owes  much-perhaps  all-  to Tribe,  How
Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations  for Evironmental Law, 83  YALE  L.J.  1315,
1338-40  (1974),  and R.  WOLFF.  Tss  POVERTY  OF  LIBERALISM  191-93  (1968),  concluding:  "Kings
achieve  freedom  only when they converse with other kings.  In that sense a free society is a society
of  kings,  and  Kant  was  right  to  call  his  ideal  moral  community  a kingdom  of  ends."  It also
elaborates  on  a prior attempt  of mine,  Michelman,  Conmments  on  Riker  on National  Planning
(unpublished  paper  delivered  at Liberty Fund Conference  on  National  Planning, Dec.  1975,  at
22-24.  A  closely related  conception  of freedom-  as  consisting in participation in the ordering of
public affairs-is  luminously portrayed  on page after page of H. ARENDT.  ON REVOLUTION  (paper
ed.  1965)  [hereinafter  cited  as  ARENDT.].  Dr.  Arendt's  stunningly  expressed  commendations  of
freedom  as  "public  happiness" (e.g.,  id. at 124),  rest heavily  on  foundations  other than' the Kan-
tian perception  of the relation of freedom and principle;  but her argument includes  the latter, as
also  it  insists on  the opposition of freedom  to "prosperity"  (id. at 133),  to "desire"  (id. at  136),
and to "private  happiness"  (id. at 273).)
"
tBut  note that analytical  use of the conception  need not imply  a belief that it is a true  or
complete  one.  See ECONOmIC  ANALYSIS  at notes 45-46  infra & text accompanying.
The truly distinguishing mark  of the neoclassical  economic  vision of human experience  and
fulfillment  is not  its  individualism  but its  subjectivism.  That  experience  accrues  to  individuals
and not  groups,  that fulfilling  experience  depends  on  (if it  isn't identical  with)  the  individual's
and not the group's freedom,  are assertions  few modems would contest; but individual  freedom is
one  thing,  and  strict  subjectivity-unfathomable  privacy  and  arbitrariness-of  all  values  is
another  and quite different  sort of thing.  "X  is free"  says something  about  the relations among
X's motives,  X's action and X's will or consciousness.  "X's values  (or ends)  ar strictly subjective"
says something  about  the  relations  of X's  motives  to  the motives  of  others.  It  is  controversial
whether  the  state  of freedom  for  individuals  is  attainable  or  maintainable  in  society  without
societal acceptance  of and respect  for  the  supposed  fact  of strict  value-subjectivity.
[Vol.  53:145COMPETITING  JUDICIAL MODELS
through  "willingness  to  pay."  The  resulting  allocation  of resources  to  their
highest-paying  employments  is  the state  known  to economists  as efficiency.32
Much  like  the  link  between  the  public-interest  model  and  an  objective
stance  toward  values,  there  seems  to  be  a  linkage  between  the  economic
(public-choice)  model  and  a  subjective  stance  towards  values,  provided  by
what we might call  a Hobbesian  or Lockean notion of freedom.33  To see how
this  works,  let  us  provisionally  assume  universal  recognition  of  a  set  of
"natural"  or  pre-political  individual  rights-rights  on  the  order  of those  to
dispose  over  and  do  something  with  one's  body,  mind,  and  capacities,  and
also  over  and with  those  things  of which  one becomes  the "owner"  without
violating another's ownership -entitlements  which translate into  claims not to
be  assaulted,  enslaved,  trespassed  upon,  robbed,  defrauded.  The  exact  con-
tent  of  such  a  basic  set  of  individual  natural  rights,  its  derivation  and
defense,  are much-vexed  questions not yet definitively  answered in  any of the
individualist  literature  from  John  Locke34  through James  Buchanan5  and
Robert  Nozick. 36  Also  unanswered  is  the  question  whether  any  such  pre-
political  rights  are  necessary  logical  foundations  for an  economic  theory  of
the  state.3 7  For  the  moment  these  problems  can  be  assumed  away,  and
universal  recognition  (or  deduction)  of  a  set  of basic  rights-constitutive  of
what might  be  called  the  "ethical  individual"-  can  be  supposed.  The  nor-
mative  economic  theory of governmental  institutions  can then  be seen  as pro-
ceeding at  two  levels.  At the first  level  is what  has  been variously  called the
"protective,1
38  or the "minimal,"' 9 or the "night-watchman"'4  state:  Every in-
"2See,  e.g.,  id. at notes  33-44  infra & text accompanying.
33See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND  TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT  4-7  (§§  4-8);  16-17  (§§26-27);  70-73
(§§123-31)  (T.  Peardon ed.  1952); T.  HOBBES,  LEVIATHAN  OR THE  MATTER.  FORME AND  POWER OF
A  COMMONWEALTH  ch.  5,  at 43  (Collier Books  ed.  1962):  "[I]f a man should talk to me of afree
will; or anyfree,  but free from being  hindered  by opposition,  I should not say he were  in an er-
ror,  but that his  words  were  without meaning,  that  is  to  say,  absurd;"  id. ch.  14,  at  103:  "By
LIBERTY,  is understood,  according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of exter-
nal impediments:  which impediments,  may  oft take  away part of  a man's  power  to do  what he
would;  but cannot  hinder him  from  using the  power  left him,  according  to  his judgment,  and
reason  shall  dicate  to  him;"  T.  Hobbes,  The  Citizen:  Philosophical Rudiments  Concerning
Government and Society,  in T.  HOBBES,  MAN  AND  CITIZEN  228 (Anchor Books  ed.  1972): "If they
suppose  liberty to  consist in this,  that there be  few  laws,  few  prohibitions,  and those  too  such,
that except they were  forbidden,  there could be no peace;  then I deny that there is more liberty
in democracy than monarchy  ....  For although the word liberty may in large and ample letters
be written  over the gates of  any city whatsoever,  yet it is not meant the subject's but the city's
liberty"
1J. LOCKE.  SECOND  TREATISE OF  GOvERNMENT  (T. Peardon  ed.  1952)  [hereinafter  cited  as
LOcKE].
35J.  BUCHANAN.  THE  LIMITS  OF  LIBERTY:  BETWEEN  ANARCHY  AND  LEvIATHAN  (1975)
[hereinafter  cited  as  BUCHANAN].
36R.  NoZICK,  ANARCHY.  STATE,  AND  UPTOPIA  (1971)  [hereinafter  cited  as NozicK].
"See,  e.g.,  BUCHANAN,  supra note 35,  at 9-11,  21-23.  R. NOZICK. supra note  35,  at 26-28,
33-35,  48-53,  57-59,  151-53.  Locke's  name,  of  course,  is  at or  near  the head  of  every  list  of
liberal theorists of prepolitical individual ("natural") rights.  See,  e.g., J. LOCKE, supra  note 34,  at
70-73  (c.  IX).
"SBucHANAN,  supra note  35,  at 68.
"NozicK,  supra note 36,  at 26-27.
40See id. at 25,  26.
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dividual's  basic  entitlements  will just obviously  be  worth more  to the  several
individuals  (assuming,  always,  latent  consensus  on  what  everyone's  basic  en-
titlements  are) if enforcement  is guaranteed  by an impartial  institutional  en-
forcer rather  than left to self-help.  But  the protective state  as thus explained
will  be  limited  to  articulating  and  enforcing  obvious  rules  against  assault,
trespass,  fraud,  theft,  promise-breaking,  and  the like;  and yet it is very plain
that  our state  (including  our  local  governments)  has  gone  far  beyond  that
role,  and  functions  also  at  the  second  level,  which  Buchanan  calls  the
"productive state"41  and others have called the "welfare state" -producing  not
only goods and services  of a  material kind but  also regulatory  programs (such
as zoning or environmental  control)  which cannot  plausibly  be palmed off as
mere  realizations  of  the  basic  personal  and proprietary  entitlements  of  the
ethical  individual.
42
Yet  it  is  possible  to  give  an  individualistic-economic  rationale  for  the
welfare  state,  too.  In  fact,  at  least  two  such  accounts  are  available-what  I
shall  call  the "big-bribe"  and  the  "market-failure"  accounts.  The  "big-bribe"
account will  to many seem  the less  plausible,  though  perhaps  only  because  it
is  the  less  intricate.  Its  individualistic  explanation  of  the  welfare  state  is
directly  parasitic  on  the  simple  theory  of  the  protective  or night-watchman
state. 4 3  Suppose  we say the problem  is to justify  continued  acceptance  by the
relatively well-endowed-those  who would  be the best-off if everyone were  left
unmolested  in  an  ungoverned  state  of nature-of  governmental  authority  to
tax  and  regulate  for  welfarish,  redistributive  or  productive  purposes.  Then
the answer  is that such acceptance  is a  price (or call  it a bribe)  those better-
endowed  should  find worth  paying,  in  exchange  for peaceful  acceptance  by
the  naturally  worse-endowed  of the government's  protective  police  authority.
To the naturally well-endowed,  the expected  net cost of governmental  welfare
activities  is supposed  to  be less  than  that  of the  combined  expected  costs  of
self-defense  and  losses  to predatory  neighbors  in  a  state  of nature;  while  to
the  naturally  worse-endowed  the  expected  value  of  the  welfare  activities  is
supposed  to  be greater  than  what  they  could get  by unrestricted  predation.
Thus, welfare-state  activities  are viewed  as a continuing  incentive to abide  by
and support  the  state's  night-watchman  function;  and unswerving  loyalty  to
the  constitutional  framework  that  authorizes  and  generates  both  protective
and  welfarish  programs  is venerated  because  nothing  else  stands between  us
and  deadly  Civil Warre.
44
4'BUCHANAN,  supra note  35,  at 68.
4
2See,  e.g.,  Ellickson,  Suburban Growth Controls: An  Economic and Legal Analysis 390-
403,  86  YALE L.J.  385  (1977);  B.  SIEGAN,  LAND  USE  WrrHOUT ZONING  (1972).
43What  follows  is  a  crude  summary  of  a  careful  and  complex  argument  in  BUCHANAN.
supra note  35,  at 53-73.
44This  is the view apparently taken  in Posner,  The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974  Sup.  CT.  REv.  26-31.  But  cf. ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS.  supra note 2,  at 343 (last paragraph of §  24.3) (Constitution  is designed to protect par-
ticular  interests  of powerful  groups,  not  those  of the  powerless).  It is  of  a piece  with  the one
taken  in  T.  HOBBES.  LEVIATHAN  OR  THE  MATrER.  FORME  AND  POWER  OF  A  COMMONWEALTH
[Vol.  53:145COMPETITING  JUDICIAL MODELS
The  market-failure  account,  though rather more laborious  than  the big-
bribe  account,  may  have  more  influence  in  contemporary  interpretations  of
our prevailing  governmental  institutions.  The  idea  is to  view  government  as
one  of  two  great  sub-systems-the  private  market  is  the  other-which
together  are  supposed  to  achieve  an  individualistically  optimal  allocation  of
resources. 45 Individuals  come to market,  so to speak, each with her or his own
current  endowment  of preferences,  abilities,  and property claims.  Of course
the juxtapositions  of these initial individual situations are always such that ex-
change  transactions  among  two  or  more individuals  would  be  advantageous
for both or all of them, each judging according to his or her own preferences.
Each  such  case  of  potential  gains  from  trade  involves  an  "externality"-a
situation  in which some of the costs or some of the benefits  of a  person's  ac-
tions  (or  inactions)  accrue  to  other  persons.  Under  behavioristic  in-
dividualism,  efficient  resource  allocation  has for  certain occurred  only  when
all costs  acre  borne,  and all benefits  enjoyed,  by those who  choose to produce
them  or have them  produced.  The  virtue of a free market is  the tendency  it
generates toward  this state where  externalities  are all "internalized"  by volun-
tary  exchange  transactions.  Yet markets  can sometimes  fail  to realize the op-
timum  condition  of complete  internalization.  Such  failure  is  associated  with
unusual difficulty (high  transaction  costs) in striking a bargain  or in organiz-
ing all who would have to  agree to participate  in a  transaction  in order  that
its potential,  mutual benefits  may be reaped.  Such difficulty  can result when
the  number  of persons  who  stand  to  benefit  from  a  costly  undertaking  is'
large,  and  none  of these  potential  beneficiaries  can  produce  the benefit  for
themselves  without  also  making  it  available  to  others  (whom  it  will  not  be
possible  to exclude,  at any cost  or  at feasible  cost).  Decisions  about whether
to  produce  such  benefits  cannot  be  made  efficiently  through  individual
bargaining and exchange  unless  a way can be found to induce each potential
beneficiary to make  a lump-sum offer prior to production  in exchange for the
privilege of free enjoyment  once the good is produced.  (The good might be a
capital facility  like a bridge,  or it might be provision for a specified period  of
some public  service  such  as street-cleaning  or even  of a  regulatory  program
such  as zoning.)  If that sort  of before-the-fact  bargaining were  possible,  then
the  decision whether  to  produce  would-efficiently-depend  on whether  the
(Oakeshott  ed.  1962;  Collier  Books).  Compare  Kennedy,  Legal Formality, 2  J.  LEGAL  STUDIES
351,  66  (1973).  For  the  argument  connecting  this  rationale  for  welfare-state  activities  with  a
majority-rule  system  (as  well  as  some  criticism of the argument),  see  Kuflik, supra note 22,  at
298-301.
"For  literature  in this "public choice"  vein see,  e.g.,  A.  DOWNS,  AN  ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY  (1959);  J.  BUCHANAN  & G.  TULLOCK,  THE  CALCULUS  OF  CONSENT  (1962)  [hereinafter
cited as  BUCHANAN  &  TULLOCK];  W.  BAUMOL.  WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
(2d  ed.  1965);  E.  HAEFELE,  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  MANAGEMENT
(1973);  A.  BRETON.  THE  ECONOMIC  THEORY  OF  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVER14MENT  (1974);  R.  BISH.
THE  PUBLIC  ECONOMY  OF  METROPOLITAN  AREAS  (1971)  [hereinafter  cited  as  BISH];  Buchanan,
Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation  of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L.
& ECON.  439  (1972).
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total  of  the  amounts  offered  equalled  or  exceeded  the  expected  costs,  in-
cluding  capital  costs,  of production.
But  the transaction  costs of such bargaining will  tend strongly  to be pro-
hibitively  high.  Where  large  numbers  of persons  are  involved,  getting  them
organized  will itself  be a costly  operation.  The difficulties  are  aggravated by
the  likelihood  of strategic  concealment  by  free-loaders  and  hold-outs.  Each
person,  hoping  or expecting  that  others will  choose  to pay for  a  good which
once  produced  will  necessarily  be  available  to  the  entire  neighborhood  or
community,  will have some motivation  to understate his  true demand for the
good;  and each will  realize that all  the others  are subject to the same tempta-
tion.  For such  reasons a  largish group of neighbors  might well fail to provide
themselves  with something  like  a jointly financed  police patrol-  and fail  even
to  make  the attempt-even  though,  were  the  truth  known,  a bargain  could
be struck which  each  would  regard  as  privately  advantageous.
Taught  to appreciate  this sort  of problem,  members  of a residential  com-
munity  might  unanimously  agree  to  organize  themselves  into  a  political unit
within  which decisions  about investment  in public goods and programs  would
thenceforth  be made  collectively,  typically by majority rule and very likely by
elected representatives.  The key is the majority-rule  rule, which will drastical-
ly reduce the  transaction  costs  below  those required  for obtaining unanimous
agreement  to  a joint undertaking.4 6  The  charter  of. government  would  spell
out  the  decision  rules  and  procedures,  would  include  rules  for  distributing
costs  through  taxes,  and also  would place some limits on  the range  of public
goods for which members were  liable to be taxed  and regulated.  (Such goods
would  undoubtedly include  preferred  environmental states,  to be achieved  by
regulation,  as  well  as  physical  facilities  and  services  to  be  achieved  by pur-
chase  of labor and materials.)  Each member would realize that virtually every
public  decision would depart in some measure  from his or her true individual
preferences,  and  that  on  occasion  such  departures  might  be  quite  seriously
harmful  to  him  or  her.  Public  choice  theorists  have  called  such  departures
"political  externalities,"  in  recognition  that  they  are  costs  that some  persons
are  enabled  to  impose  on  others  by  majority  rule.4 7  Yet  each  member,  by
subscribing  to the  arrangement,  would  signify  an expectation  that his or her
political-externality  costs  will  over  the long run be more  than offset  by gains
derived  from  the  coordination  that  only  a  political,  essentially  majoritarian
mechanism  can  achieve  at feasible  transaction  costs.  Public  choice literature
explores in detail-  sometimes exquisite-the  conditions (including such varied
matters  as  limits  on  substantive  competency,  procedural  and  decision  rules,
representation  arrangements,  political-party  organization,  and  boundary-
fixing criteria) under which political decisions might be expected  to approach
46For  thorough exploration,  see  BuCHANAN  &  TULLOCK.  supra note 45.
4'E.g.,  BISH. supra  note  45,  at 37-42.
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long-run maximization,  for each individual,  of the excess of coordination sav-
ings  over  political  costs.
48
41Some  of the  literature argues strongly against the plausibility of thinking that even a deft-
ly  designed  majoritarian  process  can  churn  out  hunks  of  legislated  settlements  which  are  in-
dividualistically  optimizing or  waste-minimizing  (i.e.,  approximate  the settlements  which would
have  arisen  in  a  market  unburdened  by  insuperable  transactions  costs).  At  the  heart  of  this
economically  skeptical  view  of  politics  is  a  game-theoretic  demonstration  that  even  the  most
acutely rational,  self-interested  agents in a multi-lateral,  multi-focal political arena must-no less
than  similarly  rational  agents  in the  private  market-sometimes  be  blocked  by  strategic  factors
from  finding  optimal  trading  partners  and  optimal  deals.  The  political  analogues  to
"freeloading"  and holding out" (see text accompanying  notes 43-44 supra) include  such behaviors
as  strategic agenda  manipulation, see,  e.g.,  Kramer, Some  Procedural  Aspects of Majority Rule,
in  NoMos  XVIII:  DUE  PROCESS:  264  (J.  Pennock  & J.  Chapman,  eds.  1977);  Levine  & Plott,
Agenda Influence and Implications, 63  VA.  L.  REV.  561  (1977);  and  insincere voting,  see, e.g.,
A.  SEN.  COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND  SOCIAL  WELFARE  192-94  (1970);  R. BLACK,  THEORY OF COMMIT-
TEES AND ELECTIONS  44-45  (1958).  See generally W.  RIKER  & P.  ORDESHOOK. AN  INTRODUCTION TO
POsrIVE  POLITICAL  THEORY  (1973).
We  thus  acquire  an  economic  theory  of "political  failure"  just  parallel  to  that of market
failure  (for  which  see  text  accompanying  notes  42-45  supra.). Compare  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS,
supra note  2,  at 271  ("government  failure").  But recognition  of such  failure  is not  inconsistent
with the persistence or  appeal  of an  economic  rationale for extant  governmental  institutions  (or
of a  kindred political  ideology,  see,  e.g.,  Vincent  Ostrom's  econonic  interpretation  of Madiso-
nian republicanism  in  THE  POLITICAL THEORY  OF THE  COMPOUND  REPUBLIC (1948)),  which  views
the combination  of market and governmental  sectors as  aimed at minimizing the economy's total
of deadweight  and transactions  losses.
Now  of course the  economically  inspired litereature on  "political  failure,"  as I  have termed
it,  may give  grounds  for skepticism  about  the  real-world  likelihood  that partial  substitutions of
political  for market frameworks,  in  the forms  and degrees  characteristic  of the modern  welfare
state,  will actually work  out efficiently.  That literature does  not,  however,  reveal any logical gap
or inconsistency  in  the  (no  doubt optimistic)  stories that  can be  told about  how  aptly designed
governmental  institutions might improve the economy's over-all efficiency.  The skeptical political-
failure  literature  must  be  sharply  distinguished  from  another  branch  of  economic  analysis  of
collective-choice  schemes,  typified  by  the  distinguished  contributions  of Kenneth  Arrow  (SOCIAL
CHOICE  AND  INDIVIDUAL  VALUES  2d  ed.  1963))  and  A.K.  Sen  (COLLECTIVE  CHOICE  AND  SOCIAL
WELFARE  (1970)),  which  does  demonstrate  certain  logical "impossibilities"  regarding  the  co-
existence  in  collective-choice  schemes  of various  combinations  of appealing,  formal  properties.
Although  occasionally (and  carelessly) mischaracterized  as demonstrating  the futility of collective
choice  from  an  economic  (efficiency)  standpoint,  the Arrow/Sen  literature  neither  pretends  to
nor results  in  any such  demonstration.
As Sen puts  it  (COLLECTIVE  CHOICE AND  SOCIAL WELFARE,  at 26),  Arrow  "is  concerned with
rules of collective choice which make the preference ordering of a  society a function  of individual
preference  orderings,  so that  if  the latter set  is specified,  the  former must be fully determined."
Roughly translated  and  expanded,  what  this means  is that Arrow  wants to know whether  there
are collective-choice procedures  (or formulas) which (i) take as their only inputs the several order-
ings,  of  possible social states,  respectively  preferred by  the several  individual  members  of society
(where individual  preference-orderings  satisfy  certain formal conditions  of rationality and internal
consistency),  and  (ii)  somehow  combine  those  so  as  to  produce  a  determinate  and  consistent
social  preference  ordering  of the possible  social  states  such  that,  as  between  any  pair of alter-
native  social  states,  either  one  is  socially  preferred  to the other  or  society prefers  both  equally
(but more or less than some other possibility).  What Arrow,  Sen, and their colleagues  show  is the
logical  impossibliity  of there  being some  such  procedure  or formula  for  combining  individual
preference  orderings  so  as  to get  determinate  and consistent  social  preference  orderings,  which
procedure  also  has (some  or  all of)  various appealing,  formal  properties,  such  as:  equal  respon-
siveness  to  the preference  orderings  (or  changes  therein)  of each  individual;  avoidance  of both
dictatorship  (determination  by  the  preference  orderings  of a  single  individual)  and  imposition
(determination  by  some  rule  or  criterion  extraneous  to  everyone's  preference  orderings);  con-
sistency with  the criterion  of Pareto-superiority  (any alternative  (in  a pair) preferred by  some in-
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II.  PUBLIC  CHOICE  THINKING  IN  PUBLIC  LAW  ADJUDICATION
Whether  either  the  big-bribe  or  the  market-failure  version  of the  nor-
mative  economic  (public-choice)  account  of  government  can  ultimately  suc-
ceed  in  reconciling  familiar  majoritarian  institutions  with  strictly  economic
(subjectivist  and individualist)  premises  is a  question  that deserves  attention9
but is not crucial to our present purpose,  which  is to see how  either version,  if
dividuals  and  dispreferred  by  none  is  socially  preferred);  positive  association  with  individual
preferences  (whan someone upgrades  a  given  alternative  on  his  list and  one  one downgrades  it,
society doesn't  downgrade  it).
The various  "possibility  theorems"  that can be extracted  from  this problem  are,  in various
ways  and various degrees,  ethically unsettling.  But  they do  not seem  to show  (or be intended  to
show)  that  astute use  of collective-choice  schemes,  such  as  majority  voting,  cannot in fact  im-
prove  effeciency  by reducing misallocations and/or transaction  costs.  One intuitive, though crude
and  inexact,  statement  of a  reason why  the  theorems  do  not  show  any such  thing is that  they
construe  voting  as  a  static kind  of  "%ounting" mechanism  for registering  individual  preferences
and  combining  them  into  a  social  preference,  not (as  it is  construed  from  the  "public  choice"
standpoint),  as  a  dynamic  kind  of market-continuation  process  in  which  (through  log-rolling)
prices  accrue in  the form  of vote-trades  across  measures  rather  than  in  the form  of money  or
other commodities. A  better statement may be that Arrow  and Sen search  for ways for registering
the  ethical (e.g.,  distributional),  as  well  as  the strictly  private,  preferences  of individuals  in  or
through  the "social  welfare  function,"  a  complication  that an individualistic  conception  of effi-
ciency  (and it  associated  rationales  for both  market and  collective  choice schemes)  disregards.
Elaboration  of these points  would  carry us  well  beyond the scope  of this  essay,  but readers
wishing  to pursue them might begin by  consulting Arrow at  7,  59  ("the market mechanism,"  too,
fails to "create  a rational  social choice");  id. at  109-09;  Sen at 26,  81,  161-62,  194 ("under some
circumstances  game  considerations  and vote  trading may help  to bring  in some measures- of in-
tensities  of individual  preferences,  and  a vote-trading  equilibrium  does  reflect  a compromise  of
conflicting  interests").  See  also BUCHANAN  & TULLOCK, supra note 45,  at 332,  359  n.  14;  K.  AR-
ROW,  THE  LimsS  OF  ORGANIZATION  (1974),  at  33  ("organizations,"  explicitly  including  govern-
ments, "are  a means  of achieving  the  benefits of collective  action  where  the  price  system  fails"),
53  ("the functional  role of organizations  is  to take advantage of the superior  productivity of joint
actions"),  69  (".  . authority,  the centralization  of decision-making,  serves to  economize  on  the
transmission  and  handling  of information").
41One  obvious problem  is  that the imaginalbe  unanimous  agreement  (to submit  to  a ma-
joritarian  regime of limited competency)  remains  utterly hypothetical.  It isn't just that  some are
thrust  without  choice (that  is,  born)  into subservience  to  a  national and a  state  con-
stitution  and  a local  government  charter.  New local-government  charters continue  to
be  created and imposed on non-consenting  adults  by non-unanimous  procedures.  And
in these  cases,  individualistic postulates  cannot be satisfied  by any argument that these
very  [same] political  institutions would necessarily emerge  if each member of the group
would  only act in accordance with rational self-interest;  that argument  can expalin  the
use  of  non-unanimous  charter-making  procedures  only  by  admitting  that  some  real
persons  in  fact  refuse  to  act  in  the  way  prescribed  as  rational,  and  ethical  in-
dividualism  (I  think) demands  a  full  measure  of respect  even  for those  persons  and
their preferences.  Nor  are the  postulates satisfied by  the claim  that given enough  time
and effort  we could  in fact persuade  each and  every member of the group  to support
imposition  of  the governmental  institutions,  and  use  of  coercive charter-making  pr-
rocedures  is therefore  justified  as  a  means  of saving  this time  and  effort;  ethical  in-
dividualism  will  not  (I  think)  countenance  coercion  based  on  your  assumption  that
those  who  disagree  with  you will  after  full discussion  come 'round  to  your view  (for
how can you know it won't turn out just the other way?)  Nor can  I think of any other
argument that honestly  faces  and solves the problem.
F.  Michelman,  Comments  on  Riker  on  National  Planning,  (Dec.  1975)  (unpublished  paper
delivered  at Liberty  Fund conference  on  National Planning)
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accepted,  might  work  to  explain  judicial  behavior  that  could  otherwise  be
thought puzzling in the doctrinal  areas of public  purpose  and delegation.
Beginning with  the  public  purpose  doctrine,  imagine  that a  city  govern-
ment  is  about  to  use  tax  revenues  to  assemble  a  parcel  of  downtown  real
estate,  which  parcel  it  has  specially  negotiated  to  sell  to  a  certain  private
developer  for an amount somewhat  below acquisition cost.  The developer  will
be  committed to  construct and  operate a  hotel  and a  parking garage  on  the
site.  One hundred  parking  spaces  will be made available  at no charge  to the
city for  use as a  public  parking facility.  The city,  all admit,  would otherwise
have  deemed  it  worthwhile,  in  the  interest  of  downtown  revitalization,  to
assemble  a site and develop  100  spaces itself, at a  cost slightly in excess  of the
loss it will realize from buying the site for a higher price than it will get from
the  developer  on  resale.  At  the  same  time,  the  developer's  financial  plans
disclose  his  anticipation  of an  immense  profit  on  the  deal,  of  a magnitude
that  dwarfs  any reasonable  appraisal of the  modest net  benefit that  the  city
expects  to  derive. 5 0  The city  council  has  approved  the  deal.
"5Alert,  economics-minded  readers may  have questions about  the economic  logic of the ex-
ample:  First, what is the economic  (or legal) justification  for the city's  acting to acquire the site
for  the developer  rather than  letting him  acquire it  privately? Second, how  is the developer (in
effect)  able to sell  to the city 100  parking spaces  for less than it would cost the city to accomplish
"in  house"  construction  of the same spaces  on the same site?  Third, why  should  the assembled
site be sold  by special negotiation  to a developer who anticipates  a huge profit-rather than,  for
example,  offered at auction where someone willing to accept  a more modest profit might confer
on  the  taxpayers  the benefit  of  a higher  price?
Possible  answers  are: First, it may  be  believed  that an integrated,  large-scale  development
represents  the most efficient use  for this land area,  but that problems associated with fragmented
ownership  (including  hold-out/free-loader  problems  and  clouded  titles)  are  blocking  such
development from  arising in the market. See,  e.g.,  Davis & Whinston,  The Economics of Urban
Renewal 26  LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROB.  105  (1961).  In  this situation,  exercises  of eminent  domain
powers  will  be  an  effective  and  legally available  solution.  See,  C. HAAR,  LAND-USE  PLANNING,
423-47  (2d  ed.  1971).  The city's  possession of eminent  domain  authority,  then,  explains  its  site-
assembly  role.  Second, the  developer  may  have  a  development-cost  advantage  over  the city  for
the  100  parking  spaces,  by reason either  of economies  of specialization, see,  e.g.,  A.  SMrrH, AN
INQUIRY  INTO THE NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.  Bk.  I,  ch.  I (Modern  Library
ed.  1937),  or of scale or other economies arising  out of his  doing other development work in the
neighborhood  simultaneously  with  construction  of  the  parking  spaces.  Third,  the  size  of  the
developer's  anticipated  profit may represent the  high level of risk in his line of business, or a long
lead  time  and  large  volume  of  entrepreneurial  effort  invested  in  "packaging"  the  deal,  or  a
return to a rare and socially valued feat of entrepreneurial  imagination. The city's  willingness to
negotiate  such  sales  on  terms  allowing  large  profits may  reflect  a judgment  that no  practical
alternative  is better calculated to maximize  the social benefits from such entrepreneurial  feats.  A
simple  auction sale to the highest bidder  gives no  opportunity  to extract public  benefits such  as
cheap  parking spaces  (or, in other words,  risks  allowing  the highest  bidder a larger share of the
surplus than  he  would  be willing  to accept.)  An  auction  sale  with a  minimum price (aimed  at
reserving some minimum  amount of surplus for the taxpayers)  risks  driving away too many bid-
ders.  Advertising the possible availability of the site,  and a willingness to negotiate with interested
developers,  may  seem  the best  alternative.  (Of  course  there  is another  possible  explanation  for
the city's  intervention,  the  negotiated sale,  the developer's  large profit-i.e.,  developer influence
on the conduct of city officials.  That possibility is considered in the text. The point of this note is
just to confirm that  there may be (a court  cannot as  a matter of logic say there isn't),  from the
standpoint of city residents  and taxpayers,  an economically valid  rationale  for the city's  part in
the  deal.)
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A  city taxpayer  is seeking  to enjoin the  city from proceeding,  on  the sole
ground that the  deal will involve expenditure of tax revenues for a non-public
purpose.  The plaintiff does not dispute  the legality  of spending public  funds
on  revitalization  or  on  parking  spaces  reasonably  deemed  necessary,  to
revitalization.  The  objection,  rather,  is  to  the  private  developer's  profitable
involvement.  No  statutory  or  constitutional  text  is  cited,  but  all  concerned
take  it  for  granted  that  some  sort  of  public  purpose  limitation  is  implied
either in the  constitutional grant  of taxing  power  to the  state or in  the state
constitution's  due  process  guaranty.5
Faced with this sort  of problem,  a  court seems  to have a  choice among at
least four  strategies  for  review:
(1)  Strictly procedural  review.  The  court  looks only  to  see  that  the city
council  in  reaching  its  decision  has  complied  with  the  legislative  procedures
established  by  or under  the  constitution,  statutes,  and  home  rule  charter  if
any,  and that no specific  rules against  bribery,  conflict of interest, or the like,
have  been  violated.  The  court  refuses  to  reexamine  the  merits  or  even  the
bare  substantive rationality  of the  council's judgment.
5 2
(2)  Ad  hoc  substantive  (rational basis)  review.  The  court  ascertains
whether  a  city  council,  acting  in good  faith,  could  rationally  conclude  that
the  total  (net)  benefits  to  municipal  citizens  from  this  particular  deal
"See  note  7  supra.
52This is the stance recommended  by Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality  of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities,  1974  Sup.  Cr.  REv.  26-31.  See  also  ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS,  supra note 2,  at 495-96.  It isn't  clear that the courts in any American jurisdiction  ac-
tually  carry self-restraint  this far.  The  most likely  candidate  may  be  the post-New  Deal United
States Supreme Court.  Cf.,  e.g.,  New Orleans v. Dukes,  427  U.S.  297 (1976)  (extreme deference
to  legislative classifications  when reviewing  economic regulations  under equal  protection  clause).
Yet  that Court's  abstemiousness in "economic"  cases more  certainly reflects a restrictive  view of a
national court's  role  in  a  federal  system  than  a  doubt  about  the  existence  of  a  substantive,
judicially  enforceable  legal  doctrine  restricting  exercises  of  public  powers  to  public  purposes.
That  such  a  substantive  doctrine  is  a  component  of  the Fourteenth  Amendments  due  process
guaranty  was  expressly  declared  in  Fallbrook  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Bradley,  164  U.S.  112,  158
(1896).  In Green  v.  Frazier,  253  U.S.  233  (1920),  the Court  accorded  a  highly restrained review
in a "public purpoe"  case,  explaining (id. at 239-40,  242):  "[T]he people,  the legislature,  and the
highest court of the State have  declared  the purpose  . . . to be  . . . public  . . . and within the
taxing power of the State.  With this united action of people,  legislature  and court,  we are not at
liberty to  interfere  unless  it  is  clear  beyond  reasonable  controversy  that  rights  secured  by  the
Federal constitution  [including  an acknowledged  right  not to be  taxed for a nonpublic purpose,
citing Fallbrook, id.  at 2383]  have been violated.  . . . [What  is]  . . . a public use  [is]  a  question
concerning which local authority,  legislative  and judicial,  has special  means of securing informa-
tion  . . . and  . . . the judgment  of  the highest  court of the State  declaring  a given  use  to  be
public . . . [will]  be accepted by this court unless  clearly unfounded."  In Carmichael v. Southern
Coal  Co.,  301  U.S.  495  (1937),  the  Court  again  accorded  a  substantive-though
restrained-review,  saying  (id. at  514):  "It  is not  denied  that  since  the  adoption  of the  Four-
teenth Amendment  state taxing power  can be  exerted only to effect  a public purpose  . . . [but]
the requirements of due process leave free scope for the exercise of a wide legislative discretion .... "
The views expressed  in Fallbrook, Green, and Carmichael  have never,  so far as I am aware,  been
repudiated by  the Court.
[Vol.  53:145COMPETITING  JUDICIAL MODELS
(including  those from the public good of revitalization)  will  exceed  their total
(net) tax  and  other  costs,  and  on that  basis  grants  or denies  relief.
53
(3)  "Per se"  or  categorical substantive  review.  The  court  ascertains
whether  the project entails  in any degree the use of the city's taxing power in
direct aid of a particular private interprise,  and on that basis grants or denies
relief.
5'
(4) Primary-purpose or weighing-of-benefits review. The  court  ascertains
whether the private benefits  to the entrepreneur clearly  predominate over the
public  benefits,  and  on  that basis grants  or  denies  relief.5 5
First  note  that  courts  in  such  cases  rarely,  if  ever,  purport  to  limit
themselves  to strictly  procedural review  (which would  amount to rejecting  the
public purpose  doctrine). 56 This fact suggests that the "big bribe" justification
of the welfare state  has not been strongly  operative  in the judicial mentality.
"This  is  probably  the  typical  judicial  stance.  The  substantive  conception  of  a  "valid"
legislative  decision  as one  calculated  to yield  social benefits in  excess of social  costs  is combined
with an  institutional  posture of judicial  deference  to  legislative judgments  about such  questions,
within  the bounds  of plausibility or "rationality."  See,  e.g.,  Wilson v.  Board of County Commis-
sioners,  327  A.2d  488,  498,  499  (Md.  1974) (legislative expenditure  decision  must "be reasonable
and based on  ...  honest judgment  ...  that the expenditure is for the best interests of the city;"
whether private  firm  will also  benefit  is "not  a critical  factor.")
S
4See Foster v.  Medical  Care Comm'n,  283  N.C.  110,  195  S.E.2d 517  (1973);  Lowell v.  City
of Boston,  111  Mass.  454 (1875)  (following  exception for privately  owned public  utilities).  Many
state constitutions contain express prohibitions  against "lending of credit"  to any "corporation" or
"private"  organization.  Such  prohibitions  are  sometimes  construed  by courts  to bar all financial
truck with private  enterprise.  E.g.,  Port  of Longview v.  Taxpayers,  84  Wash.  2d 475,  527  P.2d
263  (1974),  modified, 85  Wash.  2d 216,  533  P.2d  128 (1975).  Such  decisions,  however,  are  not
directly relevant  to my argument.  See text  accompanying  notes 5,  6 supra.
55A  clear and striking example is Price v. Philadelphia  Parking Authority,  422 Pa.  317,  221
A.  2d  138  (1966).  In  Basehore  v.  Hampden  Industrial  Dev.  Auth.,  433  Pa.  40,  28  A.  2d  212
(1969),  the  court  sought  to  distinguish  the  Price case  and  to  deny  that  it  had  there  used  a
primary-purpose  constitutional  test,  explaining  that  (i)  in  Price there  wasn't any  "substantial"
public  benefit and (ii) the Price  decision turned on  interpretation of an enabling statute, not  on
any  constitutional  public-purpose  doctrine.  But  this  retrospect  on  Price is  thoroughly  unper-
suasive,  because:  (i)  the Price  opinion  (221  A.  2d at 150-51  n.  35)  expressly  stipulated that  "we
find  it unnecessary  to reach  the  issue  of whether  the Authority had  acted unreasonably in con-
cluding  that present  and  anticipated  future  need  in  the locale  of  the proposed  garage  facility
were  sufficient  to  warrant its cosistruction.  Assuming  arguendo  the existence of such  need,  the
Authority may not  propose  to meet it through the medium of a project which results in an over-
whelming  and predominate benefit  to private  developers;"  and (ii)  while it is technically correct
that in Price the court held that the challenged  deal was unauthorized under the "public benefit"
language  of the  enabling statute,  it  is  also  true that  the opinion's  argument  is  founded  on  an
analogy  to  the constitutional  "public  use"  restriction  on eminent  domain  powers,  and  that the
opinion  speaks in tones suggesting  a question of broader significance than  the meaning of a park-
ing  authority enabling act.
It should  be noted that some jurisdictions,  and some single decisions,  appear  to require,  for
a valid public expenditure,  both a substantial  net public benefit and relegation of any non public
benefit to a secondary  or "incidental" magnitude.  Compare Wilson v. Board of County  Commis-
sioners,  327  A.2d  488  (Md.  1974)  with City of Frostburg v. Jenkins,  215  Md.  9,  136 A.  2d  852
(1957). (upholding industrial  development bond;  restrained  judicial review;  "whether.  private
benefits  outweigh  . ..  public  benefits  - . . [is]  primarily  a legislative  rather  than a judicial pro-
blem");  see  Opinion  of the Justices,  369  N.E.2d  447  (Mass.  1977);  Port Authority of City of St.
Paul  v.  Fisher,  275  Minn.  157,  145  N.W.  2d  560  (1966).
"See  note 52 supra.
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Under  that conception,  it will be recalled,  we buy civil  peace for the price of
abiding  by whatever the duly constituted legislative  process presents us with.57
Many  courts,  applying  the  public  purpose  limitation,  will  purport  to
follow  our second  path,  of ad hoc rational-basis  review.  This might seem  at
least consistent with  a market-failure justification  of the welfare state,  insofar
as  a  reasonably  anticipated  surplus  or deficit,  as  the  case  may be,  of social
benefits  from  a  public  good  (revitalization)  over  political  costs  (taxes)
represents  a  net  positive  or  negative  contribution  to  the  total  long-run,
public-sector  benefit-cost  balance  which,  when distributed  over  the citizenry,
can  supposedly  make  each  better off than would  have  been  possible  without
welfare-state  activity.  Yet  one  may  well  ask  why  procedurally  regular  and
non-corrupt  legislative  (city council) approval is not itself deemed sufficient to
provide  this assurance,  without  any substantive judicial oversight.  A plausible
(though  certainly  not  a  logically  irresistable)  answer  is  that  restrained,
rational-basis judicial  review  simply provides  a  cost-effective  screening  device
to  catch  some  obvious,  legislative  mistakes  which  would  otherwise  inevitably
occur  from  time  to  time-because  legislators,  too,  are  fallible-and  detract
from  the  long-run  total  benefit-cost  balance.58  Thus  it  seems  at  this  point
"Professor  Posner,  whose  normative  theory  and  positive  model  of politics  and legislation
seem  closely akin to what I have  been calling the "big  bribe" theory,  believes (it would seem  cor-
rectly) that total judicial abstention from  "public purpose"  review  is an implication  of the theory.
If particular legislation  is not designed to contribute to social welfare (because it is purely respon-
sive  to private  interests  operating  as  "pressure  groups"),  it makes no -possible sense  for courts  to
treat  the legislation  on  the assumption  that  it is  so  designed.  See  Posner's  discussions  cited  in
notes  44,  54 supra.
Still,  it  could  always  be  argued  that  the  "duly  constituted"  process  includes  a  step  of
substantive  judicial  review;  but  if we  follow  that  path the  big bribe  conception  will,  from  the
judicial standpoint, just collapse  into some other conception.  Suppose  the judge  infers from some
authoritative  source or  text  (e.g.,  the due  process  clause of the state  or federal  constitution) that
the legislature's  public expenditure  decisions  are supposed  to be subject  to  some sort of substan-
tive judicial check for "suitability,"  or "propriety"  or whatever.  If all the  court can tell (from the
texts  and  from  authoritative  history)  about  the  reason for  thrusting  this  vaguely  defined  role
upon  it  is  that  such  was  part  of the  constitutional  settlement  by  which  civil peace  was  to  be
established,  it will still have  to  find some  way of answering the open  questions  about the precise
standards,  or purposive  guides,  to be used  in performing  the  role.  If the  court for some reason
has  adopted economic  efficiency  as  its  residual guide  (for  use when the sacred texts  run out),  it
will be  driven  to  decide  what  standard  (from  among numbers (2),  (3),  and (4),  see  notes 53-55
supra &  text  accompanying,  or  some  variant  of  those)  best  accords  with  some  economically
plausible  account  of American governmental  institutions and practices.  So the economics-minded
judge  in this situation  will have to fall back from  the big-bribe account  to the market-failure  ac-
count,  or  something like  it.
5 See Michelman,  Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments On the Ethical Foundations  of
'7ust  Compensation" Law,  80  HARV.  L.  REv.  1165,  1177-78  (1967).
Another  imaginable answer  would  be that  a judicial determination  of "no  public purpose"
represents  a  judicial  finding  of  inefficiency  plus  a judicial  perception  (or  intuition)  that  the
measure under  review  is a  product  of one  of those  occasions of "political  failure,"  of economic
misfire of the self-interest  motivated  political  process,  referred  to in note  48 supra-so that the
judicial  finding  of inefficiency  is not  contradictory  of any  genuinely  opposed  legislative  result.
But while  this  answer  is imaginable,  it is hardly plausible.  Partly  for reasons  yet to be  explored,
the notion that  courts by  some mental  process  could  even  intuit, much  less perceive, that  some
particular measure  was  especially  likely  to be a  "misfire"  case,  is,  well,  fantastic.  See note  102,
infra.
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that  either  procedural  review  only,  or procedural  plus  rational-basis  review,
might be reconcilable  with a  market-failure  account  (though only procedural
review  is  consistent  with  a  big-bribe  account).
But  if  that  much  be  granted,  then  why  should  courts  applying  public
purpose  ever  lapse-as  some  courts  sometimes  do-into  the  per  se  or
categorical  mode  of  review  in  which  direct  governmental  aids  to  private
enterprise are automatically ruled out regardless of their apparent net positive
contribution  to the long-run public-sector  accounts?59 To see how  the public-
choice  model  can  also  accommodate  this per se variation,  first  consider  the
fourth  review  strategy  which  some  courts  use:  the  "primary  purpose"  or
"weighing-of-benefits"  approach.  Applying that approach  to our hypothetical
case,  the  court  would  ascertain  that  the  private  benefits  to  the  developer
clearly  overshadow  the  public  benefits  and on  that  basis would  grant relief.
But why deprive  the public of even a  modest benefit-a modest positive  con-
tribution  tc  the  long-run  public-sector  balance-just  because  the  developer
benefits  hugely?
The  answer,  in  a  public-choice  framework,  can  only  lie  in  residual
mistrust  of the  integrity  of the legislative  process-or  more  precisely,  in  the
representation  element  in that  process.  The  very  fact  that  the  total  surplus
from  the  land-development  transaction  is  divided  so  unevenly  between  the
developer and the city may raise  suspicion that the legislators  have not really
been  pursuing the  interests of their constitutents  but rather have  been "cap-
tured" by  the private  interest in some obscure  or subtle way that bribery and
conflict laws  cannot  touch,  and restrained  substantive  review  cannot  detect.
Confidence  that surpluses from exercises of governmental powers will  be wide-
ly  and  evenly  enough distributed  to  assure  that  everyone  will  be  a  long-run
net  gainer  may depend  significantly  on the legislative  representative's  always
being  actually  responsive  to popular,  constituent  interest.60  Periodic  electoral
accountability  is supposed to induce such  responsiveness  through  the medium
of legislator  self-interest  (in retaining  office,  or  at least  in raising  campaign
contributions).  Maldistribution  of surpluses to private parties might so strong-
ly  suggest the presence  of a countervailing  legislator self-interest  that a wisely
fashioned  public-choice  system  would  program  courts  in  such  cases  to  in-
tervene  prophylactically. 6'  Categorically  ruling  out  all  specially  negotiated
governmental  assistance to private enterprise-that  is,  the per se rule-would
just be  a  more extreme  version  of the  same  type  of prophylaxis.
So  it  seems,  at  least  to  this  point,  as  though  any  of three versions  of
judge-created  public  purpose  doctrine-the  rational-basis,  primary-purpose,
and per se or  categorical  variants-can  plausibly  be  reconciled  with  an  in-
s'See note  54 supra  and accompanying  text.
"0That is,  whatever  such  confidence  is able  to  survive the skeptical  literature  described  in
note  48,  supra.
"IThe opinion  in Price v.  Philadephia  Parking  Auth.,  422  Pa.  317,  221  A.2d  138  (1966),
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dividualistic  type  of normative economic  model of government,  depending on
what  the model's  design details  are supposed to be.  That might seem a pretty
bit of evidence  to support a general  thesis that individualistic  economics  is the
hidden inspiration  of judge-made  doctrine even in public law.  Yet a small  fly
in  that  ointment  is  an  awareness  that  a  fourth  and  rarely  professed  op-
tion-rejection  of  public  purpose  as  a  judicially  enforceable  substantive
limitation  in  favor  of  strictly  procedural  review-is  also  consistent  with  a
plausibly  designed  public-choice  model. 62
Let  that  problem  rest  for  a  moment.  A  second  intriguing  pattern  of
judicial  behavior  concerns  a small portion  of delegation  doctrine  represented
by  a  trio  of Supreme  Court  decisions  which,  taken  together,  have  posed  a
long-standing puzzle  to  legal  theorists.
Case  I: Eubank v.  Richmond  (1912).6s  The  Virginia  legislature  had  by
statute  authorized  city  councils  "to  make regulations  concerning  the  building
of  houses  . . .,  and  in  their  discretion,  . . . in  particular  districts  . . . to
prescribe  and  establish  building  lines  ....  ."  The  Richmond  City  Council
thereupon  adopted  an  ordinance  providing,  in  effect,  a  procedure  whereby
two-thirds of the owners  along any block could  adopt their own building set-
back  line  for  their  block.  That  procedure  was  used  to  establish  a  line  that
would  have required  the plaintiff to alter his  plans for a  house  not yet  built.
The  Supreme  Court  held  that  allowing  the  ordinance  thus  to  be  enforced
against  the  plaintiff would  unconstitutionally  deprive  him  of his  property.
Although  the Court's  opinion  hints  at  a  straight  substantive  due  process
objection  to legislative  regulation  of building  lines  (the year,  remember,  was
1912),  the opinion  as  a whole (and subsequent  decisions) makes  clear that the
decision  does  not  rest  on  that.  The  crucial  objection  was,  rather,  to  the
delegation  feature  of the  Richmond  ordinance  which  "enable[d]  the  conve-
nience  or purposes of one set of property owners to control the property rights
of  others."  Because  the  ordinance  "create[d]  no  standard  by  which  [this]
power  [was]  to be exercised,"  those  exercising  it might "do  so solely for their
own  interest  or  even  capriciously.1
64
Case II:  Cusack v. Chicago (1916).6s  The Supreme  court upheld a  city or-
dinance  which  excluded  billboards  from  predominantly  residential  blocks  ex-
cept  when a  majority  of the  owners  in the  block  would give  written consent.
The  unsuccessful  plaintiff  was  a  would-be  sign  builder  who,  apparently
6 2See note  52,  supra and  accompanying  text. If the public-choice  model is so supple  that it
can  be  reconciled  with things  courts  don't do,  as  well  as  with  various  (mutually  inconsistent)
things various  courts do  do,  then what  does  it explain? A theory  that can  logically claim  to  ex-
plain  whatever  might  be  observed,  and so  is not  empirically  falsifiable  (e.g.,  the  theory  that
whatever  happens is the mechanical  result of chains of collisions of particles set in motion at the
Creation),  doesn't  explain  anything. See  Posner,  Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL  J.
EcON.  335,  (1974)  [hereinafter  Posner  II] "It is, of course,  a  weakness rather than  a strength  in a
theory that it is  so elastic  as  to  fit  any  body of  data with which it  is  likely  to  be confronted."
-226  U.S.  137  (1912).
1
41d.  at  144.
65242  U.S.  526.
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unable  to  garner  majority  consent,  attacked  the  ordinance  on  delegation
grounds,  complaining  that it  left  his fate  to "the  whims and caprices"  of his
"neighbors. '"66  Not  surprisingly,  he  leaned  heavily  on  Eubank.  The  Court
pulled  this prop  from under him  by reasoning  that the delegation  feature  of
the  Chicago  ordinance  could  only  help  him,  not  hurt  him.  Eubank  was
distinguished  on  the  ground  that  there  it  was  the  unofficial  body  of  self-
interested  neighbors  who  did  the  dirty  work  of  imposing  the  prohibition,
while in  Cusack it was  the city councillors  who did that,  while  the neighbors
were  simply  empowered  to  confer  the  favor  of an  exception:  "The  one  or-
dinance permits  two-thirds  of the lot  owners  to impose  restrictions  upon  the
other property in the block, while the other permits one-half of the lot owners
to remove  a restriction from  the other property owners.  This  is not a delega-
tion of legislative power  .. 67 Justice McKenna,  author of the Eubank opi-
nion,  dissented.
Case  III:  Washington ex  rel.  Seattle  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Roberge
(1928). 68 A  landowner wishing  to  construct  a  charitable  home for  aged poor
persons  in  a  residentially  zoned area,  but apparently unable  to gain the  con-
sent  of neighboring landowners,  succesfully challenged  the constitutionality  of
Seattle's  zoning  provision  permitting  "a  philanthropic  home  for  children  or
for  old  people  . . . in  first  residence  district  when  the  written  consent  shall
have  been  obtained  of the  owners  of two  thirds  of the property  within  four
hundred  (400)  feet  of the  proposed  building." 69  This  provision  was  a  1925
amendment  to a pre-existing ordinance which had simply omitted such homes
from  the list  of uses  allowed  in  the first  residence  district.  Given  the  less-
than-satisfying earlier  decisions  with which  the Court had  to cope,  perhaps it
is not surprising  that its Roberge opinion  is a  welter of  confusion and incon-
sistency  from  which  it  is  impossible  to  extract  any  precise,  uncontradicted
statement  of the  constitutional  defect  found  in the Seattle  ordinance:
The  right of the [owner]  to devote  its land  to any legitimate  use is pro-
perty  within  the  protection  of  the  Constitution.  The  facts  disclosed  by the
record"0  make  it  clear  that  the  exclusion  of the  new  home  from  the  first
district  is  not  indispensable  to  the  general  zoning  plan.  And  there  is  no
legislative  determination  that  the proposed  building and use would be  incon-
sistent  with  . . . general  welfare.  The  enactment  itself plainly  implies  the
contrary.  . . . The section  purports  to  give  the  owners of  less  than one-half
11id.  at 529.
6
71d.  at 531.
61278  U.S.  116.
11Id.  at 118.
"The  tract "is located  about 6 miles from  the business center of Seattle,  on a tract  267  feet
wide,  . . . having an  average  depth  of more  than 700  feet and  an  area  of 5  acres  . . . . The
structure would  he located  280 feet  from  the avenue  on  the  west  and about  400  feet  from  the
lake on  the east, cover  4 per cent of the tract,  and be mostly hidden  by trees  and shrubs.  The
distance between  it and the  nearest  building on  the  south would  be  110  feet,  on  the  north 160,
and on  the west 365."  Id. at 117.
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the land within  400 feet  of the  proposed  building authority-uncontrolled  by
any standard or  rule prescribed  by  legislative action-to  prevent  the  (owner]
from using its land for the proposed  home  ....  They are not bound by  any
official  duty, but  are free  to withhold  consent for  selfish reasons  or arbitrari-
ly,  and may subject the  [plaintiff]  to their will  or caprice  . . . . The  delega-
tion so attempted  is repugnant  to the due process  clause  of the 14th Amend-
ment. Eubank v.  Richmond  ....
Thomas  Cusack v.  Chicago  . . . was held unlike  Eubank v.  Richmond,
supra,  and  the  ordinance  [there]  was  fully  sustained.  The facts  found were
sufficient to warrant  the conclusion that such billboards  would or were liable
to endanger  the  safety  and decency  of [residential]  districts  . . . . It is  not
suggested that the proposed new home for aged poor would be a nuisance  ....
The facts shown  clearly  distinguish the  proposed  building and  use from  such
billboards  or other  uses which  by reason  of their nature  are  liable to be of-
fensive.
As  the  attempted  delegation  cannot  be  sustained,  and  the  restriction
thereby  sought  to be  put upon  the permission  is arbitrary and repugnant  to
the due process  clause  . . . the  [owner]  is entitled  to have  the permit applied
for.
We need  not decide  whether,  consistently  with the  14th Amendment,  it
is within the  power of the state  or municipality by a general zoning law to ex-
clude the proposed  new home from  a district  defined as  is the  first district in
the  ordinance  under  consideration  .
7
Highlighted  and reduced  to its essentials,  the  logic of the  Court's discus-
sion comes  to this:  (1)  The facts  do not themselves  suggest that the plaintiffs
proposed rest home would be so disturbing to neighboring land uses as to call
for  restrictions  on  the plaintiffs  free  use  of its  property.  (2)  Nor has the  city
legislature  exercised  the  responsibility  of  determining  that  the  potential
disturbance  to  others  is  such  as  to justify  restricting  the  plaintiffs  freedom.
(3)  So  the Seattle  scheme is  simply one for  sacrificing the  plaintiffs freedom
to the  caprice of  his neighbors.  It  is  thus just like  the scheme  condemned  in
Eubank and  it  is,  just  as  that  one  was,  an  improper  attempt  to  delegate
legislative  power  which violates  the  due  process  guaranty.  (4) Of  course  the
form  of the  Seattle  scheme  is  of  the kind which  the Court held  in  Cusack is
not  a  delegation  of legislative  power  at all (that  is,  it empowers  neighbors  to
lift  a  legislatively  imposed  restriction,  not  to  impose  a  restriction
themselves) - which  was  admittedly  the  reason  given  in  Cusack  for
distinguishing that case from Eubank. (5)  But this  case differs from Cusack in
that  there  the  facts  showed  billboards  to  be noxious  intruders  in  residential
neighborhoods,  while  here  the  facts  fail  to  indicate  that  the  plaintiffs  rest
home would be a noxious intruder in its neighborhood.  So the plaintiffs pro-
perty  rights prevail  and  it does  not matter  whether  the  scheme  is labeled  a
delegation  or not.  (6)  Given  the delegation feature  in the Seattle scheme,  it  is
unnecessary  to  decide  in this  case whether  this  Seattle ordinance  would have
violated this plaintiffs constitutional  property rights if  the ordinance had flat-
7id. at  121-123.
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ly  excluded  all  rest  homes  from  the  first  residence  district.  (7)  On  this  in-
conclusive  and mystifying  note  the  Court  ends.
Now  one wants  to think  that there  must  be better, truer  reasoning than
that  to  support  the  Court's  conclusion  not  only  that  the  Seattle  ordinance
should be  struck  down  but  also that  both  the Eubank and  Cusack decisions
should be reaffirmed. 72 As  presented,  after all,  the three  cases form  a puzzl-
ing  triangle. The  Cusack Court's professed  reason for upholding  the Chicago
scheme,  while reaffirming disapproval of the Richmond  one,  seems  an uncon-
vincing  triumph  of  form  over  substance.  But  if  that  formal  distinction  is
taken seriously,  the Seattle  scheme  is like Chicago's,  not Richmond's;  and yet
Seattle's  scheme  is  treated  like  Richmond's,  not  Chicago's-that  is,  it  is  in-
validated.  What  is  needed  is  to  see  whether  economically  inspired  public-
choice  thinking  can  help  one  get  beneath  the  Court's  inadequate  formal
analysis so  as to reach more  telling explanatory  factors  that can reconcile  the
actual  decisions.
The exercise may begin by deepening  bewilderment.  Viewing the Eubank
and  Roberge cases  through  the  lens  of public-choice  theory,  which  regards
governmental  power  as intentionally  responsive  to  the private  concerns of in-
dividuals,  those  decisions seem  more wrong than ever.  It seems  as though the
decentralization  schemes  were  a  refinement  and  purification,  rather  than  a
corruption, of privatistically geared  democratic process.  Since  no one need be
concerned  about  the existence  or location  of a  setback line  or rest home ex-
cept  the owners  and residents  in the  immediate  vicinity,  the  decentralization
schemes  have  the  seemingly  desirable  effect  of  maximizing  the  direct  in-
fluence  in  each  such decision  of the  individuals  directly  affected  by  it.  The
insight  that  participants  in  the  process  would  each  look  out  for  their  own
private  interests,  being  the  very  assumption  of economic  theories  of govern-
ment,  can hardly count as a  valid objection.  Nor, for the same reason,  can it
be  objectionable  that  the  affected  individuals  act  for  themselves  directly
rather  than  through  the  imperfect  and  corruptible  medium  of  legislative
representation.  One's  puzzlement  may  be  reinforced  by  looking  forward  in
time  to  1936  and Justice  Sutherland's  opinion  for  the  Court  in  the  Carter
Coal  Company  case,  invalidating,  on  delegation  grounds,  a  congressional
authorization and incentive  to coal producers  and miners to enact by majority
rule a legally enforceable  labor code for their own industry.7 "  The Court call-
ed  the  congressional  scheme  "legislative  delegation  in  its  most  obnoxious
72The  reasoning in Roberge has often found confused.  See e.g.,  Hogue, Eastlake and Arling-
ton Heights: New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use,  28  CASE  W.  RES.  L.  REV.  41,  48-51
(1977).  [hereinafter  cited  as Hogue]  We  can grant  the  legal realists  their predictable claim  that
the  best  explanation  for  any  logical  inconsistencies  among  the  decisions  lies  in  such  extra-
doctrinal  factors  as  turnover in the  Court's personnel,  changes  in political  ideologies  or relative
influence of Justices,  etc. Our question nevertheless  persists, for we are looking at things from  the
standpoint of the Justices who  issued and agreed  to the Roberge opinion, and trying to figure out
how they could  have  thought the three decisions  were mutually  consistent.
"1Carter v.  Carter  Coal Co.,  298 U.S.  238,  311  (1936).
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form,  for it is not even  delegation to an official or an official body,  presump-
tively  disinterested,  but to  private  persons  whose  interests  may be  and  often
are  adverse  to  the  interests  of  others"  participating  in  and  subject  to  the
regulatory  scheme.74  And  yet  in  economic  theory  legislative  officials  are not
"presumptively disinterested"  but rather supposed to pursue  the particular  in-
terests  of their  constituents.
On  second  look  a  good  market-failure  explanation  for  the Eubank deci-
sion may be  detected.  In both  variants of the normative  economic  theory  of
government,
76  government  is  regarded  as  a  necessary  evil-a  generator  of
political  externality  costs  worth  bearing  only  because  and  insofar  as  they
replace  even  larger  market  externality  costs.  The  latter  are  the  costs  of
discoordination  resulting  from  market  failure.
76 Market  failure  is  a  problem
typically  associated  with  high  transaction  costs  arising  out  of  strategic
behavior  in  large-number bargaining  situations.  But the  Richmond  Council's
very  act  of adopting  a  blockfront  decentralization  scheme  implies  its judg-
ment  that  the relevant  bargaining  group-  consisting  of the  property  owners
within  a  relevant  spillover  area-need  be  no  larger  than  the  number  of
owners  within  a  block;  and that number may be small enough that the tran-
saction  costs should not be expected to overwhelm  a  private-market  deal bin-
ding each owner  to a restrictive  covenant establishing  a consensually  accepted
building  line.
77  Thus  there may  be insufficient market-failure  justification  in
1
4 d.  at  311. 75That  is,  the  "big-bribe"  and  "market-failure"  variants.  See  text  accompanying  notes
40-46,  supra.
"
8The big bribe variant  focuses on  the costs  of predation and defense  in a state  of nature.
"See  B.  SIEGAN,  LAND  USE  WIThOUT  ZONING  77-84  (1972);  Ellickson,  Alternaiives to Zon-
ing:  Covenants, Nuisance, Rules,  and Fines as Land  Use  Controls, 40  U.  CI.  L.  Rxv.  681,
713-19  (1973).  The crucial importance  of group size,  and the  sharply lesser likelihood of strategic
factors preventing joint pursuit of the convergent  aims  of members  of small groups,  are  explored
at length  in  M.  OLSON,  THE  LOGIC  OF  COLLEcTIVE  AcriON:  (1965)  [hereinafter  cited as  Olson].
Application  of Olson's analysis  to  the problem  of controlling land uses  across a  given  area is
a bit complex  but worth trying to  work out.  From an economic  standpoint,  the basic question to
be  asked  about  any  contemplated  restriction,  or  scheme  of  restrictions,  on  uses  which  owners
within  the  area  would  otherwise  be  legally  free  to make  of  their respective  parcels  of  land,  is
whether  the restriction  or scheme would  be efficient in the sense that the total of the private  ex-
change  values  of the benefits it would  bestow  exceeds  the total  of the private  exchange  values of
the  detriments  it would  impose.  Only  if  the  answer  to  that  question  is  "yes"  is  there  even the
possbiility  of  a problem  of market  failure  which  might  be (partially)  rectified  by  coercive,  ma-
joritarian governmental  action; and likewise,  in terms  of Olson's  analysis,  it is  only if that answer
is  "yes"  that we can  properly speak  of  the aggregation  of owners within  the area  as constituting
(vis-a-vis  the  question  of imposing  the  restrictive  scheme)  a  "group"-"a number of  individuals
with  a  common  interest."  (Id. at  8).
Their  "common  interest"  of  course,  is just  that of  getting  the  efficient  scheme  imposed  if
there is one.  We  have  already (See notes  43-46,  supra & text accompanying)  noted some reasons
why strictly voluntary,  private  action,  in the form of a multilateral  market exchange  transaction,
might fail  to  hit upon and  impose  an actually  efficient  restrictive  scheme.  Olson's  thesis focuses
on  the size  of the group of owners  in the area  as an important  factor affecting  the probability of
such  market failure,  saying  that the  probability  increases  with  increasing  size of the group.
One of Olson's  points is  the simple and obvious  one that the  transaction costs  of concluding a
voluntary  arrangement  will  increase with increasing  size of  the group  (see OLSON  at 46,  48)-a
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this  case  for  any  regulatory  intervention  with  its  ever-attendant  threat  of
severe  political  externalities.  The  significance  of  the  Richmond  scheme's
decentralization  feature,  then,  would  be  its  implication  that spillovers  from
building  set-back  decisions  are not believed  to  extend beyond  a  block  or  so,
making  it feasible  to  hope  for  internalization  through  voluntary,  consensual
dealings within  a blockfront-sized group.7"  This account  ties in nicely with the
point having special  significance  (see id. at 42)  in cases,  such  as those  we are considering,  where
lack of unanimous  agreement  will likely bmean  no  deal  at  all (because  (a) just  one parcel  with
billboards  can blight the whole  block,  and (b)  the worst situation of all is  to have  had your land
restricted while some neighbor's is left unrestricted,  and (c)  the best situation  of all is to own the
only unrestricted  lot in the block).
But  Olson's  analysis  takes  us  beyond  this  obvious  point  regarding  transaction  (organiza-
tional)  costs  to  a  quite  distinct  (though  complementary)  feature  of group  size-a  feature  most
easily perceived  if we  artificially divide  the potential  voluntary transaction  into the  two stages  of
(i) identifying the several,  and the total,  private valuations of the costs (detriments) of a restrictve
scheme,  and  (ii)  arranging  for payment  of  those  costs  by  those  owners  (or some  of  them) for
whom  the private  valuations of the scheme  are positive.  Stage  (i)-securing complete  and honest
reports from each owner  in the area  of how much monetary compensation (if any) will be needed
to prevent adoption  of the scheme from injuring his or her net welfare position-obviously entails
transaction  costs  which will increase  with  the number  of owners  who must be heard  from.  But,
according  to  Olson's  analysis,  the  likelihood  of successful  completion  of stage  (ii)  depends  on
group size  for reasons in addition to transaction  costs.  Once the total compensation-payments  bill
is known to all  those  owners  who regard the scheme  as  beneficial,  the group composed of those
beneficiary owners may be, in Olson's  terminology,  either a "privileged,"  or an "intermediate,"  or
a  "latent"  group.  (See  id. at 49-51.)  The  beneficiary  group  is privileged if at least  one  of  its
members  values  the group's "collective  good" (i.e.,  imposition  of the  restrictive scheme) so  highly
as  to  find it  worthwhile  to  pay  all  necessary  compensation  payments  himself;  the group  is  in-
termediate if it has  no  such  member  and also  "does  not  have  so  many members  that  no  one
member  will  notice  whether  any  other  member  is  or  is  not  helping  to provide  the  collective
good;"  and it is latent if each  of its  members thinks  that whether or not he or she contributes to
the effort  to obtain  the collective  good (the  restrictive  scheme)  is a circumstance  that will  make
no practical difference  to  the other members and  so will go unnoticed  by them.  The crucial con-
ceptual  distinction between  intermediate  and latent groups  thus is one  pertaining to incentives:
each  member  of a  latent group  has  reason  to think  that the  collective  good  is  as  likely  to  be
privided  if she  does  not contribute  as if she does,  so  there  is  an incentive  for each  to  withhold
voluntary  contribution.  But each  member  of an intermediate  group  is in  a position  to  see that
her failure to contribute  may lead others to  refuse, and so result in her not obtaining the desired
good;  and so there is some incentive to  contribute.  Olson arrives  at two related conclusions  from
this analysis,  which certainly  are  consistent  with  intuition:  First: whether  a group is  privileged,
intermediate,  or latent  is likely to depend significantly  on group size-with smaller  groups being
more  likely  to  br privileged  and  larger groups  being  more  likely  to be  latent.  Second, with  a
privileged  group  there  is  a  reasonable  expectation  that  a  collective  good  (such  as  an  efficient
scheme of land use  restrictions) will be privided by voluntary private  transactions with no special
effort at group coordination  or organization;  with a latent group such  a good will  not be provid-
ed except  through some coercive  framework (such as  a majoritarian legislature);  and with an in-
termediate  group  the  good  may  possibly  (or may  not)  be provided  without coercion,  but some
special  coordinating  or organizational  effort  will  be needed.
The  upshot  is  that increasing  size of  a group  of potentially  affected  landowners  hurts  the
group's  chances  of  voluntarily  (extra-governmenatlly)  adopting  an  efficient  scheme  of land  use
restrictions  in  two  distinct though complementary  ways:  (1) the larger the group,  the higher the
transaction  (organizational)  costs;  and (2)  the larger the whole  group,  the larger (probably)  the
subgroup  of potential  beneficiaries,  and,  therefore,  the  less likely that subgroup  is to fall within
the  "privileged"  or "intermediate"  category.
78The argument  is a normative  twist on  a positive hypothesis  advanced  in Posner  II, supra
note  62,  at 345;  "[TJhe demand  for regulation  . . is greater among industries  for which private
cartelization  is  an unfeasible  or  very  costly  alternative-  industries  that lack  high  concentration
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later  decision  in  Gorieb v.  Fox,79  upholding  a  city  council's  regulation  of
building  setbacks,  fixed  on  a  block-by-block  basis,  against  substantive  due
process  attack  and  distingushing  Eubank on the  delegation  point.  In  defen-
ding  the  ordinance  the  Court  suggested  a  number  of conceivable  virtues  of
block-long uniform  building lines.  Most of these  were  plainly of the sort  that
are significant only within short range  (roughly,  a single block)-for example,
protecting  each  parcel  from  shadows  cast  by  buildings  on  the  others.  But,
significantly,  at  least  one  of the  Gorieb Codrt's justifying  factors-the  safety
hazard  to  traffic  at corners  where  visibility  is  impared  by  curbside  construc-
tion-is  a  spillover  of at  least  citywide  dimension.  On the economic  view we
are now developing,  the difference  between  Gorieb and Eubank is just that in
the latter case the Richmond  Council had excluded  consideration  of citywide
spillovers  by decentralizing  the  decisions  to blockfronts.
Now  how  well  does  all  this  work  for  Cusack, Roberge, Carter Coal? In
Roberge the  Seattle  Council's  scheme  would,  by analogy  with  our treatment
of Eubank, imply  its  belief that  spillovers  from  a  rest-home  subside  into  in-
significance  beyond  four  hundred  feet  from  the  home.  In  a  developed
residential  area  one might  easily  expect  to  find  thirty  or  more  homeowners
within a  400-foot radius of any point8 0- quite possibly  in excess of the "small
and  other  characterisitics  favorable  to  cartelization.  They  lack good  substitutes  for regulation."
Compare  Buchanan,  supra note  43,  at  444-45.
Constrast  the solution  to  the Eubank/Cusack puzzle  offered  by R.  HALE, FREEDOM  THROUGH
LAW  364  (1952)  [hereinafter  cited  as  HALE]:
(1)  As noted by  McBain,  Law-Making by Property Owners, 36  POL. Se.  Q. 617
(1921),  the Cusack ordinance "could  reasonably  have been supported as a protection of
[neighborhood]  property  values;"  and  if so,  provision  for waiver  of protection  by  the
(only)  potentially  affected  property  owners  would  have  been  "reasonable."  [But see
note  117,  infra and  text accompaning.]
(2)  "On  the  other  hand,  the  justification  for  an  ordinance  which  requires
buildings to conform  to a street line may  be thought  to lie, not in the protection  of the
value of property  abutting the  same street,  but in the general  convenience or beauty of
the city."
(3)  But conditioning  a  land-use restriction  on  neighborhood  action or  waiver  is
"reasonable"  only if protection  of  interests  contained  within  the  neighborhood-  and
not  some  citywide  interest  or "more  general  consideration" -is  the justifiying  aim  of
the restriction.
(4)  It follows  from (1),  (2),  and  (3)  that the delegation  feature  was "reasonable"
in the signboard case but not in the building-line  case;  or, putting the same conclusion
somewhat differently,  that inclusion of the delegation feature in the Eubank building-
line ordinance  is consistent  only with a  view  of  that ordinance  as aimed at protecting
neighborhood  rather than  citywide interests,  and on that view  of it the ordinance  fails
the substantive  due  process  test  of relationship  to  a valid  and significant  societal in-
terest (because,  according  to (2),  "the justification"  for such an ordinance is  "thought
to  lie  [only]  in the general  convenience  or beauty of the  city.
But this attempt  to reconcile Eubank and Cusack seems fatally flawed by the arbitrariness  of
(2)-of "thinking"  that  only  citywide interests,  not localized  neighborhood  concerns  (as reflected
in "property values"),  can rationally justify a builiding-line  ordinance.  Armchair  reflection seems
sufficient to banish any such "thought."  If authority also  is required,  see the Supreme Court's opi-
nion in  the Gorieb case,  discussed  in text immediately  following.
79274  U.S.  603  (1928).
10A  circle with a radius of 400 ft.  has an area  of (400)2 7r =  507,456  sq.  ft.  A  quarter-acre
building  lot has  an area of about  11,000  sq.  ft.
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number"  of bargainers  for  whom  strategic  transaction  costs  are  expected  to
remain  tolerable."'  On  the  other  hand,  the  Court's  description  of  the  case
suggests  that  the  number  actually  involved  there  may  have  been  much
smaller.' 2  Perhaps  an  efficient  legal  system  would  forbear  from  such  a
"microscopic"' ' 3  examination  of  the  facts  of  particular  cases.  If  so,  then
Roberge  could  be  viewed  as  consistent  with  Eubank  in  terms  of  an
economically  justifiable  general  rule  rejecting  land-use  regulation  schemes
which  are  decentralized  to  the "neighborhood"  scale,  because  of the general
likelihood  that at that  scale  the market  externalities  arising from  bargaining
strategy  are  unlikely  to exceed  the  political  externalities  associated  with  col-
lective decision. 84 Carter Coal is just a bit harder to deal with.  On the surface
it would  seem that the numbers of individual  producer firms  and miners, the
units  which  would  have  been  organized  into  majority-rule  regimes  by  the
Bituminous  Coal  Conservation  Act  of  1935,  was  very  large  indeed.  The
Court's recital of the facts does not, however,  reveal  the extent to which these
individual  agents  might  have  already  organized  themselves  into  voluntary
associations  for  purposes  of  negotiating  labor  agreements,  and  it  is  con-
ceivable  that  the  number of economically  operative  units had  (as  the  Court
somehow  knew,  but  did  not  say)  by  such  means  been  reduced  to  a  small
enough  number  that  no  further  governmental  intervention  was  needed  to
overcome  the  transaction  costs  of voluntary  bargaining.  Of  course just  sug-
gesting  this  possibility  discloses  a  broader  and  plainly  more  powerful
economic  interpretation  of  the  Carter Coal  delegation  holding:  If  such
collective-bargaining  units  had  in  fact  been  organized  on  either  side,  they
would have been regarded by  economists not as the benign  outcome of volun-
tary  transactions  overcoming  externalities  and  thereby  achieving  efficiency,
but  rather  as  economically  damaging,  anti-competitive,  combinations  in
restraint of trade which  obstructed the march  towards  efficiency. 8  The  only
externalities  that would be overcome by such associations,  whether  voluntarily
organized  or  imposed  by  the  government,  would be  the  merely  "pecuniary"
ones arising out of competition;  and those externalities,  not being regarded as
economically  evil  or inefficient,  would  have  provided  no justification  for the
imposition  of the political-externality  costs implicit  in majoritarian  formula-
tion  of a  Coal  Code.
But whatever may be said about Roberge and Carter Coal, the proposed
economic  rationale  for  the  Eubank  decision  will  not  suffice  to  explain  the
I'See  note  77 supra.
"See  note  70 supra.
"Compare  Posner, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contratct Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
83,  103  (1977).  [hereinafter  cited  as Posner  III].
"On  the  economic  arguments  favoring  use of rules  of thumb  over particularistic  applica-
tion of broad standards, see id. at 95-96,  114;  Ehrlich  & Posner,  An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  257  (1974).
"
5See,  e.g.,  EcONOMic  ANALYSiS  supra note  2,  at 239-41,  501.
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Cusack case.  If  block-sized  groups  are  not  too  large  to  deal  economically6
with  building  setback  spillovers,  neither  are  they  too  large  to  deal
economically  with billboard  spillovers.  The proposed  theory seems  to suggest,
then,  that  the  Chicago  billboard  ordinance  should  have  been  struck  down
because  its  block-by-block  decentralization  feature  implied  that  billboard
spillovers  are block-sized  in scale,  and  so could  have been most economically
handled  by  the  unregulated  market.
Economically  inspired,  public-choice  thinking,  however,  offers  another
way  to get at  Cusack-one which  has  the happy virtue  of giving some more-
than-formalistic  point to the Court's insistence that the Chicago scheme mere-
ly  gave  the  neighbors  the power  to lift  a  restriction  imposed  by the  Council,
this being viewed  as somehow different from giving them the power  to impose
their  own  restriction.  Suppose  the  Chicago  council  had  just  flatly  ruled
billboards  out  of  predominantly  residential  blocks.  Normative  public-choice
theorists  could  argue  that  the  billboard  interests  would  have  had  no  valid
complaint,  because  this  outcome  would  just  have  been  one  of a  series  over
which  they,  presumably,  like  other  interests,  could  expect  to  derive  a  net
benefit  from  coordination  which  only government  could  achieve  at a  feasible
transaction  cost.87  While  the  particular  outcome  (billboard  exclusion  from
residential  areas)  is  deterimental  to  them,  other  outcomes  of  the  same
legislative  process  presumably  have been or will  be beneficial.  And  this rela-
tionship  of  reciprocity  is  not  supposed  to  be  accidental.  The  billboard  in-
terests in  Cusack, almost certainly a  self-conscious  and very possibly a  formal-
ly  organized  interest-group,  would  have  had a  fair  chance  to fight their bat-
tle,  to  protect  their  interest,  to  engage  effectively  in  political  horsetrade,  at
the city council  level. They in fact may have exacted  some concessions respec-
ting  other  legislative  concerns  of  theirs  during  the  process  of  building  a
legislative  majority  to enact  the  challenged  ordinance.  It  may,  indeed,  seem
especially  plausible to think of them  as having thus "given in"  (for a price)  to
the ordinance,  since  it leaves  them with  at least a  hope  of prevailing in par-
ticular  situations  by obtaining  neighborhood  consents.  But be  that last point
as  it  may,  since  the  billboard  interests  cannot  (in  this  public-choice  vision)
complain  about  a  flatly  prohibitory  ordinance,  they a fortiori can not  com-
plain  about the  one  that gives  them  an  escape  hatch.
A  comparison  of  the  political  opportunities  available  to  the  interests
which  turn  out  to  be  harmed  in Eubank is  instructive.  For them,  no  com-
parable  log-rolling opportunity  ever  seems  to have existed.  At least it is hard
to  imagine  an  anti-setback  lobby  mobilizing  to  oppose  the  Richmond  or-
dinance  in the City Council or exact concessions  in respect of its enactment.88
8 That is,  with tolerable  transaction  costs.  See  note  77  supra & text  accompanying.
7See  notes 43,  44 supra  & text accompanying.
8There  may,  of  course,  have  been  a self-conscious-even  an  orgainzed-homebuilder  or
developer  (vacant  land  owner) interest.  But participants  in such  an  interest  could  normally  an-
ticipate sharing in the benefits  as  well as in the burdens to be generated by the blockfront  actions
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The  only  trenchant  legislative  decision  was  made  at  the  blockfront  level,
where no space  or opportunity  for political trade ever existed. The blockfront
group was not a polity  possessed  of any breadth of substantive  competence  or
even  continuity  of organized  existence.  The Madisonian  or Dahlian  vision  of
coalitions  that form  and re-form  from issue to issue,  of legislators  exchanging
support  here  for  support  there  in  an  ever-shifting  alignment  of  interest
groups,  making  plausible  an  expectation  that  over  the  long  run  everyone
would  enjoy  a  net  balance  of  political  gains  in  excess  of losses,  had  neither
substantive nor temporal scope in which to operate.  In the Eubank blockfront
there  would  be one  group  of winners,  one  group  of losers,  on one,  single,
nakedly  redistributive  occasion. s9
So  the effort  to find  an economic  rationale  for  the  Cusack decision sug-
gests  that  a  crucial  element,  in  the  market-failure  version  of the  normative
economic  theory  of  how  majoritarian  government  can  serve  everyone's  in-
dividual  long-run  interest,  is  the  theory  of  coalitions,  of  log-rolling,  of
"minorities  rule"  in  Robert  Dahl's  arresting  phrase. 9 0  Without  that  theory
there  can  be  no  credible  assurance  that  each  individual  will,  over  the  long
run,  derive  net  advantage  to  his  or her  own,  private interests  from  the ma-
joritarian  welfare  state.
Having  seen  how  log-rolling  theory  can  thus  provide  an  economic  ra-
tionale  for the seemingly  opposed  resvlts  in the Eubank and  Cusack cases,  it
is necessary  to  consider  how  well  that  same rationale  might  also  handle  the
decisions  in Roberge and Carter Coal. As  for Roberge, the answer  is not very
well at all. The objectionable  regulatory scheme in Roberge arose out of two,
successive,  actions  by the  Seattle Council.  The first  action  was adoption  of a
comprehensive  zoning scheme  in which rest homes  were omitted from  the list
made  possible  by  the  Richmond  ordinance:  They  would  own  (or be  building  on) some  parcels
whose  amenity value would be increased by more  than their development value would  be reduced
by  the  various  blockfront  actions,  as well  as  some parcels  for which  the  balance  would  be  the
reverse.  A  priori, then,  the enabling  ordinance  may for them  have  been no more  a threat  than
an  opportunity.  By  contrast,  the  Chicago  billboard  ordinance  could  work  only to  the  disadvan-
tage  of firms  in the  outdoor  advertising  business:  first,  by  destroying  the value  of outstanding
leases  (or negotiations  for leases)  in residential  areas;  second,  by drastically  reducing the supply
of legally available  billboard  sites and thus  driving up the price (in  the forms both  of rentals  to
owners  and  of  "bribes"  to  neighbors  in return  for  their consents);  third,  by  reducing  the  total
number of useable  advertising  locations available  at feasible  cost,  and thereby reducing  the total
demand for billboard-related  services  such  as site  acquisition,  construction,  artwork,  production,
posting.
8
91t is true,  of course, that some blockfront  owners might have been compensated by others
(with,  e.g.,  money) for agreeing to  vote in favor of the building line  despite its  injurious  impact
on  their  interests.  But since  a unanimous  vote was  not  required,  there  would  very  likely  be  at
least a  few  uncompensated,  injured owners.  See generally W.  RiKER,  THE THEORY  OF  POLITICAL
COALITIONS  (1962).
9 R. DAHL,  A  PREFACE TO  DEMOCRATIC  THEORY  (1956).  See also D.  TRUMAN,  THE GOVERN-
MENTAL  PROCESS  (1958);  A.  BENTLEY.  THE  PROCESS  OF  GOVERNMENT  (1949);  W.  BAUMOL.
WELFARE  ECONOMICS  AND  THE  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  45  (2d  ed.  1965);  E.  HAFELE,  REPRESEN-
TATIvE  GOVERNMENT  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  MANAGEMENT  (1973).  The group-interest  theory  sup-
ported by Truman and  Bentley, supra, is critically reviewed  in OLSON.  supra note  76,  at 117-31.
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of  uses  allowed  in  first  residence  districts.  It obviously  would  be  stretching  a
point too far to deny that the pendency of a  comprehensive zoning bill before
a  city  council  affords  a perfectly adequate-not  to say  an unusually fine-op-
portunity  for  all  interests  whose  land-use  activities  would  suffer  restriction
under  the  bill  to  defend  themselves  through  normally  available  log-rolling
channels.91  At  any  rate,  one  could  hardly  make  that  denial  and  still  have
much  of  any  governmental  regulatory  competence  left,  and  of  course,  one
could  not  make  it  at  all  without  (in  our  proposed  economic  frame  of
reference)  outright rejection  of the  1926  decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.
92  The  second  action  consisted  of an  amendment  allowing  rest homes  in
first  residence  districts  if,  but  only if,  the  requisite  consents  were  obtained
from neighboring  owners.  From  the standpoint  of log-rolling theory,  the total
effect  looks similar  to,  though  possibly  less  obviously justifiable  than that of,
the  Chicago  City  Council's  action  upheld  in  Cusack.
9
3
Application  of  the  log-rolling  theory  to  Carter Coal yields  a  more  am-
biguous  result.  On  the one  hand,  Carter Coal seems  to resemble  Eubank in
that in neither case  were well-defined,  interest-oriented  decisions made by the
constitutionally  recognized  legislative  body  (Congress  or  the  Richmond  City
Council).  In  both  cases  the  delegation  was  so  vague  or  open  that  no  one
could  really  tell  how  he  stood  to  gain  or  lose  until  specific  proposals  took
shape  in  the irregular forum  to which authority  had been delegated,  so  that
only  in that forum  could  there have been any possibility  of joint optimization
through  trade.  On  the other hand,  Carter Coal seems  to  differ  sharply from
Eubank when  attention  is  shifted  to  the  make-up  of the  irregular  forum's
agenda.  In Eubank that  agenda  was  utterly flat  and  simple:  one unidimen-
sional issue,  one resolution.  By contrast,  the  agenda  laid before the coal  pro-
ducers  and miners  by  the  Bituminous  Coal  Conservation  Act  of  1935-for-
mulation  of codes  to govern  production,  employment,  and  marketing  in the
nation's  coal  industry-was,  one  would  think,  bursting with  potential  issues
that could cleave  the participants  along many different  axes into many  cross-
cutting  proto-coalitions.  Certainly  one  cannot  conclude  without  closer  in-
vestigation  that  there  was  no  genuine  possibility  there  of joint optimization
through  vote-trading.
94  Carter Coal, then,  can perhaps be fitted with the log-
rolling  theory,  but only  by  making  a  superficially  dubious  assumption  about
unexplored  facts.
91See  Michelman,  Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations  of
'.ust Compensation" Law,  80  HARv.  L.  REv.  1165,  1218,  1223  (1967).
91272  U.S.  365 (1926)  (upholding comprehensive  zoning  ordinance  against  substantive  due
process  attack).
"As  compared  with  the  Chicago  outdoor-advertising  industry,  sponsors  of  "philanthropic
homes for  children  or old  people"  in  Seattle may  seem less  certain to  have been an organized  or
organizeable  interest  group capable  of effective  lobbying  at the city-council  level.
"
4Optimization,  that  is,  from  the standpoint  of the participants.  We have  already seen  that
from a more inclusive,  societal standpoint,  the anticompetitive  outcome of the code-making  pro-
cess  could not  be expected  to be  optimizing,  see note  85  supra and  text accompanying.
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Pausing  now  to  review,  we  have  identified  two  distinct  normative
economic  sub-theories  of delegation:  the small-numbers/low-transaction-costs
sub-theory  (henceforward  the  "small  numbers  theory")95  and  the  log-
rolling/thin-agenda  ("log-rolling")  sub-theory. 6  The  small  numbers  theory
adequately  handles  Eubank and Roberge, and  covers  Carter Coal by  exten-
sion'7  but  fails to  explain  Cusack. The  log-rolling  theory  adequately  handles
Eubank and Cusack, covers Carter Coal only if stretched,  and may  fail to ex-
plain Roberge.91 The obvious next  move  is  to cumulate  the two  sub-theories.
A normative  economic  account  of government will  then  be seen  to offer  two
separate  reasons  for  invalidating  certain  legislative  delegations:  (i)  that  the
group to which the delegation  is made is so small  as to contradict there being
an  economic justification  for  any  collective  decision  at all,  and  (ii)  that  the
delegation  prevents  the  crystallization  of issues,  in  an  interest-oriented  form,
in any forum whose  agenda  is fat enough  to accommodate joint  optimization
by  log-rolling.  It  can  then  be  said  the  the  Eubank delegation  was  bad  on
both  grounds,  the Roberge delegation  was  bad  on first  ground,  the  Carter
delegation  was  questionable  (or worse) on both grounds  and  so  certainly bad
when  the  doubts  are cumulated.
But  Cusack, alas,  remains  a problem.  Cusack looks  like the same case  as
Roberge: a  delegation  bad  on small-numbers  grounds  but not  on log-rolling
grounds.  If either ground  alone is supposed to be sufficient  for condemning a
delegation,  then Roberge stands explained  but Cusack does not;  and if both
together  are supposed  to  be necessary  for  invalidity,  then  Cusack stands  ex-
plained but Roberge does  not. The only way finally to square  all four  cases  is
to  show  that,  in  normative  economic  thinking,  the  small-numbers  objection
should  recede  before  an  unusually strong  showing  of log-rolling  opportunity
in a  constitutionally recognized  legislative  body. To  any reader who has  been
willing  to  follow  the  economic  tour de force this far,  it will  come  as no sur-
prise  to be  told  that  this,  too,  can be  done-if with  some effort.
As a prelude for this last triumphant step,  it is necessary to shift attention
momentarily  back to the public purpose  doctrine.  It can  now be seen that as
between  strictly  procedural  review  (tantamount  to  a  rejection  of  any
justiciable,  substantive  public-purpose  limitation)9  and  rational-basis  review,
only  the former and not the latter truly fits the market-failure  version  of the
economic  theory  of government-just  as  only  the  former  fits  the  big-bribe
version. 00  For in  recognizing  the  crucial  significance  of log-rolling,  one  sees
that  the  market-failure  account  depends  not  only  on  a  conception  of self-
interested  legislative traders-or  of legislative  traders  self-interestedly  respon-
sive to  self-interested constituents-but  also on a  conception of legislative out-
95See notes  75-86  supra & text accompanying.
"See  notes  87-94 supra & text  accompanying.
9 1 7 See note  85  supra & text accompanying.
IsSee  notes 91-94  supra & text accompanying.
19See  note  56 supra &  text accompanying.
'0 0See note  57  supra  & text accompanying.
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put  as not  a  series  of  discrete,  separately  intelligible  and  appraisable  enact-
ments,  but rather  a  continuous  unitary network  of compromise-of  implicit
multilateral  trade  so  complex  as  to  be  almost  certainly  opaque  and  in-
decipherable  to  any  outside  observer. 1 01
The log-rolling element  in the normative  public-choice  argument  implies
the  indissoluble  interconnectedness  of all  the  moments  of legislative  activity,
depriving  an observer  of all ability  to individuate  or isolate legislative  acts for
purposes  of  rational-basis  appraisal.  There  just  is  no  saying  where  one
legislative  transaction  ends  and  another  begins,  if everything  the  legislature
does  is  integrated  into  an endless,  unfathomable  process  of  implicit  bargain
and  compromise.  Since  it  is just  that process  over  time,  and  no  particular
moment  inside  the  process,  that  is  supposed  to  redound  to  everyone's  net
private  advantage,  only the  integrity of the process  and not  the virtue of the
moments  can  ever be  open  to  external-that  is,  judicial-appraisal.
10 2
A crude-but not,  alas,  quite fanciful-analogy should  serve to drive  the
point  home.  Assume  P,  an  individual,  methodically  ploughing  under  crops
growing  on  his  farm.  Any  objection  that  Ps  behavior  is  wasteful  is  plainly
ruled out  by the  subjectivist,  individualist  tenets  of economics  (once granted
that those  really are P's land and P's crops).  One  might want  to say that PIs
behavior discloses  his insanity,  so as to vitiate any ethical claim exerted by his
subjectivity  and justify  restraining  him;  but caution  is  in  order  because  one
might,  if  one  troubled  to  ask,  discover  that  P  was  destroying  his  crops  in
return  for  a  large  monetary  payment  from  Q.  That  news  should  end  our
suspicion  of  P's  mental  health.  It  might  at  the  same  time  raise  a  concern
about  Q,  but  she  probably  has  an  equally  sane-though  possibly  idiosyn-
'O'Compare  Kennedy,  Legal Formality, 2 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  351,  (1973);  J.  COMMONS.  LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS  OF  CAPITALISM  7-9  (1924).
"
02This is the  conclusive  reason why  it  would  be fantastic  to think (see  note  58 supra) that
courts  engaged in rational-basis  review  are  responding  to  perceptions  or intuitions  of occasional
political  failure  or  misfire.  In  order  to  work  at all as  an  economic  rationale  of  the  welfare
state-in  order  to  compete  effectively  in  that  role  with  the  "big  bribe"  conception,  as  it  in-
contestably  has  in  the modem  history  of  American  political  thought,  see,  e.g.,  notes  45,  90
supra-the  "market  failure"  conception  must  commit  itself  to  the  claim  that  the  self-interest
motivated,  majoritarian  legislative  process  has an economizing  tendency  over much or most of its
constutional range.  The most that can be yielded  to the skeptical  wing of the literature,  see note
48 supra, is that  the process  doesn't  work perfectly, that sometimes it  breaks  down or fouls  up.
But given also  the interconnectedness  (discussed  in  the text) of all legislative  episodes, no one can
possibly claim to know just where in  the stream of legislative output the breakdowns have occur-
red.
Of course  it  remains  quite  possible to  think of judges  identifying  occasions  when legislative
measures  impair  interests  to  which such  an  extraordinarily  high value  is conventionally  assigned
that measures  impairing  those  interests  are  presumptively  inefficient;  and one might include,  in
the explanation  of why judges  on such  occasions  intervene  relatively  unrestrainedly,  the  thought
that judges  can in such  cases reasonably  suspect that the  political process must  have been visited
with "failure"  (else  it wouldn't-couldn't-have  committed  this enormity).  But  here  we have hit
upon  a  version  of  the  economic  theory  of  civil  liberties  and  the  Bill  of  Rights,  see,  e.g.,
BUCHANAN  & TULLOCK,  supra note  45,  at 73-74;  compare J.  RAwLs.  A THEORY  OF JUSTICE 205-21
(1971)  [hereinafter  cited as  Rawls],  and have  left  the domain of the "public purpose"  doctrine.
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cratic-explanantion  for  her conduct,  which  could  conceivably  involve  some
sort  of exchange  offer  from  R.  And  so  on.  In  the normative  public  choice
model  of legislation,  there is never  any  way of ruling out the  possibility of  a
network of obscure exchanges  that would explain,  if one  could only see it,  the
rationality  of  all  votes  cast in  favor  of ostensibly  crazy  measures.
And there (Eurekal)  we have the reason why,  in a  case like Cusack, a pa-
tent small-numbers  objection  to the economic  rationality  of the decentraliza-
tion  scheme  must be disregarded  as long  as  the scheme  can  be  seen  to  have
originated  in  a  duly  constituted  legislative  process  in  which  there  was  the
clearest  of opportunities  for  log-rolling  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  well-defined,
"vested"  interest  (i.e.,  the  billboard  industry)  which  stood  to  be  directly
harmed  by  the  very  enactment  establishing  the  decentralization.  The  final
result  is  that  by  use  of normative  economic  thinking  these  four  delegation
cases  can  be  reconciled,  but  only  by  a  move  that  also  overthrows  a  well-
entrenched body  of doctrine  in the not-so-remote  area  of public purpose.  No
matter  how  one  works  this  economic  shell  game,  one  cannot  cover  all  the
peas.
In  a  normative  economic  framework,  then,  it  looks  like  good-bye  to
rational-basis  review  under  the banner  of public  purpose-or, for  that mat-
ter,  of general  welfare  or  due  process  or equal  protection.  Yet  under  those
banners  state  judges,  at  least,  do  continue  to  invalidate  ordinances  and
statutes on grounds of substantive irrationality or like inadequacy,  and judges
state  and  federal  continue  to  intone  the rational-basis  litany. 03  If it  is true
that  even  such restrained  substantive judicial  review  is at odds  with the  sub-
jectivist,  individualist,  normative  economic  account  of  the  majoritarian
welfare state,  then  that account  cannot be said  to have undisputed  possession
of  the judicial  imagination  in the  realm  of  public  law  adjudication.  Some
other  conception  also  must  be  exerting  influence  there.
III.  PUBLIC  INTEREST THINKING  IN  PUBLIC  LAW  ADJUDICATION
Having  considered  some judicial  applications  of the public  purpose  and
delegation  doctrines  in  light  of  the public  choice  model,  one  ought  now  to
consider these  docrines in light  of the public  interest model.  Again  beginning
with  the public  purpose  doctrine,  the  hypothesis  now  to  be explored  is  that
substantive  judicial review  under  the aegis of public  purpose,  which impres-
sionistically seems  a far more  common judicial stance than merely procedural
review  of legislative  expenditure  dicisions,  is consistent  with an imputation to
'03 See,  e.g.,  in addition  to  cases  cited  at nn.  53-55  supra, United  States  Brewers'  Ass'n  v.
State,  220  N.W.  2d  544,  192  Neb.  328  (1974)  (invalidating statutory  protections  for  alcoholic
beverage distributorships  because "the  exercise of the  police power must be  directed toward  and
have  a rational  relation  to  the best  interests  of society  rather  than  the mere advantage  of par-
ticular  individuals").  See  generally  Note,  Counterrevolution in  State  Constitutional Law,  15
STAN.  L.  REv. 309  (1963);  Hetherington,  State Economic Regulation and Substative Due Process
of Law,  53  Nw.  L.  REV.  226  (1958).
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judges  of a  public-interest  type,  but  not a  public-choice  (economic)  type,  of
normative  model  of  government.104  In  a  normative  economic  framework
substantive  review  founders  on  subjectivism:  the  court  confronts  an
unanalyzable,  continuously  emergent  network  of  bargains-all  of  them
presumptively  rational  in  the eyes  of those  who actually  make  them-  among
kaleidoscopically  shifting  coalitions  of self  interest.  But  in  a  public-interest
framework,  in which  measures  are supposed  to  result  from  a joint  legislative
search  for  the right  or  best  answer,  nothing logically  prevents  a  court  from
concluding  that the legislature's  search must just have gone off the tracks in a
particular  case. 05
Of course the judges would not have available  any tightly structured  logic
or formula for deducing when a  legislature has switched  out of the ideal role.
They  would  have  to  consult  their own  educated understanding  of the values
broadly  shared  in  their society 0 8 - including  the rate  and  direction  of evolu-
tion  of values0 7- in order to make judgments  about whether  given  legislative
products  fairly  reflect  an  effort  to  realize  those  values  or  their  trajectories.
Sometimes  judges  would,  of necessity,  be  remitted  to  "hunches"10 8-just  as
courts  supposedly striving  to make  the common  law efficient  must  sometimes
fall  back on  huriches  about such  esoteric  questions  as  that  of how  to  adjust
the  legal  relations  of tulip  gardeners  and pea bird  ranchers,  when  their ac-
tivities  are  mutually  interfering,  so  as  to  maximize  the  social  value  (in  the
economic  sense of aggregated  individual  valuations)  of the  resultant  product
mix  of tulips and pea  birds.109
"'But  the  exceedingly  loose  review  in  federal  courts  may  reflect  the  influence  of  an
economic  model.  See  note  52 supra.
'I 5 ndeed,  the positive economic  theory of legislation-as  distinguished  from  the normative
economic  theory  embedded  in  the  public-choice  model-predicts  that humanly  frail legislators
will  tend to  stray  from  their ideal  role,  at  least unless  some external,  discipline  like substantive
judicial  review  is  imposed.  See,  e.g.,  G.  STIGLER.  THE  CITIZEN  AND  THE  STATE:  114-41  (1975);
POSNER  II, supra note  62;  notes 228-30,  infra & text accompanying.
Loose substantive review can be construed as both  a recognition that legislators playing their
ideal  role  re  generally  better  situated  than  are  judges  for reasoning  towards  right  solutions  to
social  problems,  and at the same time  a device  for prompting  the legislators  to  act in that ideal
role.  Compare  the  role  assigned  to  civil  disobedience  in  RAWLS.  supra note  102,  at  364-68,
382-86.
'No  doubt  closely  consulting  institutional  history,  as  does  Hercules  in  Dworkin,  Hard
Cases, 88  HARv.  L.  Rav.  1057  (1975).
'See  Tribe,  Structural  Due Process, 10  HARv.  Civ.  RTs.  Civ.  LiB.  L.  REV.  269,  291-303,
314-21  (1975).
"Compare  POSNER  III, supra note  83,  at  118.
0'
0 See  Posner,  Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.  LAW.  & ECON.  201,
209-11  (1971).  Compare  Lincoln Dairy  Co.  v.  Finigan,  170 Neb.  777,  787-88,  104 N.W.  2d 227,
234  (1960)  where,  in the  course  of invalidating  a  statutory  regulation  of  milk marketing  prac-
tices,  the court said:  "Courts are  not powerless to determine  the character  of... legislation.  The
construction  of statutes  and  the  determination  of their  reasonableness  is  the ultimate  province,
responsibility,  and  duty of the courts  and must  be exercised  by them if state and federal guaran-
ties of liberty and  property  rights are  not  to be  made subservient  to pressure groups  which seek
and  frequently  secure  the  enactment  of  statutes  advantageous  to  a  particular  industry  and
detrimental  to  another under  the guise  of police  power  regulations."
[Vol.  53:145COMPETITING  JUDICIAL MODELS
What  happens  if we try to use public-interest  thinking to solve the puzzl-
ing batch  of delegation  cases?1  One  conceivable  approach  is to differentiate
the  public-choice  and public-interest  models  with  respect  to  what  role  they
assign  to the legislature in the recognition,  creation,  and protection  of rights.
In  the  economically  inspired  public-choice  model,  the  legislative  process  is
seen  as  designed  to  reveal  what  legal  rights it  would  be expedient  to  create
for various  classes  of people."'  In a  public-interest  conception,  by  contrast,
the legislature's job  is that of discerning what rights various  classes  of people
as a matter  of fact have,  irrespective  of the legislature's  actual  success  in ac-
curately  discerning  them,  and  of providing  suitable  forms  of protection  for
those rights.'
1 2  Cusack (the Chicago billboard  case) would then reflect judicial
satisfaction  that  the  city  legislature  did  its job  correctly  by  concluding  and
declaring that  property owners  in  established  residential  neighborhoods  have
rights not to be intruded upon by  "offensive"  structures like billboards,  at the
same  time recognizing  that there  is no objection  to letting people  waive their
rights;  while in Eubank (the Richmond  building-line  case) the city legislature
could  be  said  to  have  failed  in  its  responsibility  to  decide  whether  owners
along a block  have rights not to be disturbed  by their neighbors'  nonuniform
setbacks  or thin front yards,  and in Roberge (the Seattle rest home case)  the
city  legislature could  be said either  to have  made  no  determination  whether
the  residential  owners  have  a  right  against  entry  of  rest  homes  into  their
neighborhood  or,  if they  did  make  such  a  determination,  to  have  made  it
wrongly.  This  interpretation  accounts  for what  earlier  seemed  to  be surplus
rhetoric in the Roberge opinion." 3  It also fits  well with the decision in Euclid
v.  Ambler  Realty  Co.,  "1  ten  years  after  Cusack  and  two  years  before
Roberge, in which the Court's validation of a  city regulation  excluding  apart-
ment houses from single-family residence  areas rested  heavily on the idea  that
apartments  would  be  noxious  intruders  in  such  areas  (like  "pigs  in
parlors")," s  so that  the city  legislation  could be seen  as simply recognizing  a
"0See  notes  63-71  supra text accompanying.
"'The economic  problem is to  devise that system  of pre-exchange  rights (legally enforceable
claims)  which  will  minimize  the sum  of (i)  deadweight  losses  (misallocations)  remaining  after
completion  of  all  economically  feasible  exchange,  and  (ii) the  costs  of such  exchnge  itself.  For
some elaboration,  see  Calabresi  & Melamed,  Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the  Cathedral,  85  HARv.  L.  REv.  1089  (1972):  Demsetz,  Some Aspects of Property
Rights, 9  J.  L.  & EcON.  61,  64-67 (1966);  EcONoMic  ANALYSIS,  supra note  2,  at  36-38,  44-48.
Some versions of the normative  economic theory of government  seem to proceed from  a set of ax-
iomatic,  pre-political  ("natural") rights-physical security of the person,  for example,  or property
rights in the products of one's labor.  But insofar  as they do,  they are hybrid theories-economic
superstructures  on  noneconomic  (objectivist)  foundations.
"'It will be noted that I am using "public interest"  here  to denote  any conception  in which
the government's  role  is  to  identify and/or  realize  ends  or  values  regarded  as  objective  for  the
society-not  just non-individualist  ends  or  values  like  national  power  or  cultural  eminence;  so
there  is nothing odd about describing  the legislature's  job in such a conception  as that of identi-
fying  and  protecting  the objective  rights of individuals.
'sSee  note  71  supra & text accompanying.
1"Note  92  supra.
"'1272 U.S.  at 388.
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true right  of the residential  owners  already  implicit  in  the  ancient  common
law doctrine  of nuisance.  The account  can  even  handle the  1927  decision  in
Gorieb v. Fox,  1 6 one year after Euclid and one  before Roberge, upholding a
city  ordinance  establishing  building setback  lines  on  a  block-by-block  basis,
relying  on  Euclid and  distinguishing Eubank by reference  to  the  delegation
feature of the latter case.  In Gorieb the city legislature  could  be said  to have
done the job  that no legislature did in Eubank, that of determining  (correct-
ly,  the Court must have thought)  that building on one's  property  too close  to
the street  is  a  violation  of the  property  rights of one's  neighbors.
There  are,  however,  serious  problems  with  this  true  rights-false
rights-no rights account  of the cases.  One is that it does not explain why the
Eubank blockfront  cannot itself be  treated  as legislature  determining  the ex-
istence  of  a  sort  of  right  apparently  endorsed  by  the  Court  in  Gorieb.
Another  is that it does not explain why the Richmond  City Council's action in
Eubank (or the Seattle  Council's  in Roberge) cannot be treated  as  analogous
to the  Chicago  Council's  in Cusack-that is,  as  a  determination  that people
do  have  rights  not  to  be  disturbed  by  neighbors  building  too  close  to  the
street  (or  neighbors  introducing  rest  homes  into  a  residential  neighborhood)
but are free  to waive those rights (in Eubank, by just never asserting them).  A
still  more  serious  problem  is  that  the  Chicago  ordinance  was  in  fact  not  a
device  for  allowing  a  property  owner  to  waive  his  right  not  to  have  a
billboard  enter  his  neighborhood,  but  rather  one  for  empowering  his
neighbors to  waive  his  supposed  right  against his  will;
117  and  it  seems  very
odd  to  think of  the Supreme  Court  in  1916  as  recognizing  a  collective,  but
not an  individual,  right  against  intrusion  by  billboards." 8
All in  all,  we can  conclude  that if  public-interest  thinking has  some way
of explaining the delegation  cases,  it must be a different  and better  way than
the  rights-focused  approach.  An  important  clue  to  a  possible  better  way  is
provided by an important new  chapter in the delegation saga,  not yet discuss-
ed.
Two  terms  ago,  in  Eastlake v.  Forest City Enterprises, 119  the  Supreme
Court revisited  the  problem  of the Eubank, Cusack, and Roberge cases  in a
slightly altered  context.  The voters of the city of Eastlake,  Ohio,  had amend-
ed their  city charter,  as  authorized by the Ohio  Constitution,  to stipulate that
any  zoning  changes  agreed  to by the City Council  must be  ratified  by  a 55%
116Note  79 supra.
17That  is,  a  majority  of the  owners in the block  could  grant  a  waiver.
1"It  is true  that  the  plaintiff in Cusack was  a would-be sign  builder,  not  a non-consenting
neighbor,  but that  point  seems  insufficient  to  handle  the  objection.  The  restraint  on  the sign
builder is  supposed,  in  our tentative  public-interest  theory,  to be justified  by the fact (which  the
Council's  ordinance  is merely  supposed  to  recognize)  that  his  neighbors  have  rights  against  his
building  the  sign.  But  the  idea  that  the  Council's  ordinance  means  to  recognize  such  rights is
contradicted  by  its  provision  allowing  entry of  the sign  with  less than  unanimous  consent-thus
undermining the supposed justification for restricting  the sign builder's  freedom in the first place.
1-9426  U.S.  668  (1976).
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vote  in  a  referendum  before  they  could  take  effect.  The  plaintiff,  a  lan-
downer  who  had  obtained  both  Planning  Commission  and  City  Council  ap-
proval  for  a  zoning  reclassification  to  permit  construction  of an  apartment
building  but  apparently  lacked  confidence  in  the  outcome  of a  referendum,
challenged  the  referendum  requirement  as  a  violation  of due  process  rights.
The  Supreme  Court  of Ohio  agreed,  citing  the Eubank case  and  calling the
procedure  an "unlawful delegation of legislative  power."120 The U.S.  Supreme
Court  reversed.
The  Court  first  denied  that  the  referendum  could  properly  be
characterized  as  a  legislative  "delegation"  at  all,  considering  that  siate
legislatures  are  supposed  in  the  first  place  to  derive  their powers  from  the
people,  who  can  always-as  had  the  people  of  Ohio  in  their  constitu-
tion-reserve  some  of the law-making  power  to  themselves  (or  to municipal
electorates)  by  devices  such  as  the  referendum.  But  as  the  Court  seemed  to
recognize,12'  that  analysis  showed  only  that  the  Eastlake  referendum  pro-
cedure did not violate  any procedural  mandate  of Ohio  Constitution.  It did
not answer  the  general  procedural  due process  complaint  that  the plaintiff's
right to use his property had been left dependent  upon (as the Ohio  Supreme
Court put it) "the potentially  arbitrary and unreasonable whims  of the voting
public,"'2-which,  of course,  is just where  Eubank comes  in.
The  Court  answered  the  due  process  claim  by  observing  that  judicial
relief would  always  be  available if the voters'  action could  be shown  to have
been  substantively unreasonable;  by recalling that the requirement  of "discer-
nible standards"  to control legislative  delegations  to administrative  bodies had
never  been  applied  where  power  was  reserved  to  "the  people  themselves;"1
23
by  noting  that  there  is  no  better  assurance  that  a  representative  legislature
"will  act  by  conscientiously  applying  consistent  standards  than  there  is  with
respect  to  voters;"1 24  and-without  yet  having  said  anything  which  could
distinguish  Eubank-by simply  concluding  that  there  is  nothing  constitu-
tionally objectionable  about a  standardless  referendum  procedure  for making
land-use  decisions.  Eubank was  then,  at  last,  distinguished  on  the  ground
that in  that  case the  legislative  body (presumably  the Court  was thinking  of
the Richmond City Council) had delegated its authority "to a narrow segment
of the community not to the people at large." 2 "5  "The standardless delegation
of power to a limited group ...condemned  . . .in Eubank," said the Court,
"is  not to be equated with decisionmaking  by the people through the referen-
dum process."" 26 Roberge was distinguished in the same way.  Borrowing from
1"'41  Ohio  St.  2d  187,  198,  324 N.E.2d  740,  747  (1975).
"'426  U.S.  at  675.
12141  Ohio  St.  2d  at 194,  324 N.E.2d at 746.
123426  U.S.  at  675.
121Id.  at 675-76 n.  10.
"
51d.  at 677  (Court's  emphasis).
126Id.  at 678  (emphasis supplied).
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a Ninth Circuit opinion,  the Court added  the thought that "a referendum...
is  far  more  than  an  expression  of  ambiguously  founded  neighborhood
preference.  It  is  the city  itself legislating  through  its  voters-an  exercise  by
the  voters  of their  traditional  right  .. .to  [determine]  .. .what serves  the
public  interest.
1 5 27  That  last  quotation,  with  its  derogation  of  mere
neighborhood  "preference,"  in  favor  of something  called  a  "public  interest"
found by  something  called  "the  city  itself,"  should  certainly  suggest  that  the
Court  was  not  in  direct  touch  with  the  divinities  of  economics  and  public
choice  while  ruminating  on the Eastlake case.  And  analysis  will  shortly  con-
firm  what  the  Court's  rhetoric  suggests.
The  public-choice  argument  against  the  legitimacy  of  the  popular-
decision  process  in Eubank and  Roberge applies  with  undiminished  force  to
Eastlake. Just  as  the  property  owner  in Eubank suffered  a  definite  loss  in  a
one-time-only,  substantively  and  temporally  restricted  forum  providing  no
scope  for politcal compensation  through  vote  trading (or even  for build-up  of
moral  obligaiton  to  be  politically  cashed  in  the  future)  so  it  was  with  the
Eastlake plaintiff.  Of course it  is  not literally true of the Eastlake  electorate,
as  of the  Richmond  blockfront,  that  it  will  never  again  act  as  a  body,  or
possibly  even  be  in  a  position  to  do  something  nice  for  Forest  City  Enter-
prises,  Inc.  But  you  obviously  cannot  dicker  with  a  citywide  electorate  for
support  now in exchange  for your support  on something  else later;  the coali-
tion  process  does  not work in  the unwieldy  and  irregular referendum  forum;
one  just  wins  or  loses  and  that  is  all.  The  transactional  assurance-the
assurance  from  log-rolling-of broadly distributed  long-run net  benefits from
public  action  is  suspended equally  in both  the  cases. 128  Nor will  the  public-
choice  analyst  get  any  comfort  from  the  Court's  characterization  of  the
Eubank blockfront  as  a  "narrow  segment"  or  "limited  group,"  as  contrasted
with  the  wholesome  inclusiveness  of  the  Eastlake  electorate.  The  Eubank
blockfront  was  no  narrower  or more  limited  than  the scope  of the impact  of
the issue  presented to  it.  Why  else  would  "narrowness"  of the  decision  group
be  a  concern?  In  an  economic,  public-choice  framework  that  query  seems
unanswerable. 129
A  thesis  of  this  essay,  of course,  is  that the Eastlake decision  exemplifies
the salience in the judicial  mentality of what I have  called  the public-interest,
1271d.,  quoting  from  Southern  Alameda  Spanish  Speaking  Organization  v.  City of  Union,
424  F.2d  291,  294 (9th Cir.  1970)  (emphasis supplied).
'21See  Wolfinger  & Greenstein,  The Repeal of Fair  Housing in  California:  An  Analysis  of
Referendum  Voting,  62 AM.  POL. Sci.  Rav. 753,  768-69  (1968)  [hereinafter  cited as Wolfinger  &
Greenstein].
12 9 A  conceivable  answer is that "narrowness"  refers  to an affected  group's being  so small (in
absolute  numbers)  as  to  suggest  that  a voluntary,  unanimous  settlement  could  be  achieved  at
tolerable  transaction  costs  without any  governmental  intervention.  See  notes  76-78 supra & text
accompanying.  But  our prior discussion  suggests  that a  serious log-rolling  defect should be suffi-
cient,  in  the  economic  conception,  to  condemn  a  delegation  even  in  the  absence  of  a  small-
numbers  objection.  And in the sense relevant  to the log-rolling dimension,  the Eastlake  electorate
was  a  "narrow"  forum,  with  a  thin agenda.
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as  opposed  to  the  economic  or  public-choice,  model  of legislation.  For  that
thesis,  a  testing  question  is  whether  public-interest  thinking  can  illuminate
not only the Eastlake result but the Eastlake Court's treatment of Eubank (as
well  as Roberge and  Cusack), as  public-choice  thinking  cannot.
In  addressing  that  question,  it is  necessary  to  refer  to  the  discussion  in
Part  1130  of the idea  that one  can  be  an individualist  in ethics-can,  that is,
take it as a premise  that what ultimately counts  in life is the experience  of in-
dividuals-and  yet  maintain  that  an  adequate  conception  of  individual
freedom  depends  on a view of at least some values as objective  not subjective;
and  to  the  suggestion  there  that  freedom  for  individuals  depends  upon the
possibility  of objective  ends  or  values  to  which  one  can  commit  oneself  on
principle;  that  for  individuals  in  secular society  such ends  or values  will  en-
compass matters  of interpersonal relationship,  obligation  and respect and,  for
the  freedom-seeking  socialized  individual,  political  process  will  be  both  a
medium  for  reasoning  towards  ends  (and  acting  towards  their  attainment)
and,  at  the same  time,  itself  one  of the  ends.
In  such  a  public-interest  conception  (or  community  self-determination
conception)  of politics,  there  is nothing  crucially  objectionable  about  letting
decisions  be made  by a process  such  as a referendum  vote  offering no  oppor-
tunity  for  vote-trading,  because  the  object  of  the process  is  supposed  to  be
communal  definition  of  aims.  That point will  suffice to  explain  the Eastlake
result in terms  of a  public-interest  model, but more is needed  to  explain the
Eastlake opinion's  treatment of Eubank. For if politics  is  a medium  for joint
definition  of  aims,  why  not  also  joint  definition  by  the  Eubank group  of
blockfront neighbors?  One possible  answer  may come  from  Rousseau,  begin-
ning  with  his  insistence  that  the  definition  of  aims  through  politics  is  an
ethical  process, 
13  and one which treats  the individual  as  the ultimate object
of  ethical  concern.
132  Such  insistence  means  that  when  individuals  act
politically,  when  they  act  as  citizens,  they  are  to  act  on behalf of and  with
regard  to  one  another,  as well  as  themselves,  as persons worthy of  a full  and
equal  measure  of respect.
1 33  In  Rousseau's  no  doubt romantic  and  arguably
totalitarian vision,  the requisite motivations of sympathy,  respect,  and respon-
sibility  were  to  be  instilled  in  part  through  an  elaborate  education  pro-
1 5tSee  notes  25-30 supra & text accompanying.
1"See, e.g, J.-J.  RoussEAu,  supra note 24,  at 15  ("act of association creates  a moral and col-
lective  body").  See  also  CASsIRER,  THE  QUESTION  OF JEAN-JAcQuEs  ROUSSEAU,  supra note  28,  at
65-66;  note  28 supra, passim.
"'sSee, e.g., J.-J.  ROUSSEAU,  supra note 24,  at 13-14  (problem is "to find a form of associa-
tion which will defend and protect  ...  the person and goods of each associate");  id. at 15 (social
compact  provides  for "'receiv[ing]  each member as an indivisible part of the whole"')  (emphasis
in original).
"
5See,  e.g.,  id.  at  10;  id.  at  29  ("undertakings  which  bind  us  to  the  social  body  are
obligatory  only  because  they  are mutual");  id. at  30 ("every  authentic  act  of the  general  will
binds  or  favors  all  the  citizens  equally").  This is  the  condition  on  which  the acts  of  a popular
sovereign  are  truly acts  of self-government  and,  accordingly,  realizations of moral  freedom.  See
Levine,  supra note  20,  at 39,  40,  43. See also note  138,  infra.
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gram.134  But  they  would  have  to  depend further  on  a  strong  and  clear  dif-
ferentiation  of the special  role one plays  as citizen from one's  normal,  every-
day pursuits  as private  individual and,  relatedly,  on  a careful  construction  of
special  formal  or ceremonial  contexts designed  to place  the individual  in the
special  citizen's  role-to  force  that  role  on  the  individual  by  cultural
means-on  those  special  occasions  when  political  as  distinguished  from  nor-
mally  self-regarding  private  action  is  in progress.
35
An  appreciation  of  this  motivational  importance  of  context  and  role
could  go far towards  explaining what  the  Supreme  Court might  have  meant
by  dismissing  the  Eubank blockfront  as  a  "narrow  segment"  and  a  "limited
group" to be distinguished  from "the  people"  or "the  city;"  and  also what the
Court  could  have  meant  in  the  Carter Coal case  when  it  objected  that  the
majority  of coal  producers  and  miners  would  not  be  acting  "in  an  official
capacity,  presumptively  disinterested"-  all of it rhetoric  which makes no sense
in an economic,  public-choice  model of legislation. 36 The Court's true  mean-
ing, I suggest,  is that when you  ask an immediately interested person to  cast a
vote  in  a one-time  blockfront  decision  about a  building setback,  or in  a one-
time industry  decision  about a labor code,  you just cannot expect  that  person
to switch  into his  or her special  citizen's  motivational  mode of sympathy  and
responsibility  for all  equally.  A  strong  enough  signal has  not been  sent or a
sufficiently  powerful  cultural  constraint  invoked  to  do  such  heavy  motiva-
tional work. The Court thinks it is  a different  case,  however, when a person  is
11
4See id. at  139-40 (discussing  the "civil  religion").  But my  text  fails  to convey  the subtlety
and  richness  of Rousseau's  views on  education.  See CASSIRER.  supra note  28,  at 120-27.
"'That  Rousseau  had  no  thought-and  no wish-that  the private  sphere  of  life  should
disappear  or dissolve  into the  "general will"  is evident  throughout  THE SOCIAL  CONTRACT.  See
LEVINE,  supra note  20,  at 57-58,  74-76,  196-97.  For evidence  of the significance  he attached  to
formal  or  ceremonial  context  see,  e.g.,  J.-J.  RoussEAu.  supra  note  24,  at  90,  92,  100,  103-04
("apart  from  [his  particular]  good,  [each  man]  wills  the general good  in  his  own  interest  ....
Even  in selling  his  vote  for  money,  he  does  not  extinguish  in himself the  general  will,  but only
eludes  it.  The  fault  he  commits  is  that of  changing  the  state  of the  question,  and  answering
something  different from  what he  is  asked.  Instead  of saying,  by his vote,  'It is  to  the  advantage
of the State,'  he says, 'It  is of advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should
prevail.'  Thus  the law  of public order in  assemblies is  not  so  much  to  maintain  in  them  the
general  will  as  to  secure that  the question  be always  put to it,  and  the  answer  always given  by
it.") (emphasis supplied);  id. at  106  ("when in the populr assembly a law is  proposed,  what  the
people  is asked is  not exactly whether it approves  or rejects  the proposal,  but whether it is in con-
formity with the general  will,  which  is their will.  Each man,  in giving his vote,  states his opinion
on  that point;  and the general will is found  by counting votes.")  (emphasis supplied).  Chapter IV
of  Book  IV  of THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  id. at  110-21,  describing  forms  of political  organization
and  procedure  in  republican Rome,  is evidently  aimed  in  part  at showing  how such  factors  can
be  used to  frame  occasions for eliciting  expressions  of the general  will rather  than of particular
wills.  See especially  id. at  119-20,  discussing  use of what we moderns  call  a  roll-call  vote.  For a
contemporary  echo and  a bit of empirical  support for the claim that "an individual  will respond
differently  depending  on  how the question  is  asked  of him,"  insisting  on "proper  emphasis  [on]
the  differentiation  of institutions  for  putting the  question-e.g.,  the  market  institution  to  elicit
private  oriented responses  and political  institutions for  those which  are commonly  oriented,"  see
Maass,  Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decision, 80  Q.J.  EcoN.  216-17
(1966).
"'See  notes  73-74,  supra & text accompanying.
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sent  to  the  polls,  in  her  capacity  as  a  registered  voter,  to  act  on  a  matter
before  the whole  city with which  she,  supposedly,  continuingly identifies  and
which maintains  a  continuing  salience  in  her consciousness  of political  life.
While  it  is  worth  suggesting  that  such  a  Rousseauian  vision  of  politics
may  have  played  a part  in  the Court's  decision  and  choice of rhetoric in  the
Eastlake case,  it should  not be suggested  that Rousseau's  argument,  properly
understood,  can  justify  that  decision.  Certainly  there  is  a  serious  question
whether  direct-democratic  procedures  can be  expected  to  elicit  authentic  ex-
pressions  of  a  general  will  when  used  sporadically  in  large  and  politically
apathetic  electorates.
13 7  Lacking  any  evidence  on  the  point,  it  would  be
foolhardy  to  assume  that  contemporary  Eastlake  is  a  modem  incarnation  of
eighteenth-century  Geneva.  Beyond  that  difficulty,  Rousseau  certainly  would
have  objected  that  the  form  of the  zoning-change  question  presented  to the
Eastlake  electorate  was  far  too  particularistic,  far  too  remote  from  any  in-
telligible  issue  of general  principle  or general  rule,  to  allow  the members  of
the  electorate  responding  to  that  question  to  be  regarded  as  the  sovereign
people  whose  legislative  utterances  express  a  general  will,  or  reflect  the ideal
of self-government.
1 3 8
1"See,  e.g.,  Wolfinger  &  Greenstein  supra note  128  at 767-68.  Rousseau's  own  deep  con-
cerns  about  sustaining  the  citizenry's  political  morale  are  in  evidence  throughout  THE  SOCIAL
CONTRACT.
'Rousseau  would  have said that on  this occasion  the electorate  was not legislating, but ac-
ting in the role which Rousseau variously  styles that of the "prince,"  "executive,"  "magistrate,"  or
"government."  Compare  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court's  somewhat  surprising  concession,  in  the
Eastlake  case  below,  that the zoning  change presented  a  "legislative"  (not an "admininstrative")
question and therefore  was subject to the Ohio  constitution's referendum  provisions.  41  Ohio  St.
2d at 191,  324 N.E.2d  at 743-. The court's position  may  have been  that the issue was suitable
for  determination  by  referendum  (i.e.,  was  "legislative")  because  the  proposed  development
might have had significant city-wide ramifications.  But in  Rousseau's scheme,  true legislation,  ex-
pressive of the general will,  is that which is "mutual; and [its] nature is such that in fulfilling [its
obligations]  we cannot work for others without working for ourselves."  It  must be cast  in  such a
way that "there  is not a man who does not think of 'each'  as meaning him,  and consider himself
in  voting for all  . . . . The general will,  to be really  such, must be general  in  its  object as well as
its essence;  ...  it must both come from  all and apply to all;  and ...  it loses its natural rectitude
when  it  is  directed  to  some  particular  and  determinate  object,  because  in  such  a  case  we  are
judging of something foreign  to  us,  and have  no  true  principle  of equity  to guide  us."  J. -J.
RoussEAU,  supra note  24,  at  29.  The  same  chord  is  struck  time  and  again  throughout  THE
SOCIAL  CONTACT,  see,  e.g.,  id.  at 27,  30-31,  35,  36,  54.
This is of course not to say  that all legitimate  political  acts must be legislative,  must be acts
of sovereignty,  in Rousseau's  sense of embodying  general  and  mutual  principles and rules.  Ob-
viously,  the  laws have  to be applied  to particular  cases  and there  is thus a role for an  executive
and a judge.  Nor is there  any ultimate  reason why the democracy itself may not play  these roles
in addition  to that of sovereign legislator,  see  id.  at 99,  though  Rousseau seems to  have thought
such arrangments  risky and unwise:  "It  is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them,
or for the body of the people  to turn  its attention away from  a general standpoint  and devote  it
to particular objects.  Nothing is more  dangerous than the influence  of private interests  in public
affairs,  and  the abuse  of  the  laws by  the  government  is a  less  evil  than  the  corruption  of the
legislator,  which  is the inevitable  sequel to  a particular  standpoint."  Id. at 65: "Were  it possible
for the sovereign,  as such, to  possess the executive  power,  right and fact would be so confounded
that  no  one  could  tell  what  was  law and  what  was not;  and  the  body  politic,  thus  disfigured,
would soon  fall a prey to the violence it was  instituted to prevent."  (emphasis supplied).  See also
id.  97.  It  follows that every conferral  of executive  or judicial  authority must itself take  the form
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So  while ascription  to the Court of a  Rousseauian  public-interest concep-
tion  of politics  plainly  comes  closer  than  ascription  of  an  economic,  public-
choice  conception  to  explaining  the  opinion  and  decision  in  Eastlake, no
more  than  a relative  advantage  can  be claimed.  A bit of reflection  will show
that  the  Rousseauian  public-interest  model  also  works  at  least  as  well  as  the
economic  model  for  Carter Coal, Eubank, Roberge, Euclid, and  Gorieb.
But  then  what  about  the old nemesis,  Cusack? It  will  be  recalled  that  a
previous  discussion  succeeded  in  giving an  economic  account  of  Cusack, but
at  the  heavy  price  of  knocking  the  public  purpose  doctrine  out  of  the
economically  approved  category. 3 9 Can Rousseauian  public-interest  theory do
better?  From  the  standpoint  of  a  concern  about  ceremonial  context,  the
Chicago  scheme  upheld  in  Cusack,  no  less  that  the  Richmond  one  struck
down in Eubank, left things  to  a "narrow  segment" or  "limited group" unlike-
ly  to  be  perceived  by  its  members  as  a  true  civic  forum  rather  than  a  bat-
tlefield  or  market. 40  Imputing  to the  Supreme  Court  a  Rousseauian  sort  of
community  self-determination  model  of  government  would  seem,  then,  to
leave  Cusack in  an anomalous  position.  Certainly  we cannot impute  that sort
of thinking  to  the  Court  that  decided  Cusack,  but  as  for  the  contemporary
Court-the  Court  that decided Eastlake-things  look  a bit brighter.  For that
Court  dealt  with  Cusack  in  a  cautious  way  that would  leave  intact  any  at-
tribution to it of a  Rousseauian vision.  Whereas  the Eastlake opinion seems to
of true (general)  law, even-or  especially-where  such  authority is  to  be exercised by  the whole
electorate.  See,  e.g.,  id. at 97-99.
Now  in the case  of the Eastlake zoning referendum  there was  no  "law"  in Rousseau's  sense
to  govern  the  "executive"  decision  about  whether  to  allow  Forest  City's  zoning  change-no
general rule or  principle,  enacted in such  a way as  to  impinge mutually  on  the interests of each
citizen.  Nor did the  special  charter provision  for zoning  referendums  itself meet the standards of
generality required  for a true act of legislation.  (We might note  in passing how  Rousseau's  argu-
ment  would  condemn  not  only  the Eastlake procedure  but  also  that  approved  by the  Supreme
Court  in James  v. Valtierra,  402  U.S.  137  (1971).)
The problem  of framing legislation  so  that it will  have the  kind of generality and mutuality
of impact  needed to satisfy the  conditions  of Rousseau's  argument  for the possibility  of discover-
ing a general will through  voting,  and  at  the same time will be sufficiently trenchant  actually to
control  the  decision of executive  and judicial officials,  is,  obviously,  a  vexing one.  It is  known to
modern  American  administrative  law in the guise of "delegation"  doctrine.  See,  e.g.,  McGautha
v.  California,  402 U.S.  182,  270  (1971)  (opinion  of  Brennan, J.).  I  know  of no  demonstration
that  the  problem  has  a  solution.  Certainly  Rousseau  offers  no  such  demonstration.  Compare
LEvINE.  supra note  20,  at  48-49.  What  he  offers,  rather,  is  an  argument  that such  a solution
must  be  possible  if political  freedom-and,  therefore,  moral freedom-is  to  be possible  in and
through  a democratic  state.
'See  notes  99-103  & text  accompanying.
1"From  the standpoint of a concern  about generality  of legislation the Chicago scheme was
actually  worse than the  Richmond  one: In Eubank the neighbors in imposing  the setback  line  at
least  had to impose  it generally,  on  themselves  as well  as  others,  whereas  in Cusack the  releases
were  to be granted or witheld on  a case-by-case-  basis.  Thus the lack of standards  created risks of
favoritism  and  discrimination  in Cusack not-at  least not  so  obviously  and directly-present  in
Eubank. The extent to which such risks were  present in that situation would  seem to  have varied
from  block  to  block,  depending  on  what  proportion  of  a  block's  building  lots  were  already
developed,  with what  degree of  uniformity in  the setback  distances  of houses  already  built.
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imply  continuing  approval  of Eubank  and  Roberge even  in  the  course  of
distinguishing  them,  the opinion's treatment  of Cusack is both  more subdued
and more  equivocal:  Eubank and Roberge (which  superficially seem  opposed
to  the  Eastlake result)  are  dealt  with  in  the  opinion's  text,  while  Cusack
(which  superficially  seems  supportive  of the Eastlake result)  is  relegated  to  a
footnote-a  footnote  which non-committally  relates  that  "since  the  property
owners  could simply  waive  an  otherwise  applicable  legislative  limitation,  the
Court  in  Cusack  determined  that  the  provision  did  not  delegate  legislative
power  at  all."141  Nothing  is  vouchsafed  about  the  contemporary  Court's  ap-
praisal  of its  prededessor's  oft-questioned  analysis.142  In  short,  probably  the
best  thing that can be said  about Cusack from the Rousseauian  standpoint  is
that  it is  wrong.  And  the Eastlake Court  is  not saying  differently.
IV.  A  COMPARISON  OF THE DESCRIPTIVE  POWER  OF THE Two  MODELS
So far,  by looking in detail  at the  explanatory  value of two  basic  models
of governmental  legitimacy  in relation  to  two judicial  doctrines-public  pur-
pose  and  delegation-this  essay  has  produced  just  a  few  bits  of evidence  in
support  of a  sweeping  claim which  remains  unproven:  that in judicial treat-
ment of public  law problems,  a noneconomic  ideal conception  of politics  as  a
vehicle  for community self-determination  competes strongly with an economic
ideal  conception  of politics  as a vehicle  for private self-maximization.  Judges,
the evidence  suggests,  go about their public-law work  in the grip of these  two
opposed  models.  As a way of further exploring  the content of the models and
their oppositional relationship,  and also  of further investigating  the clarifying
potential  of this  two-models  thesis,  it  may be useful  to  probe an  area  of law
particularly  related  to  local  governments-zoning-by  considering  another
puzzling  pair  of Supreme  Court  decisions-a  recent  pair,  this  time-which
seem  to  have  split  on  the  question  of the  constitutionality  of  "single-family
zoning."
In Belle Terre v.  Boraas (1974),143  the  Court upheld  a  zoning  ordinance
enacted  by  a  very small  village  (it  occupied  about  one  square  mile  and in-
cluded  220  homes  inhabited  by  700  persons),  restricting  the  use  of  village
land  to  dwellings  for  but  one  "family,"  defined  so  as  to  exclude  any
"'426  U.S.  at 677-78  n.  12.
"tSee,  e.g.,  Hogue,  supra note  72; Delegation  to Private Parties  in American Constitutional
Law, 50  IND. L.J.  650,  675-80  (1975);  HALE,  supra note  78;  McBain,  Law-Making By Property-
Owners, 36  POL. SCL  Q. 617  (1921).  It is worth noting that the Court's opinion in Belle  Terre v.
Boraas,  416  U.S.  1, 6-7  (1974),  had reiterated  the Roberge Court's idea (see text following note
69,  supra) that the Cusack ordinance  was distinguishable  from  that in Roberge because  the use
regulated  in Cusack was,  as that in Roberge was not,  a noxious  one, likely "to  work ...  injury,
inconvenience  or  annoyance  to  the community,  the district,  or  [some]  person."  The Court's ap-
parent retreat,  in the Eastlake opinion,  from that line of defense  for Cusack seems consistent  with
the  thesis advanced  here. In a Rousseauian  type of public-interest conception  of politics, it would
be repugnant to  propose that my commercial  billboard might be obnoxious in the neighborhood
even  though yours is not.
"4416 U.S.  1.
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household  group  of more  than two  persons  not all related  to  one  another  by
blood,  marriage,  or  adoption.1
4
4  It  was  asserted  by  those  attacking  the  or-
dinance  that  it  trenched  upon  constitutionally  protected  interests  in  privacy
and  free  association.  The  ordinance  was,  indeed,  so  designed  that it  would
have  the  following  effects:  (i)  it would  deter  unmarried  couples  from  having
children  if they wished neither to  leave  Belle  Terre nor  to get married;  (ii)  it
would  bring  pressure  on  unmarried  couples  to  get  married  if  they  wished
both  to  remain  in  Belle  Terre  and  have  children;  (iii)  it  would  require  the
removal  from  the  village  of  couples  willing  neither  to  marry  nor  to  remain
childless;  and  (iv) it would  completely  bar from  Belle Terre households  com-
posed  of several  unaffiliated  adults.  Thus  the  ordinance  could  very  possibly
constrain  individuals  in  their  choices  regarding  marital  status,  or  family
household  composition,  and  certainly  could  penalize  (or  at any  rate  burden)
individuals  who  refused  to  be  so  constrained.  If  those  choices were  constitu-
tionally  protected  (under the  rubrics of  "association"  or  "privacy"),  then,  ac-
cording  to  the prevailing  canons  of adjudication  implicity  accepted  by  both
sides,  it would  be incumbent  on the village to justify its encroachment  in this
constitutionally  protected  zone  by  showing  that  the  encroachment  was
"necessary"  to  satisfy  some "compelling  interest"  of the state  or village."
45
Justice  Douglas,  writing for  the Supreme  Court majority,  concluded  that
no constitutionally  protected  interests in  privacy or  association  were  involved,
that  the  ordinance  was  just  an  ordinary  instance  of  "economic  and  social
legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which  we respect...
if the law be  'reasonable,  not arbitrary'  . . . and  bears 'a  rational  relationship
to  a  [permissible]  state objective.'  "146  No doubt there were permissible  objec-
tives  in  plain  sight:  "A  quiet  place  where  yards  are  wide,  people  few,  and
motor  vehicles  restricted  are  legitimate  guidelines  in  a  land  use  project  ad-
dressed  to family needs.  ...  47  But since,  as Justice Marshall's  dissent amply
showed,  these  anticongestion  goals  might  have  been  addressed  more  directly
by regulations not intruding into household composition  choices,14
8  everything
depended  on  the  Court's  surprising  categorization  of  the  Belle  Terre  or-
dinance  as  plain  economic  and  social  legislation,  so  that  the  village  could
justify  it  by  showing  it  to  have  a  mere  tendency  towards  some  permissible
goal,  without  having  to  show  public necessity  or  lack  of less  restrictive  alter-
natives.
The  Court's  easy  denial  that  constitutionally  protected  personal  in-
terests-civil  liberties-were  jeopardized  by the Belle  Terre  ordinance  is  sur-
prising.  The plaintiffs'  contrary  claim" 9  was  at least  respectable,  demanding
1"Id.  at  2.
14'See  id. at 7-8;  id. at  12-13  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting).
'Id.  at  8.
'Id.  at  9.
1"Id. at  12,  18-20.  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting).
'
49Although  the  plaintiffs'  interest  has  occasionally  been  deprecated  as  a  purely  economic
one  in  saving  expenses  by  sharing  living  quarters,  they  asserted  the civil-libertarian  interest  in
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more  serious refutation  then  the Court  produced.  There had  been a number
of  prior  decisions,  invalidating  state  laws  intruding  on  individual  choice
respecting  such matters  as marriage,  divorce,  intra-marital sex  relations,  pro-
creation,  child  rearing,  family  planning,  and  education.  Commentators  had
offered  powerful  suggestions about how to array  and interpret  those decisions
as  jointly  reflecting  a  notion  of  constitutionally  protected  family  privacy,
rooted  in  an  appreciation  of the household  grouping  as a  kind  of protected
zone  within  which  values  might  be  generated  and  nurtured-values  that
might provide  the  alternatives  and suggest  the new  directions  needed  to pre-
vent  the solidification  and stagnation  of values  that might otherwise  occur  in
a monolithic  society.150  The Court itself has since signified agreement  that the
prior decisions were properly arrayed  together in a  "privacy" group,  though it
has  not espoused  any similar-or  indeed  any  very informative-rationale  for
the  privacy  notion  that  has  thus  collected  together  a  number  of  decisions
which earlier  had been  seen  as unrelated.
151
Yet Justice  Douglas'  opinion makes  only  a  brief and evasive-almost,  it
seems,  uncomprehending-response  to  the  privacy  and  association  claims:
"The  ordinance  places  no  ban  on  .. .forms  of  association,  for  a  [legal]
'family'  may,  so  far  as the  ordinance  is  concerned,  entertain  whomever  they
like. ' "
1 52  How  is  one  to  explain  this  apparent  insensitivity  to  a  fairly
straightforward  civil-liberties  claim,  on the part of this Justice who has  never
been  thought to be either obtuse  or an  enemy  to civil liberties-who  has,  in-
deed,  been  described  as  "the  most  ardent  and  explicit  champion  of lifestyle
freedom  yet  to sit  on the  Court?"153
Three years  after upholding  the  Belle Terre  ordinance,  the  Court  again
confronted  a suburban  single-family  zoning  restriction.  This time,  in Moore
v.  East Cleveland, 
154  civil  liberties  prevailed  and the ordinance  was  ruled in-
valid.  East  Cleveland's  somewhat  unusual  and  complicated  regulation  could
be  roughly  described  as  exluding  not only  nonfamilial  household groupings,
but  also  "extended"  as  distinguished  from  "nuclear"  families.1 5  One  of its
their complaint  (see  Appendix  on  Appeal,  Belle  Terre  v.  Boraas,  416  U.S.  1 (1974),  and that
assertion  was  never found to  have  been  disingenuous.
15
0See  Heymann  & Barzelay,  The Forest and the  Trees:  Roe v.  Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U.L.  REv.  765  (1973).
'Special  constitutional  protection  for  a  category  of  autonomy-related  interests  collected
under  the rubric  of "privacy"-including  free  choice  regarding  "matters relating  to  marriage,
procreation,  contraception,  family relationships,  and child rearing  and education"-has  recently
been  confirmed by  the  Court. "In these areas,"  says the Court,  "it has been  held that there  are
limitations  on the State's  power to substantively regulate  conduct."  Whalen v.  Roe, 429  U.S.  589,
599-600  & n.  26  (1977),  quoting from Paul v.  Davis, 424 U.S.  693,  713  (1976);  Carey v. Popula-
tion  Services Int'l,  97  S.  Ct.  2011,  2016  (1977).
152416  U.S.  at  9.
'
53Wilkinson & White,  Constitutional  Protection  for Personal  Life-Styles,  62  Cornell L.  Rev.
563,  564  (1977)  [hereinafter  cited  as Wilkinson  & White].
154431 U.S.  494 (1977).
1
551d.  at 496 & n.2,  500,  504;  id. at 508  (Brennan, J.,  concurring).
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particular features  was to  distinguish  among households  containing  a  grand-
parent  and  more  than  one grandchild,  admitting such  households  if  all  the
grandchildren  were one another's siblings but excluding  them if any pair were
first  cousins.  The  appellant  was  an  East  Cleveland  homeowner  appealing
from  a  criminal conviction  and  fine for  having harbored  two  grandchildren,
first  cousins,  in  her  home.
Writing for a  plurality  of four Justices, 1 5 6 Justice Powell relied  on  a  civil-
libertarian  position similar  to  that which had been unavailing with  the Belle
Terre majority  of which  he had been  a member-the  position that,  "[as]  this
Court  has long recognized  ...  freedom  of personal  choice in matters  of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties [particularly]  protected  by the Due
Process  Clause  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  Because  the  East  Cleveland
ordinance  "intrudes  on  choices  concerning  family  living  arrangements,  [the]
Court  must  examine  carefully  the  importance  of  the  governmental  interests
advanced  and the  extent  to  which  they  are served  by  the challenged  regula-
tion."  Examined  from  that  standpoint,  various  anticongestion  goals  cited  by
East  Cleveland  could  not justify  its  ordinance,  because  "the  ordinance  . . .
serves  them  marginally  at best."'1 57  Of course,  the same was true of the  Belle
Terre  ordinance, 1 58  but it was distinguished  as not encroaching  on a  "private
realm  of family  life,"-  evidently  meaning  by "family"  not simply  a  domestic
househQld  group,  but  a  group  mutually  linked  by "blood,  adoption,  or mar-
riage."'5 9 The only  reason  offered  in  defense  of this distinction  was that "the
Constitution  protects  the sanctity  of the  family  because the  institution  of the
family is  deeply  rooted in this Nation's  history and tradition.  It is through the
family  that we  inculcate  and pass  down many  of our most  cherished values,
moral  and  cultural."
1 6 0
Two  Belle Terre  dissenters who joined Justice Powell's East Cleveland opi-
nion  also,  through  Justice  Brennan,  contributed  some  additional  views  of
their  own.  Although  they might  consistently have  dealt  with  the Belle Terre
case  by simply sticking to their earlier position that it was wrongly decided,  16
they  instead  said  that  it  was  distinguishable  because  the  Belle  Terre  or-
dinance did not,  as the  East Cleveland  ordinance  did,  "inhibit  [in any man-
ner]  the  choice  of related individuals  to  constitute  a  family,  whether  in the
'nuclear' or 'extended'  form."
1 62 But they offered  no account at all of the con-
stitutional  relevance  of  this distinction.
"'6Including  Justices  Brennan,  Marshall,  and Blackmun.
"1431  U.S.  at  500.
15sSee note  148  supra, and  text  accompanying.
151431  U.S.  at  498.
"OId.  at 503-04.
161 Justice  Marshall  had dissented  on  the merits, 416  U.S.  1,  12,  while Justice  Brennan  had
declined  to reach  the merits,  id. at  10.  Both Justices  may have  abandoned  further resistance  to
Belle  Terre in Young  v.  American  Mini Theatres,  Inc.,  427  U.S.  50,  84  (dissenting opinion  of
Stewart, J.,  joined  by Brennan,  Marshall,  and  Blackmun, J.J.
162431  U.S.  at  511  (Brennan  J.,  concurring  emphasis  in original).
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One more vote-that of Justice  Stevens-was  needed  to swing the Court's
five-to-four  decision  against  the validity  of the  East  Cleveland  ordinance.  In
Justice  Stevens'  view,  the  constitutionally  protected  right  infringed  by  that
regulation  was not a special right of self-determination  in matters relating  to
family  life,  but  a  general  property  owners'  "fundamental  right"-"to  decide
who may reside  on [one's]  property,"  or,  still more generally,-"to  use [one's]
own property as  [one]  sees fit,"  short of creating  a "nuisance"  that "impair[s]
the enjoyment of other property in the vicinity" or violating a community land-
use scheme having  a  "substantial relation  to the public health,  safety, morals
or  general  welfare." 16 3  The  challenged  feature  of  the  East  Cleveland  or-
dinance  could  not  satisfy  this  "substantial  relation  to  general  welfare"  test
because  the city could not possibly "explain  the need for a  rule which would
allow  a  homeowner  to  have  two  grandchildren  live  with  her  if  they  are
brothers,  but not if they  are cousins."1 16'  Apparently  perceiving that families-
only  type ordinances-including  Belle Terre's-would  be generally vulnerable
to  like  objection, 1 6 5  Justice  Stevens  expressed  sympathy  for  a  series  of  "well
reasoned"  state  court  decisions  protecting the  rights of "unrelated  persons  to
occupy  single-family  residences  notwithstanding  an  ordinance  prohibiting,
either  expressly  or  implicity,  such  occupancy.5 1 66  Even  so,  he  defended  the
Belle Terre  decision  (in  a  footnote)  as  "upholding  a  single-family  ordinance
as one primarily concerned with the prevention of transiency in a small,  quiet
suburban  community."
16 7
All  of the  reasons  advanced  by  the  majority Justices  for  distinguishing
between  the East  Cleveland  and Belle Terre ordinances  are deeply  unsatisfy-
ing.  The  difficulty  with  Justice  Stevens'  "transiency"  point  is  its  stark
nakedness.  No  explanation  is  offered  either  of why or how  transiency might
be  regarded  as  an  evil,  or of why  unaffiliated  households might  be thought
more  prone  than  "families"  to be  transient  in whatever  sense  is supposed  to
be  relevant.168  The  Belle  Terre  decision  itself sheds  no light  on  these  ques-
tions,  because  it  made  no  reference  to  any interest  on  the villagers'  part  in
avoiding  transiency,  relying  rather  on  their interests  in  avoiding  congestion
and  in  maintaining  "family  values" - interests  on  which  Justice  Stevens,
evidently,  though  it inappropriate  to  rely.
1
611d.  at 513,  520  (Stevens J.,  concurring).
"'Id. at 520.
'Children  would  apparently  not pose  a special  threat  to public  welfare just because their
parents  were  not intermarried.
'16Id. at 516-17.
1'7Id.  at 519  n.15.
1"The  plaintiffs  in  the  Belle  Terre  case  were,  as  the  Court's  opinion  noted  in  passing,
"students at [a]  nearby State University"  campus.  416  U.S.  at 2-3.  But  the Court's reasoning in
no  way  relied  on  this  fact;  nor  did  the opinion  even  advert  to  it  again,  unless  we  count  the
paragraph  reading:  "The  regimes  of boardinghouses,  fraternity  houses,  and  the like present  ur-
ban problems.  More  people  occupy a  given  space;  more  cars rather  continuously  pass  by; more
cars are  parked;  noise  travels with crowds."  Id. at  9.  Nowhere  is there  any mention  or  hint of a
concern  about  transiency.
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Justice  Brennan's  concurring  opinion simply makes no  attempt  to  defend
the  plurality's  distinction  between  "families"  and  household  groupings  of
unrelated  persons,  accepting  the former but rejecting  the latter  as bearers  of
constitutionally  protected  interests  in  domestic  self-determination.  So Justice
Powell's  opinion for the plurality must bear the entire burden of that defense.
Now  doubtless  there  are policy  arguments  for  trying to preserve  the strength
of  traditional  family  forms  in  society, 69  and  doubtless  these  are  strong
enough  that  a  finding  of  constitutional  impediment  to  certain govenmental
efforts  in that direction17 0  is not "lightly"  to be made. 71  Doubtless,  too,  "the
institution  of the  family  is  deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation's  history  and  tradi-
tion."' 72 But from none of these  premises  does the conclusion  follow that "the
Constitution  protects  the  sanctity  of the  family"'73  in  the  sense  required  by
the  joint  results  of  the  Belle  Terre  and  East  Cleveland  cases-that  is,
validating  governmental  direct  censorship  of nontraditional  ("unrelated")  in
favor  of  traditional  ("related")  household  groupings  in  favor  of  traditional
("related")  household  groupings. 74  In  fact Justice  Powell's  proposition  that
"the  Constitution  protects  the  sanctity  of  the  family"'75  - in  that  or  any
other  sense  - is  certainly  false  if  taken  as  a  literal  report  of anything  the
Constitution  says.  Such  constitutional  protection,  if detectible  at all,  can only
be  an  inference  from  the  document  viewed  as  a  whole-  as  a  presumably
1
69"The  nuclear,  heterosexual  family is  charged  with several of society's most  essential  func-
tions.  It  has  served  as  an  important  means  of  educating  the  young;  it  has  often  provided
economic  support and psychological  comfort  to  family members;  and it has operated as  the unit
upon  which  basic  governmental  policies  in  such  matters  as  taxation,  conscription,  and  in-
heritance  have  been  based.  Family  life  has  been  a  central  unifying  experience  throughout
American  society.  Preserving  the strength  of this  basic,  organic  unit is  a  central  and  legitimate
end  of the police  power."  Wilkinson  & White, supra note  153, at  568-69.
"
5An  opposite result  in the  Belle Terre  case,  invalidating  direct,  regulatory  proscription  of
unconventional  household  groupings,  would  leave open  many  possible  avenues  for  a governmen-
tal  policy  of  encouraging  the  formation  and  maintenance  of  conventional  family  units.  The
preceding  footnote suggests  some of  them,  but hardly exhausts  the possibilities-some  of which,
however,  seem  foreclosed  by such  decisions  as United  States Dept.  of Agriculture  v.  Moreno,  413
U.S.  528  (1973);  Stanley v.  Illinois,  405  U.S.  645  (1972);  Levy  v.  Louisiana,  391  U.S.  68  (1968).
'""Law  is  a  vehicle  by which  democratic  majorities  reaffirm  shared moral  aspirations  and
summon society's  allegiance  to  a common  set  of behavioral  goals.  Deploying  the constitution  to
undermine conventional  precepts of  domestic morality  is a step  not lightly  taken."  Wilkinson  &
White,  supra note  153,  at  568.
111431  U.S.  at 503.
111431  U.S.  at 503.
1
74Patriotic observance,  to  take just one example for comparison,  has also  been a traditional
institution  in our  country  from  its  beginnings,  and  it  is  one  for  the sustenance  of  which  im-
pressive  policy  arguments  can  be  summoned  and  various  nonregulatory  means  doubtless
employed.  But  does  the Court  think  it follows  that  village governments  are  free  to  enact  bans
against  those who decline  to partake of-or even  those who  actively but peaceably oppose-such
observance?  See,  e.g.,  West Virginia State  Bd.  of Educ.  v.  Barnette,  319 U.S.  624  (1943).  It is
interesting  that precisely such  a  distinction  between  direct  regulatory  proscription  and  less  coer-
cive means  of "influencing"  or "encouraging"  private decisions  lies at  the heart of Justice  Powell's
opinion for the  Court in the extremely controversial  case  of Maher v.  Roe,  97 S.  Ct.  2376,  2383
(1977).  See  also Califano  v. Jobst,  98  S.  Ct.  95, 99-100  & n.11  (1977).
111431  U.S.  at  503.
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coherent plan  having  underlying  moral premises,  themselves  implicit  but in-
telligible  through  a parsing of the  constitutional  plan's overall  "structure  and
relationships." 176  And  when  we  consider  that  a  main  pillar-if  not  a
keystone-in  that structure  is  the first amendment,  an inference  that govern-
ments  are  not  only  constitutionally  bound  to  respect  traditional  household
forms,  but are  also  constitutionally  authorized  to censor  nontraditional  ones,
becomes problematic  to say the least.177 The difficulty is  only  aggravated,  not
alleviated,  when-in  the  light  cast  by  the  first  amendment-one  heeds
Justice  Powell's  injunction to open  "our  eyes  to the basic  reasons why  certain
rights associated  with  the family have  been accorded  shelter  under the Four-
teenth  Amendment's  Due  Process  Clause,' 7T 8  and  reflects  on  his  suggestion
that  a  crucial  reason  is that  "it  is through  the  family  that we inculcate  and
pass down  many of our most cherished values,  moral and cultural."' 79 While
1"See  generally C.  BLACK.  STRUCTURE  AND  RELATIONSHIP  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  (1969);
Michelman,  The Supreme Court and Litigation  Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights
(pt.  2)  1974  DUKE  L.J.  533-34  &  n.20,  discussing  Bork,  Neutral Principles and  Some  First
Amendment  Problems 47  IND.  L.J.  1,  17-19  (1971).  It  is  true,  of course,  that Justice  Powell's
plurality opinion purports  to rest  on  the  Fourteenth Amendment's  guaranty  of "liberty"  against
governmental  deprivation  without due  process of law.  But  "liberty"  is an  exceedingly  vague  no-
tion  and  the  plurality's  limiting  idea  of the  "rational  continuum,"  borrowed  from  the  second
Justice  Harlan's  dissenting  opinion  in  Poe  v. Ullman,  367  U.S.  497,  522,  543,  (1961),  seems  to
recur to  a structuralist conception:  "[T]he  full scope of the liberty guaranteed  by the Due Process
Clause  cannot  be  found  in or limited  by the precise  terms  of the specific  guarantees  elsewhere
provided  in the Constitution.  This  'liberty'  is not  a series  of isolated  points pricked  out in terms
of the taking of property;  the freedom  of speech,  press,  and religion;  the right to  keep  and bear
arms;  the freedom  from  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures;  and so  on.  It  is a  rational  con-
tinuum  . . . which recognizes,  what  a  reasonable  and sensitive  judgment  must, that certain  in-
terests  require  particularly  careful  scrutiny  of  the  state  needs  asserted  to  justify  their
abridgment."  431  U.S.  at
1
77"[A]s  with  the  first  amendment,  lifestyle  proptection  may  require  defense  of  the  most
idiosyncratic among us in order to discourage,  at the outer perimerter,  the state's natural inclina-
tion to compel its  citizens to think and behave  in orthodox  patterns."  Wilkinson  & White, supra
note 153,  at  613.
"Pierce struck  down  an  Oregon  law  requiring  all  children  to  attend  the State's
public schools,  holding  that the Constitution  'excludes  any general  power of the State
to standardize  its  children  by  forcing them  to accept  instruction from  public teachers
only.'  . . . By the same  token the Constitution  prevents East  Cleveland  from  standar-
dizing  its children-and  its  adults-by forcing  all  to  live  in certain  narrowly  defined
family patterns."
431  U.S.  at (plurality  opinion  of Powell, J.).  But  why doesn't  the same  apply  if we  substitute
"Belle  Terre"  for  "East Cleveland"  in that last sentence? "There  will,"  after all,  "always  be some
Americans  who resist traditional  conceptions  of family  life and regard the favored  legal  status of
the nuclear  family  as economically  oppressive  and a source  of indignity  and  affront." Wilkinson
& White, supra note  153,  at  68.  Why  is it  that governments  are  free  to  "standardize"  them?
171431  U.S.  at  501.
17Id.  at 503-04.  Compare  Wilkinson  & White, supra note  153,  at  623:
Arguably,  the  state  has  no  legitimate  interest  in restricting  living  arrangements  to  a
narrow  ideal of domestication:  to,  for example,  the middle  class family of four  safely
cottaged  in the suburbs.  That model  has  been with us  too briefly and  is changing too
quickly  to  be the real basis of the state's concern  in this area.  Rather,  the state's pro-
per  concern  derives  from  the  basic  functions  performed  by  'family'  units  in society
from  sexual fulfillment  and  reproduction,  to  education  and rearing  of the  young,  to
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none  of this quite proves  that  the Belle  Terre decision  is  wrong,180  it does,  I
believe,  amply  show  that Justice  Powell's  defense  of  that  decision  in  East
Cleveland is inadequate  and  unconvincing  as it stands.  And  so the stage is set
for asking whether either-  or both-  of the two suggested judicial "models"  of
local-government  legitimacy  can point the way  towards  a more authentic  and
satisfying account  of the joint  results  in the  Belle Terre and  East Cleveland
cases  than  the Court's  opinions  reveal.
From the economically  inspired,  market-failure ("public  choice") justifica-
tion for governmental  authority,  one can derive  a fairly persuasive  defense  for
the Belle  Terre  ordinance.  Environmental  or atmospheric  factors-including
a  factor  best  entitled  "moral  ambience" - might  certainly  count  as  a  signifi-
cant  type  of  spillover  or  public  good  (bad). 18 1  Prevalence  of  a  uniformly
"familistic"  type  of ambience in one's local community  is a  condition that any
individual  household  might  value  highly,  and  in  addition  is  a  somewhat
delicate  condition  easily  subject to  destruction  by  the presence  of nonconfor-
ming  households  who  would  (granting  the reciprocity  of it all'
82) thereby  be
impairing  the welfare  of others.  Beyond  the  question  of the  ambience  itself
there is the related question  of the local public budget:  how heavily the com-
munity  members  shall  tax  themselves  and  how  the  proceeds  shall  be
distributed  among  various possible  objectives such  as  public protection,  educ-
tion,  recreation.  There is a good economic  argument to the effect  that the ef-
ficiency  of  a majoritarian  fiscal  regime  is  maximized  when  homogeneity  of
preferences  among  the  citizenry  is  also  maximized  - essentially,  that when
preferences  coincide,  political externality  costs  and political  transaction  costs
are both  minimized,  or, putting it  another  way,  that as  preferences  increas-
ingly  coincide,  the majoritarian  process  approaches  closer  to the Pareto-ideal
condition  of frictionless  consensus  or unanimity; 88  and,  of course,  regulatory
screening of prospective  entrants  by  a  criterion of conformity  to the establish-
ed familistic  norm  can be  construed  as  a  device  for  assuring convergence  of
preferences  on  those  typical  for  normal  families.1
84
economic support and emotional security ....  [These] vital purposes of thi family...
appear to require some fidelity and  constancy of relationship.
Was the Court, perhaps,  privy to some evidence that household groups without a marriage bond are
peculiarly lacking in fidelity  and constancy? Is there any such evidence?
"'See  notes 181-189,  193-95,  infra & text accompanying for arguments supporting the decision.
'It  should so count in a normative  economic conception of politics, even if not in an objectivist
conception  in which the fundamental  aim  is something  like "equal concern  and respect"  for each
person,  rather than maximum  realization of private preferences.  See R. DwORKIN  TAKING  RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY  275-78  (1977).
18
t Granting, that is, that the effect of a regulation like Belle Terre's is  to impair the welfare of
persons  like the plaintiffs.
113See,  e.g.,  Hirsch,  The Efficiency of Restrictive Land Use Instruments, 53 LAND  ECON.  145,
151-52 (1977)  [hereinafter cited as Hirsch];  McGuire, Group  Segregation and OptimalJurisdictions,
82J. POL. ECON.  112 (1974);  R. BISH. & H. NOURSE.  URBAN  ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS  129-31
(1975)  [hereinafter  cited as BIsH & NOURSE];  BISH. supra note 45  at 46-53.
1
841t is,  indeed,  a more efficient sorting device  than other forms of "snob" zoning which have
sometimes  been  recognized as conducive  to the purpose,  e.g.,  BISH  &  NoURSE.  supra note 183.  See
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The  economic  defense  of  the  Belle  Terre  ordinance  is,  however,  in-
complete,  (or,  conversely,  proves  too much)  until  note  is  taken of both  the
community's  size  and its  position within  a surrounding  constellation  of com-
munities. With  its capacity of at least  220 households,  Belle Terre  could fair-
ly claim  to be  too large  to achieve  a  uniform  ambience,  at feasible  transac-
tions  cost,  through  voluntary  consensual  agreements  embodied  in  restrictive
convenants.' 8 5  On  the  other hand,  Belle  Terre  is  plainly small  enough  (one
square  mile)  to  make  implausible  any  claim  that  by  its  regulation  it  was
monopolizing  some  relevant  market  (in  local  community  ambiences  or
budget-packages),  thereby  impeding  the  achievement  of  efficiency  in  that
market.  In  this light  the Court's  highlighting  of Belle Terre's  small  size'1
6  is
noteworthy,  as  is  the fact,  asserted  by the village and never contradicted,  that
opportunities  existed  elsewhere  in  the relevant  market area  for indulgence  in
non-familistic  living  arrangements  by  those with  non-familistic  preferences.' 87
The  Belle Terre  ordinance  thus  presents  an  analogue  to  the  segregation-of-
incompatible-uses  rationale  for  certain  kinds  of use-zoning  that  some'88  but
not all' 8 9  economic  analysts have found plausible.  The Belle Terre regulation
certainly  externalizes  some  costs  onto  persons  like  the  plaintiffs,  for  whom
(presumably)  no  available  alternative  is  quite  as  favorable  as  living,  non-
familistically,  in  Belle  Terre;  yet  it  may  be  reasonable  to  think  that  the
scheme  copes  so  effectively  with  other externalities  which whould  arise in  its
absence  as  to be,  on the whole,  a  positive  contribution  towards  efficiency  in
the  use  of metropolitan  land.
If, however,  the economic model of legitimacy thus accounts  for the Belle
Terre decision,  how can it also  handle  the opposite East Cleveland decision?
The subjectivist-individualist  attitude of economics  apparently would foreclose
any  possibility  of suggesting  that  non-familistic  intrusions  upon  a  familistic
ambience  are somehow  a more  real,  a more valid,  spillover than are "extend-
ed family" intrusions  upon a "nuclear family"  ambience. 90  If the Belle Terre
ordinance  is  to  be  explained  or  rationalized  as  an  economically  prudent
device  for  minimizing  externalities  (reflecting  the  present  villagers'  actual,
private preferences  as  combined  through  majoritarian  procedures),  it is hard
to  see  how  a  like  rationalization  can  be  denied  to  the  East  Cleveland  or-
dinance.  We  may  not  be  able  to  fathom  a  significant  preference  for  a
Hirsh,  supra note 183, at  152-53. A regulatory sorting device is not superfluous-one could not rely
on private, voluntary choices to sort metropolitan populations into municipal groupings characteriz-
ed  by  internally  convergent,  if  externally  divergent,  preferences-  because  there  are  counter-
incentives stemming from the property-tax  system of local finance.  See id. at 148,  151.
185See note 77,  supTa & text accompanying.
1
86By devoting the first two sentences  of the opinion to this feature.  416 U.S.  at 2.
"'?See Appendix on Appeal,  Belle Terre v.  Boraas, 416 U.S.  1, A46-A47  (1974). Jurisdictional
Statement in id.,  at 57a-58a  (unreported  opinion of the  trial  court).
1
88See, e.g.,  Ohis, Weisberg  & White,  The Effect  of Zoning on Land Value,  1 J. URB. ECON.
428,  440 (1974).
1"
9See, e.g.,  B.  SIEGAN,  LAND  USE WITHoUT  ZONING  (1972).
"'0See note 31 supra & text accompanying.
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"nuclear"  as  opposed  to  an  "extended"  family  ambience,  but  those  in  East
Cleveland,  as  the  outcome  of  their  majoritarian  procedure  presumptively
shows,  evidently  have  that  preference  notwithstanding  its  general
mysteriousness.  Of  course,  East  Cleveland  is  many  times  bigger  than  Belle
Terre. 91 But not  only  does nothing  in any  of the  majority Justices'  opinions
even  hint  at  any  significance  in  that  fact;  more  important  is  the  lack  of
anything  to indicate  that East  Cleveland  is  so  large (or otherwise  so situated)
as  to render  its regulatory  scheme monopolistic  or preclusive  of opportunities
for  extended-family  living for those  who prefer  it. t
9  The  conclusion  is  clear:
Imputation  to  the Justices  of  the  economic  model  of  legitimacy  succeeds
rather nicely in explaining Belle  Terre, but at best indifferently  in explaining
East Cleveland.
How well can  these  decisions be explained  by imputing  a community-self-
determination  type  of public-interest  model of legitimacy?  Certainly  some of
Justice  Douglas'  rhetoric  in Belle  Terre  seems  to  reflect  such  a  conception:
"The police  power,"  he said,  "is  ample  to lay  out  zones  where  family values,
youth values, and the blessings  of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area
a  sanctuary  for  people."'93  It  is  not  hard  to  see  how  the  conception  would
tend  to justify  the  Belle Terre  ordinance  for surely  the  members  of a  small
village  population,  much  as  those  of a  residential  household,  can  easily  be
seen  as  a  group  having  a  vital  interest  in  room  to  choose  a  community-
defining (and  thus  a self-defining)  set of values,  or way  of life,  or moral  am-
bience.  The  arguments  in  favor  of endowing  community-sized  groups  with
such capacity  look,  indeed,  very like  those for  creating and protecting  a free-
choice capacity  for household groups. 94 So  how can  the plaintiffs  interest  in
determining  their way  of  life be  legally entitled  to  prevail  over  the  villagers'
quite  parallel  and  equally weighty interest?  The villagers  (as  a  village group)
wish  to  nurture  traditional  family  values.  The  plaintiffs  (as  a  household
group)  would  nurture something  else.  Why  should  the  plaintiffs  prevail-at
least  as long  as they can,  without great  loss or  inconvenience,  live nondisrup-
"'According  to the 1970 U.S.  Census, the population of East Cleveland  was 39,600.
"'See 431 U.S.  at 550 (White, J., dissenting).  In appraising the likelihood of such preclusion, it
may be relevant  that East Cleveland  is a majority-black municipality.  See 431 U.S.  at 508-10 (Bren-
nan, J.,  concurring).  There may not be many-perhaps there are no-other Cleveland suburbs with
both  living  conditions  and  demographic  features  reasonably  matching  East  Cleveland's.
"'3416  U.S.  at 9  (emphasis supplied).
194See  note  150,  supra & text accompanying.  The possibility  of such  an  explanation  of the
Belle Terre decision is recognized,  but not-as it seems to me-taken seriously enough,  by Raggi,
An  Independent Right  to Freedom of Association,  12  HARv.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REv. 1,  24-25,  28
n.107  (1977).  Raggi's  objection  to justifying the  decision  by appeal  to "a  competing associational
interest ...of  the  townspeople in  living in and  maintaining  a certain  lifestyle"  (id. at  24)  ap-
parently  is  that such  a justification  would  endorse  an "absolute  right  of . . . a majority  . . .to
dictate the  disposal  of another's  propety."  Id. at  25.  But  that observation,  even  if correct,  only
sharpens  and  dramatizes-it  does  not  resolve-the  dilemma  posed  by  the  case.  See  L.  TRIBE.
AmERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAw  977-79  (1978)  [hereinafter  cited as  TRIBE],  and  the  observation
may not be  correct.  See  notes  199-205,  infra & text  accompanying.
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tively  somewhere  else?  For  a  Justice  entertaining  any  such  idea,  its  most
straightforward  translation into the parlance of two-tier  equal protection  doc-
trine would have been  to say that even  though the plaintiffs do have constitu-
tionally  favored  or fundamental  interests  at  stake,  the  state  also  has  a  con-
stitutionally  favored  or  compelling  justification  for  allowing  the  village
population  to work  out and establish its choice.  But to state the case  that way
requires  explicit  assertion and defense  of the proposition  that protected  zones
for  community  choice  are,  like  protected  zones for  household  choice,  a part
of  a  "constitution  of liberty."195  If the Justice  were not  quite  ready to  assert
and  defend  that  position-but  at  some  level  of  awareness  were  drawn  to
it-he  might  temporize  by  some  such  device  as  forcing  the  Belle Terre  or-
dinance  into  the  unlikely mold  of mere  economic  and social  legislation.
This  non-economic,  community  self-determination  account  of  the  Belle
Terre decision  bears  an  interesting  comparison  with  the  economic  account
proposed  above.196  While this  account  does not  depend,  as  that one did,  on
Belle Terre's being large enough  to sustain it, it does depend,  as that one also
did,  on Belle Terre's being small  enough to sustain it-or, more precisely,  on
Belle Terre's being  a minor enough part  of a  larger  complex of communities
or potential  communities.  For if there were no place but Belle Terre  to which
the  plaintiffs  could  feasibly  repair  to live  nondisruptively  according  to  their
own  lights,, then  given  the  lack  of  of  grounds  for  preferring  the  villagers'
lights  to  those  of the  plaintiffs,  the  proper  disposition  would  seem  to  be  to
make  the villagers  allow the plaintiffs  some room in  which  to live their  lives,
despite  the  unfortunate,  resulting partial  impairment  of the villagers'  ability
to  live  theirs.197  It  is  only  because  the  plaintiffs  can  reasonably  be  asked  to
live elsewhere that the villagers'  already  established way of life seems  to entitle
them  to  stand  their  ground. 98  Thus  there  is  an  anti-monopoly  qualifier  in
both  the  economic  and  the  community  self-determination  accounts  of  the
Belle  Terre  ordinance's  validity-a  partial  commonality  which  suggests  the
possibility  that  the  two  accounts  may  not  be  so  antithetical,  at  bottom,  as
they  may sometimes  appear to  be.
Now how well  does  the community self-determination  account  succeed  in
explaining the East Cleveland decision?  Can one say that it works, in that the
East  Cleveland  regulation  embodies  no  intelligible  effort  at value  definition
(or formation,  or  reshaping),  so  there  is  no  state  interest  in  permitting  that
19See  F.  HAYEK,  THE CONSTITUTION  OF  LIBERTY  (1960).  Professor  Hayek  might  not  cheer
this  application of his neat locution,  but  I do  not see how he  could  deny its  fittingness.
"'See  notes  174-82 supra & text accompanying.
1"
7See TmBE,  supra note  194,  at 983.  More precisely, this would be the proper  disposition in a
normative  conception  of government  which  was  objectivist in  the  compound sense  of (i)  incor-
porating the  view that joint definition  of values at the community  level is a critical dimension  of
personal freedom  (see note  30, supra and text accompanying),  and (ii) incorporating  a belief that
that view  itself  has  an  objective  basis,  in  a moral  theory  rooted  in reason  and  including  some
such  axiom  as  the claim  of each  person  to "equal respect  and  concern"  (see note  181,  supra).
"'8See  TRIBE, supra note  194  at 983.
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regulation  which can justify the infringement  of the plaintiffs own  interest  in
self-determination?  The  argument  would  be  that  there  is  no  intelligible  or
recognizable  value,  or value  system,  or ideal  social  vision,  or moral  concep-
tion,  that  anyone  could  be  trying  to  discover  or realize  by  favoring  nuclear
over  extended  families-or,  better,  that  there  is  no  such  intelligible  value
system  or moral conception which  one could  thus be  trying to realize  without
thereby  vilating  a  special  constitutional  injunction  against  invidiously  race-
related distinctions' 99-so  that the true purpose  of the ordinance  may be sup-
posed to lie  elsewhere.  If no  one could find the words through which  even  to
begin  an  explanation,  in  terms  anyone  else  could  even  begin  to  understand
(unless  by  reference  to  invidious  socio-cultural  stereotyping),  or  what  ideal
form  of life  inspires  the  preference  for  nuclear  over  extended  families;  if no
one  could  verbally  evoke  (even  if  only  intuitively  or  suggestively)  a  cogent
relationship  between  that  preference  and  some  more  inclusive  and  com-
prehensible  vision  of life  (unless  a vision made  coherent  only  by an  invidious
racial stereotype),  then  the ordinance  is not a  (constitutionally  admissible) ef-
fort  at  community  self-determination  and  must  be regarded  as  if aimed  at
some mundane  goal-such  as  minimizing  public  school  costs-which  cannot
override  the plaintiffs  interest  in  self-determination.
It is not,  as might be  thought,  an objection  to this  view that even  though
the outsider can find  no intelligible  moral point  or direction  in-a preference
for nuclear over  extended  families,  the East  Clevelanders  might have  grasped
or intuited some such significance  in it. A like objection was cited  as a reason
for  doubting  whether  the East Cleveland decision  could  be  defended  in  an
economic  conception  which  would,  at  the same  time, justify  the  Belle  Terre
ordinance.2 00  But  the  objection  there  reflected  the  deep  subjectivism  of the
economic  standpoint,  and it does not carry  over  to the  objectivist standpoint
from which  community self-determination  is a  valued  process.  Economics  in-
sists  (methodologically 20 1)  on  the  essential  privacy  and  arbitrariness-  the
a-rationality-of all values.  But  that proposition  is denied  by the Kantian  (or
Rousseauian)  philosophy  that  underlies  the  notion  of  community  self-
determination  as  a  condition  of personal  freedom. 2 0 2  In  that  philosophy  it
must be possible  to reject formulations of ends (as well  as selections of means)
because  they  are unreasonable;  and  so  it must likewise  be possible  to  say,  of
this  or  that  formulation,  that no  one  could  reasonably  think  it.
20  Granted
'See  431  U.S.  509-10  (Brennan,  J.,  concurring),  noting  that extended-family  living  ar-
rangements  are  "especially  familiar  among  black  families,"  and  in  that  light  deploring  the
"cultural  myopia"  and  "depressing  insensitivity"  displayed  by  the  East  Cleveland  ordinance
(although  forbearing  from  any  attribution  to  the  city government  of  a  racially  discriminatory
motivation).
lssSee  note  191  supra & text  accompanying.
O'See  note  31  supra.
202See  note  30  supra and text  accompanying.
"0'See M.  HORKHEIMER.  ECLIPSE  OF  REASON  3-57,  162-187,  esp.  at 43,  174  (paper ed.  1974)
[hereinafter  cited  as  HORKHEIMER].  TRIBE.  supra note  194,  at  989,  seems  to  agree  in principle
with the position  taken  here but  to doubt its proper  application  to  the East Cleveland case.
[Vol.  53:145COMPETITING  JUDICIAL MODELS
there would be more  than a touch of presumption  in a judge's  passing judg-
ment  on  whether  some  asserted  but ineffable  end  or value,  known  or  iden-
tified  only  by  its  supposed  connection  with  some  preference  for  a  specified
social state such  as families-only,  or nuclear-families-only,  is reasonable  or in-
telligible  as such.  Presumptuousness  of that sort  seems  to be endemic  in the
role of the judge,204  even  (or  especially) in the  economic  conception  of that
role. 2 05  In  the  end,  whether  in  the economic  conception  or  the one  here  il-
lustrated,  the  judge  has  to  fall  back  on  an  educated  sense  of how  people
think,  feel,  or want.
The  result  of this discussion  suggests  that,  as  between  the  two  proposed
models of local-government  legitimacy,  imputation to the Supreme  Court of a
community  self-determination  model  does  the  better job  of explaining  the
Court's  dispositions  in  the  Belle  Terre  and  East  Cleveland  cases  taken
together.  Readers can  review the arguments-possibly revise them-and come
to  their  own  conclusions.
V.  THE  INTELLECTUAL SITUATION  IN
PUBLIC  LAW  ADJUDICATION
No  grand  generalizations  are  warranted  by  the  fragmentary  evidence
presented  here.  At most it  may suggest that  a  community self-determination
model of local-government  legitimacy  competes with an economically  inspired
public-choice  model in  the adjudication  of "open" 2 0 6 questions  arising under
the  few  public-law  doctrines  examined  above.  One  cannot  say,  on  this
evidence,  whether  the  competition  described  obtains  over  a  significantly
broader range  of public-law  questions  or,  if it does,  whether  these  loose for-
mulations of the models  are the most trenchant or fruitful ones with which to
attempt  a  description  of any such  broader  opposition  or irresolution (respec-
ting political  ideals)  as  may  be  playing  a  part  in the  adjudication  of such
questions.  From  some  preliminary  work  it  does  seem  that  the  two  opposed
models  will  prove  clarifying-and  may  themselves  be  clarified-as  they  are
applied to a  number of other topics in the constitutional  and other basic  law
of local  government,  including  voting  rights  and  the  distribution  of voting
power; 207  standards  and  rights  regarding  the  incorporation  of  new  local-
government units;20 8  rights regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits
2
01Compare  Kennedy,  Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89  HARv.  L.  REv.
1685,  1776  & passim (1976)  [hereinafter  cited  as  Kennedy].
2sSee notes  108-09,  supra & text accompanying.
2
05See  notes  5,  6 supra & text accompanying.
21
t See,  e.g.,  Town  of Lockport  v. Citizens for Community Action,  430 U.S.  259  (1977);  Hill
v.  Stone,  421  U.S.  289  (1975);  Salyer Land Co. v.  Tulare Lake Basin Dist.,  410 U.S.  719 (1973);
Abate v.  Mundt,  403  U.S.  182  (1971);  Kramer v.  Union Free School  Dist.,  395  U.S.  621  (1969). 20OSee,  e.g.,  State ex rel. Davis v. Town  of Lake  Placid, 109  Fla.  419,  147 So.  468  (1933);  F.
MICHELMAN  & T.  SANDALOW,  MATERIALS  ON  GOVERNMENT  IN  URBAN  AREAS  612-21  (1970).
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of governmental  operations within  a unit;209  rights regarding the  distribution
of fiscal burdens and capabilities  across political units;21 0  and rights regarding
fiscally  motivated  barriers  to resettlement  across  political  units.2 11  But  those
puddings  are still baking.
An  eventual  appraisal  might  be  that  one  of  the  two  opposed  models
dominates  the  other  in  the judical  treatment  of open  local  government  law
questions  taken  as  a whole,  in the sense of explaining all or most of what the
other can explain and much else  besides.  Or it might be that neither concep-
tion  dominates,  that  the situation just seems  irresolute.  In that event  inquiry
perhaps  might  turn  towards  trying  to  classify  instances  in  which  one  or the
other model  does  seem dominant:  can their respective  domains  be staked  out
by  subject  matter?  by  type  or  level  of official  agency  whose  acts  are  under
review?  by  jurisdiction  or  level  or  reviewing  court?2 12  by  still  some  other
dimensions?  If so,  what  further  inferences  are possible  regarding  the  role  in
law  of these  competing  political  images,  or  their  role  in  contemporary  in-
tellectual  life generally, 213  or their sociological  or anthropological  underpinn-
ings?
A  further  possibility,  which should  not  be  overlooked,  is  that  these  two
conceptions,  which  seem  opposed  and mutually  contradictory  at the  level  of
abstraction  naturally  evoked  by  the  legal  doctrines  and  decisions  examined
have,  may at a  deeper  level  be aspects  of a  unified  conception not  now fully
comprehended.  This essay has  enearthed  a few  clues to  the possbility of such
a deeper  synthesis:  the need for an antimonopoly  qualifier on community self-
determination; 214  the perception  that  the shared  or  objective  'Values underly-
ing  or  flowing  from  community  self-determination  may  include-quite  cen-
trally  or prominently-respect  for  individual  autonomy  and  civil  liberties;2 1 6
and  the converse  perception  that  normative  economic  conceptions  of govern-
ment  may  be founded on notions  of pre-political,  objective  rights.2 16  Pushing
this speculation  a bit further,  it may be what one  sees are not outcroppings  of
some  underlying  synthesis,  but  rather  signs  of  enduring,  irresolvable  con-
2 05See,  e.g.,  Myles  Salt  Co.  v.  Board of  Commrs,  239  U.S.  478  (1916);  Assoicated  Home
Builders  v.  City of Walnut Bay,  4  Cal.  3d 633,  484 P.2d  606,  94  Cal.  Rptr.  630  (1971);  Teagen
v.  Borough  of  Bergenfield,  19  N.J.  Super.  212,  290  A.2d  753  (1972);  Sperry  Rand  Corp.  v.
Town  of North  Hempstead,  53  Misc.  2d  970,  280  N.Y.S.2d  600  (Sup.  Ct.  1967).
21
5 See,  e.g.,  San  Antonio  Independent School  Dist.  v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1 (973);  McLen-
nan  v.  Aldredge,  223  Ga.  879,  159  S.E.2d  682  (1968). 5 2
1 See,  e.g.,  Southern  Burlington  County  NAACP  v.  Township  of Mt.  Laurel,  67  N.J.  151,
336  A.2d 713  (1975).
21
tAs  to the  last  possibility, see  note  52  supra.
2 'The  work  of  Duncan  Kennedy  is  addressing  questions  of  this sort.  See  Kennedy,  supra
note  204;  D.  Kennedy,  "The  Rise and Fall of Classical  Legal  Thought  1850-1940" (various  draft
chapters  of unpublished  manuscript).
t 2
14See note  197 supra & text accompanying.  LEVINE,  supra note  20,  at  74-78.
2
15See note  112 supra & text accompanying.  Compare  Horkheimer, supra note  203,  at 175:
.[o]nly  a  definition  of  the  objective  goals  of society  that  includes  the  purpose  of the self-
preservation  of the subject,  the  respect  for  individual  life,  deserves  to be  called  objective."
2
1 "See  note  111  supra.
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tradiction.217 There may be no  end to an  iterative alternation  between  objec-
tivist  and  subjectivist  foundations  for  political  morality-each  objectivist
premise  seeming  to rest  on  a  still  deeper  subjectivist  one,  and  vice-versa. 2 18
Those  apparently  objective,  pre-political,  natural  rights,  for  example,  may
just be hypostatizations  of estimates  about what  configuration of fundamental
legal  entitlements  will  best  conduce  to  individual  self-maximization,  given
what  seem to  be enduring,  if  contingent,  traits  of human  nature.2 9 And yet
those  estimates  may,  in  their inspirations  and available  verbal justifications,
border  on objectivist  ethics  or categorical  imperatives.
VI.  ECONOMICS:  THE  KEY  TO  LAW?
In  introducing this  study,  I said  that its aim  was to see whether adjudica-
tion  in "open"  areas of public law  can be characterized,  as common-law  ad-
judication  has  been  characterized,  as  reflecting  a  fairly  consistent  judicial
striving to make  the  law correspond  with  an economic  conception  of what  it
ought  to be.  In slightly  different terms,  the  question has  been whether  there
seems  to be an "implicit  economic logic" in public law  adjudication,  parallel-
ing  that  which  has  been  discovered  in  private  law  adjudication. 22 0  Looking
only at the very limited evidence  presented  here,  the  answer to  that question
would  seem  to  be in serious  doubt.
Now suppose  it turns out that further work confirms the suggestion  of this
study,  that insofar  as  one can  say there  is an  economic  influence  at work  in
public  law  adjudication,  one  must  say,  as  well,  that  another  and  at  least
equally powerful  contradictory  influence  is  also  at work there. What  bearing,
if  any, would such a confirmed  finding have on the validity of the descriptive
or explanatory  economic  theory  of the  common  law?
At least three  possible  objections  can be  anticipated  to a  suggestion  that
this  descriptive  hypothesis  about  public  law has  any bearing  on the  truth  of
the positive  economic  theory  of the  common law:  One objection would  insist
on the difference  between normative  and positive theories;  a second would  in-
sist  on a crucial  distinction,  in  the positive economic  theory  of law,  between
judicial  and  other  governmental  behavior;  and  a  third  would  insist  on  a
critical  difference  between  the  normative economic  theories  of private  and
public law in regard to their respective  degrees  of plausibility or of direct and
intuitive  appeal.  Considering  these  objections  briefly,  it seems  that  the  first
objection  is partly,  but  only partly valid-restricting  but not wholly refuting
2
17See  Kennedy,  supra note  204,  at 1766-76.
2t "Compare  HORKHEIMER.  supra note  203,  at 175:  "The  two concepts  [of subjective  and ob-
jective  reason]  are interlaced,  in  the sense  that the  consequence  of each  not  only  dissolves  the
other but leads back  to it."
2"
1For  a striking example  of  such  thinking,  see  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  supra note  2,  at  121
(suggesting subjectivist economic  account of right not to be raped).  Compare  B.  DEJOUVENEL,  ON
POWER  204 (1962).
2
20See  note  2, supra & text accompanying.
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the claim  that this  essay's  hypothesis  about public  law  adjudication would,  if
true,  contradict  the  positive  economic  theory  of  common-law  adjudication;
and  that  the  second  objection  is  beside  the  point  except  as  it  contributes
towards  the  restrictive  force  of the first.  The few  comments  that  can  be  of-
fered here regarding  the third  objection will not  suffice  either to dispose of it
or  confirm  it.
The first  objection  might  be  phrased  this  way:  It has  been  shown  above
(granting arguendo that anything at all  has been  shown)  that judicial resolu-
tions of open public  law issues do not conform regularly  and  closely to a nor-
mative  or  prescriptive  economic  theory  about  how government  ideally  ought
to  work.  The  author  has,  in  effect,  been  taking  the  part  of  a  normative
public-choice  theorist  engaged  in  criticizing judical  doctrines  and  decisions.
By  contrast,  the economic  theory of the common law is  a  positive or descrip-
tive,  not  a  normative  or  prescriptive,  theory.  The  theorists  mean  not  to
criticize  or condemn  such  common law  doctrines  or  decisions  as are not  effi-
cient,  but rather just to  show that the great preponderance  of these  doctrines
and  decisions  are,  as  it  happens,  efficient.  So  their  works  and  this  one  are
asking  different  questions  and  there  is,  therefore,  no  way  the  answers  can
contradict  each  other.
In  order  to  see  why  this  argument  is  partly,  but  only  partly,  right,  we
need  to take  a  closer  look  at the literature  on  the explanatory  or  descriptive
economic  theory  of  the  common  law.  That  body  of literature  seems  to  be
branching  into  two  which  can  be  labeled  an  "automatic"  branch  and  an
"intentional"  branch. The automatic  branch of the literature2 21  notes with in-
terest  how the  micro data  of the common law-its  countless  doctrines,  rules,
decisions-can  apparently  all2 22 be  captured  and rendered  by  a simple,  par-
simonious  principle  (which happens  to be a  normative principle)-that  of ef-
ficiency.  But  what  the  automatic  theorists  are ultimately  interested  in is  ex-
ploding  this  illusion  of normative  intention  behind  the  common  law.  They
seek  to  show  how  the  common  law  would  tend  to  become  efficient  by  a
mindless  (automatic)  process  in which  no  one  ever  intended  to make  it effi-
cient-in  which  no  one  had  any  intentions  at  all  regarding  the  social  at-
tributes2 2S of law  or anything else-in which  no motivations  are supposed ex-
cept  those  of individuals  in  realizing  their  own,  private ends. 224  For the  mo-
22
1See Rubin,  Why  is  the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  51  (1977);  Priest,  The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,  6 J.  LEGAL  STUD.65  (1977). 52 "All"  is  hyperbolic.  Some  anomalies  remain to  be explained.  POSNER  I,  supra note  1, at
765.
2 3Efficiency  is,  of course,  a  "social"  attribute  of social practices or institutions--i.e.,  the  at-
tribute  of conducing  to  the satisfaction  of private,  individual  preferences.  See  POSNER  II,  supra
note  62,  at 350.
2
24The  argument,  briefly,  is  that  rationally  self-interested  private  agents  will  tend  to
relitigate  inefficient  rules and  doctrines  more frequently  than efficient  ones;  so that if judges are
assumed  to be  indifferent  or  oblivious  to  efficiency  (and  their decisions,  then,  are  random with
respect  to  efficiency),  there  will be a tendency  over time for  inefficient  rules and doctrines  to be
weeded  out and  efficient  ones  to  be stabilized.
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ment,  at least it must be conceded  that nothing presented in this study affects
the validity  of the  automatic  branch  of the  positive  economic  theory  of the
common  law.2
25  Indeed,  it could well be that an effect  of the study will be to
strengthen  the  position  of the automaticians  in their  dispute with  the  inten-
tionalists.
In  the  intentional  branch  of the  theory,  the  potent  explanation  of  the
common  law's  observed  content takes  the form  of a thesis-itself,  to be sure,
a purely  descriptive one-about an intentional and  normative fact:  The com-
mon  law  is explained  by reference  to  the judge's  normative  appreciation  of,
and intentional  striving for, the good of efficiency  as a social goal.  It is possi-
ble that intentional theorists  are not ultimately  interested in claiming that the
efficiency  norm  really  exists  within  or motivates  the judge,  that  they  would
ultimately  be  content  with  the  purely  pragmatic  claim  that  the  observed
results of adjudication accord,  on the whole,  with those to be expected if such
a fantasy  were true.  Still, the theory's  express form-which may be the source
of much  of  its  charm--is  that  of ordering  a  huge  collection  of  seemingly
disrelated  phenomena  by reference  to a  supposed judicial preference  (veiled,
inarticultate,  intuitive, semi-conscious)  for efficiency.  There can be no  doubt,
at  any  rate,  of  a  considered  reliance  on  intentionality  in  some  of  the
literature:  There are  suggested explanations  of why judges should  be expected
to  try  to make  their doctrines  and decisions  efficient;22 6  and there  is  discus-
sion  seemingly  aimed  at  defending  the  intentional  version  of  the  theory
against  total  demolition  by  automaticism.
2 27
It may now be  apparent that I  think my evidence  tells against  the inten-
tional  version  of the  descriptive  economic  theory  of  the  common  law.  The
challenge  posed  by  that  evidence  looks  simple  and  straight  enough:  If the
judges  are predominantly  guided by  an economic  norm when engaged  in for-
mulating  and  applying common  law  doctrine,  why  less  so when  formulating
and applying open public law doctrine?  If, on the other hand, judges respond
ambivalently  at  best  to  economic  norms  on  the  public  law  side,  why  not
likewise  on  the  common law  side?
It must be made clear that economic analysts who claim that in common-
law,  private-law,  adjudication judges intentionally  converge  on efficient solu-
tions  do  not  advance,  nor  are  they  logically  constrained  to  advance,  any
similar  claims  about legislators  (including  constitutional  framers)  engaged  in
devising  statutes  or constitutions.  Indeed,  it  is  characteristic  of economic  in-
221The  reason  is that  the  automatic  branch  depends  on  an  argument that rationally  self-
interested  private  agents  must,  in deciding  whether  to litigate  in an  effort  to modify  some  ex-
isting rule or doctrine,  use  calculations which will lead to more frequent  relitigation of inefficient
than  of efficient  legal  material.  But  in  regard  to public-law  doctrines  and  rules,  the  relevant
agents include  public officials  and collective  entities;  and as  to them,  the argument  from rational
self-interest  to more  frequent  relitigation  of  inefficient  material  may  not  hold.  (I  have  not  yet
tried  to work out  an  answer  to the  question whether  it holds or not.)
22'See  notes 229-30  infra & text accompanying.
227 SeeEcONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  Supra note  2, at 440.
1977-1978]INDIANA  LA W JOURNAL
terpretations  of  political  life  to make  an  antithetical  claim  about  legislative
behavior-that  legislative  action  is,  as  it  supposedly  must  be,  sold  to  par-
ticular  interests  rather  than  intentionally  dedicated  to  any  such  "neutral"
criterion  as efficiency. 22 8  This same  literature suggests  at least  the beginnings
of a theoretical explanation  for such  a perceived difference  between legislative
and  judicial  behaviors,  based  partly  on  the  institutionalized  insulation  of
judges from the usual incentives  of the marketplace  (by life tenure,  protection
against  reduction  of  emolument,  etc.)  and  the  consequent  replacement  of
those by other incentives  like peer approval  or protecting judicial jurisdiction
against  legislative  curtailment. 22  Approval  and  jurisdiction,  the  theory  sug-
gests,  will  seem  to  the judges  to be subject  to  maximization  by carrying  out
the  legislative  intent  where  one  is  reasonably  ascertainable  and  minimizing
waste  (isn't  everyone  against  waste?)2 30  where  one  is  not.  This  extended
economic  theory of official  behavior  of course cannot be impeached  by show-
ing that particular  statutes or  constitutional  provisions  are inefficient  as  they
come from  the hand  of the  legislator or framer.  The  question  is  whether  it
can  be  impeached  by  showing  that judges follow  some  star other  than  effi-
ciency  when  dealing with  open  constitutional  or  general  public-law  material
for which an ascertainable,  historical  intention  does not exist and a plausible,
efficiency-oriented  interpretation  does  exist.  Well,  why  not?  "Because,"  a
highly  individualistic  economist  might  say,  "you  can't  prove  anything  in-
teresting with evidence  so utterly unsurprising  and predictable.  Surely it is ut-
terly  unsurprising  that judges  adjudicating  public  law  questions  do  not treat
them  as problems  in  economics,  given  the extreme  difficulty  (not to  say im-
possibility)  of  producing  a  credible  economic  justification  for  the  modern
state.  Given that governmental  authority has grown  to  a size and sweep  which
seem  on  their  face  a  contradiction  of strictly  economic  normative  premises,
given that individualistic  economics  cannot credibly justify the historical reali-
ty of our  actual  practice of government,  how could  one expect  individualistic
economic  norms  to  account  for  the  interstitial  general  law  through  which
judges have  policed the distribution of power within  the governmental  sphere
or its  exercise  by  particular  organs?"
Conceding  that those would be forceful  questions,  are they any less  telling
if directed  against the claim that judges have historically done-  and  continue
to do-a semi-conscious  economic number  on  the common law?  The point is
that  the  very  set  of  constitutional  practices  within  which  judicial  authority
228See G.  STIGLER,  THE CITIZEN  AND THE  STATE  ch.  8  (1975);  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  supra note
2,  at  405-07.
2t See  EcONOMIC  ANALYSIS,  supra note 2,  at 401,  404-405,  409-10,  415-17;  Landes & Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L.  & EcON.  875  (1975).  See
POSNER  II  supra note  62,  at 351.  But see  Hirsch,  Book Review,  22  U.C.L.A.  REv.  980,  986-87
(1975).
21
3 See  EcONOMIC ANALYSIS,  supra  note 2,  at 181;  id. at 22  (suggesting that people speaking
of "injustice"  usually mean  "waste").
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arises-authority  to  adjudicate  both  public  and  private  disputes-is  one
which  seems  (at least  to strongly individualistic  economists) 2 31  to  belie  the no-
tion that efficiency  is  a  salient and  esteemed  social value in  the minds of the
politically influential  citizenry.  That seems  to cut the ground from  under  the
suggestion  that judges intentionally  aiming to please either  themselves,  or the
legislature,  or the peoople  at large,  would  most likely  fall  back on  efficiency
as  a  solvent  for  open  doctrinal  questions.  Or,  if the  suggestion  survives,  it
must  do  so  with  a  more  precise  (and  interesting) meaning  than  we  earlier
noticed  in  it:  It seems  that the judges'  reference  group,  the  folks  whom  the
judges aim to  please,  must consist of some sort  of elite who  are capable of ap-
preciating  the  goodness  of efficiency  even  while  the  masses  (or  other  elites)
whose  actions  actually shape  the country's  political  destiny apparently  do not.
No  doubt there are  sociological theories  available  to fill  out that model rather
nicely.  Still,  one  is  less sanguine  about the  availability of sociological  theories
which  will  explain  why the  reference  group  is  believed  by  the judges  to  de-
mand that only common-law,  and not  also open public-law,  issues  be resolved
in  the way  efficiency  calls for;  and  one  cannot  help  doubting  whether  this
elitist  theory  of judicial  reference  groups,  whatever  it  turns  out  to  be  in
detail,  is what  the intentional  theorists  have  actually  been  contemplating.
If not,  and if they  no  not wish  to embrace  it now,  there  is  always  open
the  possibility  of denying that the  welfare  state  constitution  is  anti-economic
in spirit or effect.  It has,  in fact,  already  been shown  how the Constitution is
not  logically  inexplicable  in  terms  of  those  same  individualistic  economic
premises  which  the intentional  theory  supposes  to  have  inspired  the develop-
ment  of the  common  law.
232  Contrary  to  first  appearances  and  the  conten-
tions of some (not all)  economists,  the state's  competence  can,  with at least  a
semblance  of  plausibility,  be  understood  as  a  "means  reasonably  (not
perfectly)  designed  to  promote"  the  several  self-interests  of  individual
citizens. 2 33  Earlier,  a  sophisticated  argument  (embracing  two  somewhat
related  sub-arguments)  was  reviewed  which  reconciles  the  individualistic
assumptions  of positive  economics  with  familiar  political  constitutions  in  a
way  such  that  efficiency-oriented  common-law  judging  can  be fitted  into  a
coherent  justification  of  contemporary  political  ideology  and  practice. 2 34
Reconciliation  by this route,  however,  comes only at a price:  The intentional
economic  theory  of  private  law  would  then  imply  (that  is,  positivistically
predict) judicial  adherence  to the normative  economic  (public choice)  model
of  the  Constitution.  Insofar  as  this  essay's  discussion  of the  public  purpose
23 1See,  e.g.,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS, supra note 2, chs.  11-13,  16,  19;  POSNER II, supra note 62,
at 336-40.
2"
2See notes  31-48 supra & text  accompanying.
2
1 3The quoted phrase was used by Professor  Posner in his first edition of ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS
OF  LAW  to  explain  the  economists'  methodological  assumption  of  rationally  self-interested
behavior.  See R.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  5 (1st  ed.  1973).  It  does not appear  in the
second  edition.  I  do  not know  why  not.
23
5See  notes  33-48 supra & text  accompanying.
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and  delegation  doctrines  succeeds in falsifying  this prediction from  the inten-
tional  economic  theory,  it  would  also,  to  a  like  extent,  falsify  that theory.
If that price  seems  too high,  the intentional  economic  theory  can still try
to  maintain  itself while rejecting  both  elitist  sociology  and  the plausibility of
normative  public  choice  theory.  Its  claim  then would  be  that judges  on the
private-law  side  try  to  make  the  law  efficient-or,  in  other  words,  waste-
minimizing-because  they  sense  that minimizing waste  is  something everyone
will  intuitively  like  and  applaud  (or,  at least,  that  assiduous  and  consistent
waste  minimization  will produce  long-run  results that everyone  will  like);  but
that nothing  analogous  happens  on  the public-law  side precisely  because the
normative  (public-choice)  economic  theory  of government  is  (as  shaped to fit
actual  institutions)  so weak and implausible  (not  to say fantastic) that judges
have  no  sense that  acting in  accordance  with  it will  win them  any  approval.
The problem  with that explanation  would lie not so much in its  rejecting, as
fantastic,  the  normative  economic  theory  of the  Constitution  (if and  as  ap-
plied  to justify  actual  constitutional  practices)  as  in  its  ready  acceptance  of
the plausibility of thinking that formulating and applying the common law by
the canon of efficiency will in fact work out (or will be popularly seen to work
out) in  a  way  that  is advantageous  for  (almost) everyone  in  the long  run.  A
full treatment  of the problem requires  a  careful development  and criticism  of
the  (likely)  precise  meaning  of "efficiency"  as used  in  the positive  economic
theory  of the  common  law,  and that  is  a  task  for  another  essay.
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